The 1995 review and extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by Morgan, Thomas et al.
ACDIS
Occasional
Paper
The 1995 Review and Extension of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
edited by
Thomas Morgan, Jason Zych and
Clifford E. Singer
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament,
and International Security
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
Research of the Program in Arms Control,
Disarmament, and International Security
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
December 1996
This publication is produced by the Program in Arms
Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The papers
in this volume were part of the requirements for the
ACDIS–Campus Honors Program course, LAS 295,
spring 1995.
The University of Illinois is an equal opportunity/
affirmative action institution.
ACDIS Publication Series:  ACDIS Swords and
Ploughshares is the quarterly bulletin of ACDIS and
publishes scholarly articles for a general audience.  The
ACDIS Occasional Paper series is the principle publication
to circulate the research and analytical results of faculty
and students associated with ACDIS.  Publications of
ACDIS are available upon request.
Published 1996 by ACDIS//ACDIS MOR:1.1996
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
359 Armory Building, 505 E. Armory Ave.
Champaign, IL 61820
The 1995 Review and Extension of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
Edited by
Thomas Morgan, Jason Zych, and
Clifford E. Singer
Arms Control and Disarmament and International Security Program
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
December 1996
iii
Contents
Preface v
Introduction:
The Non-Proliferation Treaty Dilemma
Clifford E. Singer 1
North Korea, by Emily Ryo
Cultural Background on North Korea 3
A Political Perspective on North Korea 8
The North Korean Nuclear Question 16
North Korea’s Position on Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 19
Iraq, by Jason Zych
An Explanation of Iraqi Culture 21
The Political Evolution of Contemporary Iraq 27
The Development of Iraq’s Nuclear Program 33
Iraq’s Position on Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 38
Iran, by Ben Halperin
Iranian Cultural Background 41
Iranian Politics From Khomeini to Rafsanjani 43
The Position of Iran on the Non-Proliferation Treaty 46
Israel, by Adam Ciralsky
Israeli Cultural Background 47
The Political and Nuclear Situation in Israel 50
The Position of Israel on the Non-Proliferation Treaty 56
Algeria, by Mitchell Rovner
The Cultural Background of Algeria 61
Algeria’s Troubled Political Situation 65
Algeria: From French Colony to Nuclear Proliferation Risk 69
Algeria’s Position on Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 72
Other Countries
The Position of France Toward the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by All n Toreja 75
Russia’s stand on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, by B tt Booth 76
Pakistan and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by Thomas Whittenhall 77
Mexico, Brazil, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by D ve Monti 77
iv—Contents
South Africa and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, by Paul Ta our 78
Kazakhstan and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by Steven Gunther 78
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
The International Atomic Energy Agency and The Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: A Critical
Review of Their Roles in the Present Non-Proliferation Regime, by K ndra Foltz 81
Appendix
Member States of the IAEA as of 1993 91
List of Acronyms 93
vPreface
The collection of papers in this volume result primarily from a study of the extension and review of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty by University of Illinois students enrolled in an ACDIS/Campus Honors Course (LAS
295) during spring 1995. Students participating in this review contributed papers analyzing the historical and
cultural background and the energy and national security postures of a few select countries that participated in the
international extension and review conference that led to indefinite extension of the NPT in the spring of 1995.
A background article written the year before by Kendra Foltz concerning the International Atomic Energy
Agency and the NPT is also included. A notable omission from the current collection is the separately published
report “Nuclear Confidence Building in South Asia,” (University of Illinois Program in Arms Control,
Disarmament, and International Security, June 1995) to which the research of nuclear engineering student
Thomas Morgan made substantial contributions.
Just before the conclusion of the 1995 international conference, a larger number of students contributed the
brief summaries included in the collection of positions they thought that several countries might take at the
conference. These students then represented these positions in two sessions that eventually recommended that the
NPT be extended for an indefinite number of ten-year periods, with review conferences every five years. Two
thirds of the initial delegates eventually voted for this option. By consensus, this group also adopted a request
that “the non signatories to the NPT are requested by the extension and review conference to propose, before the
next review conference, amendments to the treaty that would be sufficient for them to sign the treaty”.
The results of the 1995 extension of the NPT, the representations made by the nuclear weapons signatories
(China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and others committing to the negotiation of
a comprehensive nuclear test ban, and the resulting periodic review conferences will have implications for
international relations well into the future. Thus the background material presented here should be of continuing
interest.
In reading some of this material, it should be kept in mind that the contributors were asked to prepare
background material that illuminates points of view that might be taken by various countries with an interest in
the NPT, not to give their own views on the propriety of these positions. The extent to which they succeeded
the reader can judge, but it would not be fair to ascribe the views presented here to the authors themselves.
Contributors to the collection were Adam Ciralsky, Mitchell Rovner, Ben Halperin, Emily Ryo, and Jason
Zych. Contributions for the brief summary statements came from Brett Booth, Steven Gunther, Dave Monti,
Paul Tabour, Allen Toreja, and Thomas Whittenhall. Thomas Morgan, Jason Zych, and Clifford Singer
compiled and edited the collection with the assistance of the staff in the Program for Arms Control,
Disarmament, and International Security.
Clifford E. Singer
Professor of Nuclear Engineering
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and
International Security
University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign
1Introduction
The Non-Proliferation Treaty Dilemma
Clifford E. Singer
To what extent are historical outcomes determined by background events versus the idiosyncrasies of individual
personalities? This interesting question is difficult to answer because there is only one actual sequence of
historical events to analyze, not the many that would be needed to understand the different kinds of outcomes
that might have ensued had different personalities happen to have been involved in ordinary and key events. The
positions especially of Egypt and Mexico in the 1995 review and extension of the NPT are a particular case in
point. For these countries initially took positions at considerable odds with unconditional indefinite extension of
the NPT which was the goal of the United States, upon which these countries had particularly acute financial
reliance at the time. This was perhaps in part because of the personal views of persons of influence in these
countries’ governments. It could be equally argued that the partial success of these views was in part beholden to
particular personalities or that these views had very little success because background events overwhelmed
individual’s views.
One method of dealing with this question, albeit a highly imperfect one, is to set up simulations of key
events that run in parallel with those that history will record, provide the participants with as much historical
background as practicable on the views of those whose actions run in parallel with their own, and see how the
simulation outcomes differ from the events recorded by history. Contemporaneous simulations of this type can
try to avoid the trap of “wisdom of hindsight” where Monday morning quarterbacks are allowed the luxury of
trying primarily to avoid the mistakes of the actual participants. What follows is a brief account of one such
simulation.
A University of Illinois Liberal Arts and Sciences Honors Seminar met with a class of nuclear engineers in
two sessions ending on 27 April 1995, to simulate the ongoing Extension and Review Conference for the NPT.
This group produced two results.
* The Non-proliferation Treaty was extended for an indefinite number of ten-year periods, with review
conferences every five years. Two thirds of the initial delegates eventually voted for this option.
* By consensus, the conference adopted a request that “the non signatories to the NPT are requested by
the extension and review conference to propose, before the next review conference, amendments to the treaty
that would be sufficient for them to sign the treaty”.
These results followed three month’s study and the preparation of a series of three in-depth background
papers and a conference position document by each of the Honor’s program participants. The nuclear engineering
group members had also prepared brief conference position documents after three month’s study of military uses
of nuclear energy and research into the position of a number of participating countries.
These results were reached within the allotted two conference sessions, but not without considerable
difficulty. A record of the motions made and votes cast follows. A complete set of the background papers, as
well as a background paper on the IAEA, is also included.
These are the motions made and votes taken at the NPT extension and review simulation:
1. Concerned about activities in Japan and South Korea, North Korea proposed an amendment to the
treaty banning the reprocessing of plutonium. All other participants voted no except for a yes vote by Egypt
and an abstention by the United States.
2. A straw poll on the nuclear weapons states’ position for simple indefinite extension of the treaty
yielded 1/2 “no,” 1/3 “yes,” and 1/6 “maybe” votes.
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At the request of Iraq and Egypt, Iran revised a qualified one-year extension proposal to one for an
unqualified fixed term, two-year extension. After this proposal failed, Iran announced its intention to
withdraw from the treaty and participated in no further votes.
4. Algeria’s proposal for a ten-year rolling extension with reviews every five years failed to obtain the
required majority when the United States cast an abstention as the final vote counted.
5. The U.S. back-up position for a simple twenty-five year rolling extension failed, even after Mexico
changed its initial pass vote to a yes.
6. Algeria’s proposal was then re-balloted. The final approval of two thirds of the initial attendees was
obtained when Mexico changed its pass to an abstention and then a “yes,” and Kazakhstan changed its pass
to a “no” and then a “yes”. The United States had been forced to change its pass to a “yes” vote to avoid the
conference adjourning with no extension of the treaty.
Although limited to twelve voting participants (Algeria, Brazil, Egypt, France, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan,
Mexico, North Korea, Russia, South Africa, and the United States) and three ex-officio participants (India,
Israel, and Pakistan), this simulation brought out some essential features of the flavor and arguments reported
from the actual conference occurring simultaneously in New York. The driving forces behind the adoption of a
ten-year rolling extension with periodic review were two-fold. First, non-weapons signatories other than
Kazakhstan felt the need for some measure of continuing pressure on the nuclear weapons states to pursue the
latter’s obligations under Article VI of the treaty: “Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and
to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.” Second, the majority of the participants felt that the NPT is too useful to take a chance
on a fixed finite extension precipitating the negotiation of a more comprehensive or effective treaty.
The request for suggestions for treaty amendments was an attempt to get beyond India’s continual
restatement simply that the treaty is discriminatory, Pakistan’s insistence that India sign first, and Israel’s
generic concerns about safeguards, adequacy, and other weapons of mass destruction.
Generically, the final outcome of a rolling extension with periodic review is a plausible outcome of the
actual conference under a secret ballot. The lack of any practical mechanism in the simulation for linkage
between conference issues and other international diplomacy perhaps best approximated the effects of that voting
method. (The information available to the participants at their final session suggested that an open vote at the
actual conference was more likely to occur and to result in an indefinite extension, as was indeed the case in the
actual conference.)
The participation of Brett Booth, Adam Ciralsky, Mitchell Rovner, Steven Gunther, Ben Halperin, James
Kapernakas, David Monti, Thomas Morgan, Emily Ryo, Paul Tabour, Allen Toreja, Thomas Whittenhall, and
Jason Zych is gratefully acknowledged. Background information for the Honors Seminar participants was also
provided by Stephen Cohen, Mark Leff, John Lepingwell, Clifford Singer, and Marvin Weinbaum.
3North Korea
Emily Ryo
Cultural Background on North Korea
In February 1990, the IAEA told North Korea it wanted to conduct “special inspections” of the two nuclear
waste sites at Yongbyon, a nuclear complex about 100 kilometers (km) from Pyongyang. Then in March 1990,
North Korea declared that it would withdraw from the NPT rather than comply with the demand for special
inspections by the IAEA. For a country that maintains such deep-seated hostility and suspicion toward many
countries such as the United States and Japan, divulging the secrets of its nuclear program was likely seen as a
threat to its national security (Kihl 1994, 334). In this sense, North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship was largely
brought about by its fierce desire to maintain at all costs its political autonomy against any foreign
intervention. The position that North Korea takes, and will take in the future about the issues of nuclear
armament is dependent on many factors, including to what degree these feelings of antagonism and mistrust
toward the world community will be felt and maintained by the North Koreans. The purpose of this paper is to
explore the historical origin and the nature of this highly isolationistic and nationalistic mentality of the North
Koreans. I offer a brief history of Korea, with a focus on the impact of Japanese colonialism on North Korean
national ideology, and the effects and lessons of the Korean War for the North Koreans. This historical
framework is provided in order to trace and contextualize Kim Il Sung’s political ideology, which shapes many
aspects of North Korean culture. Finally, to gain a deeper understanding of how these ideologies play themselves
out in the lives of North Koreans, I investigate the ways in which they are reflected and applied in the various
North Korean social and economic organizations.
Korea is a peninsular state located in a corner of Northeast Asia. It has been the object of constant invasion
by its surrounding neighbors as the neighboring peoples in the north tried to make this land the bridgehead for
their maritime expansion, while the ocean states wanted to secure Korea as their advance base for the invasion of
the continent. Much of the pre-modern Korean history can be explained by the term, “Hermit Kingdom,”
referring to the seclusion policy that was implemented by Korea’s last dynasty, the Yi dynasty (1392–1910) to
secure Korea’s national sovereignty against these constantly invading neighbors. This seclusion policy gave rise
to almost five hundred years of seclusion, and all throughout the Yi dynasty, Korea’s sense of national identity
took on an increasingly inward-looking, isolationist orientation. This policy came to an end when, during the
second half of the nineteenth century, Korea was taken over by Japan (Kihl 1994, 21). Emboldened by their
triumph of the Sino–Japanese war (1894–1895), Japan set out to conquer Korea. Consequently, upon conclusion
of the protectorate treaty in 1905, Korea officially came under the Japanese rule. Throughout its thirty–six years
of domination, Japanese colonial policy denied all political rights to Koreans, and forced them to undergo a
thorough cultural assimilation (Choy 1971, 40).
Against this colonial oppression, Koreans carried out a strong anti-Japanese movement, which was also
carried overseas, spreading mainly to the Koreans living in the United States and China. This movement was
largely promoted by two social groups: intellectual middle-class patriots, including former government officials
of the Yi dynasty and some Confucian scholars; and leftist intellectuals, later including some indigenous Korean
Communists. Although largely unsuccessful, this resistance against the Japanese colonialism did have the
crucial effect of “stimulating, not eradicating deep-rooted Korean nationalism” (Kim 1983, 23). Indeed, the
memories of this painful colonial period remained deep within the Korean consciousness, as they came to play
out a critical role in the later years of the nation-building that Kim Il Sung instituted. For example, during the
late 1940s, eradicating the “remnants of the Japanese imperialism” became a focal point upon which the North
Koreans were taught to think of “patriotic democracy,” and “anti-imperialism” (Kihl 1994, 42).
In 1945, the Japanese colonialism of Korea came to an end, but not through activities of the Korean
revolutionaries. The liberation came only when the Soviets declared war on Japan and the Russian combat
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troops entered North Korea. The United States wanted to prevent the occupation of all Korea by the Soviets, and
thus after an extended Soviet–U.S. negotiation, Korea was divided up into north and south of the latitude thirty-
eight. With this division, the Soviets established their authority over the whole of North Korea and worked
toward organizing a strong pro-Soviet Communist party. (Scalapino and Kim 1983, 20).
In the following years, the Soviet authorities employed various strategies to “Sovietize” North Korea. Until
the Soviet occupation, Kim Il Sung had been an obscure figure, who was little known in Korea. At this time,
the extent of his past nationalist activities was his role in leading an anti-Japanese force with the Chinese
Communist guerrillas in Manchuria. Faced with a lack of interest on the part of the indigenous Korean
Communists to seek cooperation with them, the Soviet authorities began to look elsewhere for a figure whom
they could work with to consolidate competing factions within North Korea. Kim had received training with the
Chinese and Soviet Communist Party during the 1930s, and this was enough for the Soviets to begin
promoting and popularizing Kim as the new North Korean leader (Suh 1988, 63).
Thereafter, all of the Soviet administrative directives and decisions were executed through Kim, which made
him a pivotal link between the Korean people and the occupation forces (Suh 1988, 72). The Soviets used Kim
in accomplishing their objectives of organizing a mass party, instituting Communist reforms, and creating a
military unit to support the system they instituted. In 1947 when the Soviet forces were beginning to withdraw
from North Korea, Kim was elected as the chairman of a new People’s Committee, and in the subsequent years
until his death in 1994, Kim managed to consolidate and dominate all aspects of North Korea’s political, social,
and cultural resources. According to Suh Dae-Sook, “[Kim’s] control is so complete that his every wish has
become the command of his subjects” (Suh 1988, 53).
One critical event that marked and shaped Kim Il Sung’s four decades of power in North Korea was the
Korean War. In the aftermath of Soviet withdrawal from North Korea in 1948, the Korean People’s Army was
formally established to fill the vacuum left by the Soviet forces. For Kim Il Sung, who saw the South Korean
government as just another political faction and wanted to bring about a merger of the South Korean assembly
with the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea, military reunification was the most efficient means. On
25 June 1950, the North Korean ground forces, supported by Russian-made tanks and artillery crossed the thirty–
eighth parallel and advanced without much resistance from the South Korean forces. South Korea’s capital,
Seoul, was in the hands of the North Korean army within four days. In reaction, the United States immediately
dispatched military aid to the South Korean government and sought support of the sixteen other UN nations. In
response to this action by the United States, China also entered the war on the side of the North Koreans. In
justifying its action, China explained that it would not “supinely tolerate” an invasion of North Korea (Choy
1971, 296–297). When a stalemate occurred in 1951, truce negotiations began in the last months of the same
year. What emerged from these negotiations was merely another reaffirmation of the thirty–eighth parallel, with
worsened tensions between the two Koreas, as well as among those countries that had been involved in the war
(Choy 1971, 300–301).
For Kim Il Sung, the Korean War was a devastating experience. When the Chinese entered the fight, they
demanded that Kim stay clear of their management of the war. Peng Dehuai, who commanded the Chinese
volunteers, was reported to have told Kim that he, and not Kim was in charge of the war. In fact, the Chinese
takeover of the Korean War was so comprehensive that the United States dealt primarily with the Chinese and
not with Kim Il Sung (Suh 1988, 138). Kim had mobilized the North Koreans to fight against the South
Koreans, but the fate of Korea was once again decided by the non-Koreans, leaving the country war devastated
and still divided. This was a painful lesson for Kim Il Sung, and this event was particularly important in
strengthening his view that foreign intervention was the cause of many internal problems for Korea (Suh 1988,
140).
With these broad historical developments as a framework, I will now explore some of the most salient
characteristics of the North Korean culture. Because North Korea was closed to foreign visitors until the late
1980s, first-hand accounts or systematic studies of North Korea are rare. Furthermore, because of the politically
charged nature of the North–South division, much of the existing literature is largely produced as forms of
political propaganda. In taking into account this highly polemical nature of the discourse, a critical look at the
existing literature reveals an enduring official political ideology called Juche, that dominates all aspects of North
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Korean life. In the North Korean constitution, there is a formal declaration of Juche, establishing it as the
official national decree: “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is guided in its activity by the Juche idea
of the Workers’ Party of Korea, which is a creative application of Marxism-Leninism to our country’s reality”
(Article 4).
In Kim’s own words, the idea of Juche can be summarized in the following way: “. . . a world outlook
that centres on man, placing man in the centre of all thinking and making everything serve him. It is a
revolutionary theory designed to bring about the independence of the working masses” (Report to the Sixth
Congress 1980, 29). As expressed here, the Juche idea places men in the position of being the masters of the
world, and the masters of their own destiny. This belief in the “independent” state of men, in turn, translates
into a principle of political independence called chaju. According to chaju, “every state has equal rights and the
right of self-determination” (Suh 1988, 103). What emerges from this belief is a unique North Korean
nationalism, which emphatically denounces the “contaminating” nature of foreign contact. For example,
“flukeyism” is considered one of the greatest dangers threatening the “development of national culture” in North
Korea. The only remedy to flukeyism is then, instituting the national ideology of Kim Il Sung: “. . . an
intellectual should have a firm faith in Juche and thus he will not be so influenced. . . . But one should value
one’s own things more wonderful and should not consider that having foreign goods is good” (Mukherjee 1983,
259). In this way, Juche gives support to that part of North Korean nationalism that looks upon foreign
influences with great suspicion and hostility.
In disseminating the Juche idea nationally, education plays a critical role in North Korea. North Korean
publications claim that as early as 1972, it established a universal eleven-year compulsory education, and that
today there is no illiteracy (Bok 1986, 29). The basic aim of this compulsory education is stated by Kim Il
Sung as being, “We regard as the core of education the implementation of the socialist pedagogical doctrine”. In
turn, the fundamental principle of this socialist pedagogy is “to make men revolutionary, working-class and
communist” (Sung, VI 1971–72, 262). In accordance with this objective, the content of North Korean education
stresses two main principles. First, an emphasis is laid on teaching the students the Juche idea: “Schools teach
students the principle of the Juche idea and our Party’s policies and revolutionary traditions that are an
embodiment of the Juche idea”. Second, “patriotism” is taught as an essential component of forming the “noble
mental and moral qualities: Communist education is intensified to cultivate in them . . . qualities such as
fervent love for our socialist homeland, bitter hatred for imperialism and class enemies” (Bok 1986, 72).
The North Korean education is self-proclaimed as being a “universal, free education”. By “universal,” North
Korea is referring to the fact that its educational program is uniform, and that it embraces all members of the
society. For example, members of the younger generation are supposed to receive the same education at
kindergartens and at primary and secondary schools: “All younger generations of our country receive one and the
same perfect general secondary education during the compulsory education” (Bok 1986, 31). Furthermore, North
Korean education also provides the same education for its working adult members, by granting free study-while-
working educational institutions. In order to encourage greater attendance, the state gives full pay to the officials
and workers enlisted in the study-while-working educational institutions. The outcome of these educational
policies is the ability of the North Korean government to effectively disseminate highly uniform, and
homogenous ideologies that embrace the large masses of the North Korean population (Bok 1986, 31).
The second characteristic component of Juche lies in its support for the idea of “collectivism”. The
emphasis on the independence of men, as espoused in the Juche idea does not rest on the Western notion of
individualism, but rather, on the idea that independence can only be realized on the basis of cooperation among
all men in society. According to the Juche idea, emphasis on the individual’s self-interest has led to “the
exploitation of man by man, to innumerable miseries of mankind and has perpetuated the inequality of man”.
Therefore, in the North Korean national ideology, the capitalist countries (such as England and the United
States, where emphasis is put on the individual and not on the collective) “create misery for the masses of the
people” (Mukherjee 1983, 23).
In this regard, many of the social organizations found in North Korea uphold the “supremacy of the
collective interests over the personal ones”. The traditional family bonds in North Korea are looked upon as a
source of “selfish individualism”. Kim Il Sung has repeatedly condemned family-centered thinking as a source of
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“localism” and “factionalism,” which undermines the principle of collectivism (Mukherjee 1983, 115). For
example, every woman in North Korea is obligated to join an organization affiliated with the Worker’s Party, as
well as become involved in productive labor and in other socialist activities outside the home. According to Kim
Il Sung, such an involvement would minimize their role as housewives, making them become part of the larger
social collective than just their own family circles.
The idea of collectivism is also embodied in the general economic organization of North Korea. The
collectivization of agriculture and the abolition of privately owned business and industry in 1946 resulted in a
very simplified occupational structure in North Korea, with only four occupational classifications—laborers,
office workers, farmers, and military personnel. Within this system, what is emphasized is not individual
economic incentives, but rather, the “political and ideological unity that binds them to the collective whole”
(Mukherjee 1983, 115). According to Kim Il Sung, “The most important thing in labour administration is to do
political work properly so that all the working people work willingly, conscientiously and strenuously” (Sung,
V, 277). A contrast is often made between the Japanese colonial system where people hated work, and Kim Il
Sung’s vision of a collectivized economy, where the people are actuated with a “proper motive,” which is to
work for the revolution, not for money.
Finally, North Korean nationalism is also evident in the ways in which the Juche idea views art. The Juche
idea stresses the importance of the creative ability of men and displaying them to their fullest potential: “The
level of development in a country is directly related to the creative ability of the people in that country”
(Mukherjee 1983, 19). The goal and the method of encouraging creativity and art, however, take on a different
meaning in North Korea. First, the arts are strongly and intricately interwoven with the politics in North Korea,
as they serve a specific political role. In the words of two professors who teach at Kim Il Sung University, “the
North Korean government is wary of the principle of art for art’s sake, the naturalistic tendency to recognize
only the artistic value of a work to the detriment of its ideological significance” (Sik and Hun 1980, 24). For
example, according to one account of a South Korean professor who was allowed to visit North Korea during the
1980s, “The political overtones were always present (in the performing arts), and nothing was done without
praising and acknowledging the leadership and guidance of the “Great Leader, Kim Il Sung” (Kim and Koh 1983,
17).
In employing the arts as a form of mass political propaganda, North Korea boasts of their “non-elitist” art.
For example, in North Korea, such buildings as theaters, cinemas, cultural centers, libraries and museums that
are supposedly readily accessible to the public are said to be numerous in number. However, the primary task in
constructing such places is to render an “absolutely accurate description of the glorious revolutionary history of
our respected Leader (Kim Il Sung) to the end of time and to heed his teaching” (Sik and Hun 1980, 23). As part
of its political function, the arts are also extensively used to instill a sense of cultural pride in North Koreans.
For example, Korean traditional music is repeatedly described in North Korean publications as possessing
“grace, beauty, and flexibility” that cannot be matched by the “corrupting” influences of American jazz, dance
and pop music in South Korea (Mukherjee 1983, 258).
In addition to the educational, economical, and cultural practices, North Korean nationalism is also reflected
in its relationship with foreign nations, as well as with South Korea. For the past several decades, North Korea
maintained a strict isolationist approach to foreign politics. In recent years, however, there were several attempts
at normalizing relations with some of the foreign powers. For example, in the late 1980s, North Korea was
involved in a series of negotiations with Japan, for the purpose of normalizing diplomatic relations. These
negotiations were prompted by South Korean President Roh Tae Woo’s “special declaration of northern policy—
the Nordpolitik, which expressed Seoul’s willingness to help its friendly neighbors improve relations with
North Korea. Immediately after President Roh’s declaration, Japan proposed opening a dialogue with North
Korea, but North Korea’s initial response to the Japanese overture was negative. North Korea insisted that Japan
abandon its pro–Seoul and anti–Pyongyang policy, and criticized the Japan–Republic of Korea (ROK)
normalization treaty of 1965 in which Japan had recognized South Korea as the “sole legal” government on the
Korean peninsula (Kihl 1994, 114).
It was only after the Prime Minister of Japan, Takeshita Noboru, expressed his “deep remorse and regret to
Koreans for Japan’s past actions on the Korean peninsula,” that Kim Il Sung consented to a preliminary
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conference. A year later, in 1990, there were three rounds of negotiations between Japan and North Korea. All
three rounds of talk, however, resulted in frustration because of a number of thorny issues. One of the big
stumbling blocks was a disagreement on the nature and scope of Japan’s compensation to North Korea for the
period of colonial rule (Kihl 1994, 112). North Korea insisted that Japan should compensate North Korea for
Japan’s colonial rule over Korea in the pre-World War II period. In addition, North Korea demanded a Japanese
compensation for the forty–five years following World War II, on the grounds that Japan had been responsible
for the division of Korea. Japan, on the other hand, rejected North Korea’s contention. Nakahira Noboru, the
chief Japanese negotiator, maintained that although Japan was willing to compensate for the damage done to
Koreans during the colonial period, there was no legal ground for Japan to compensate for the alleged losses
arising from “abnormal” relations between Japan and North Korea in the postwar period (Kihl 1994, 119). These
conflicting interests blocked any further progress in the subsequent attempts at negotiation, and as of mid-June
1993, the dates for the next round of talks are yet unknown (Kihl 1994, 123).
The second issue that has become a critical testing ground for North Korean nationalism is the problems of
reunification with South Korea. In the past, North Korea had continually portrayed South Korea as a puppet of
the United States and Japan, with its regime being a fascist gang that encouraged a permanent division of the
peninsula. In this view, North Korea was seen as the only legitimate Korean government in Korea (Kihl 1994,
169). Furthermore, even today North Korea believes that war is a continuation of a policy of class interests, and
that as long as imperialism exists, war will occur. Accordingly, North Korea has developed a policy of “arming
the entire people, for the objective of guarding—through the efforts of the people—the socialist fatherland from
the invasion of imperialist aggressors and class enemies” (Scalapino and Kim 1983, 139). The theme that a “war
could occur at any moment” appears consistently in its literature. This attitude has made North Korea wary of all
foreign contact and influence, including that of the South Koreans.
In looking at the broad patterns of North Korean culture, there are two themes that emerge consistently.
One theme stresses the national superiority of Koreans—a sentiment that goes hand in hand with the fierce
criticism and hostility toward foreign influence. For Koreans, this is a natural reaction to their past
victimization by the big powers that surrounded the peninsula. In order to survive in such an environment and to
maintain national sovereignty, national unity is seen as being critical. And herein also lies the second defining
character of North Korean nationalism: Unity requires a rallying symbol, which became personified in Kim Il
Sung. Kim Il Sung’s leadership was such that the culture of North Korea was thoroughly permeated with what
many refer to as the “cult of personality” (worship of Kim Il Sung). With his sudden death in 1994, and
succession of his son, Kim Jong Il, to power, the question as to whether this unity can be maintained has
become a critical question that still remains to be answered.
Before predicting an inevitable course toward disintegration for North Korean nationalism, there are two
issues that must always be kept in mind. First, all throughout Kim Il Sung’s rule, Kim Jong Il had been
ingrained in the North Korean minds as the “Beloved Leader Comrade”. That is, the early indoctrination of Kim
Jong Il as the unquestioned successor of Kim Il Sung had been forged deeply in the minds of North Koreans, and
in this sense, preservation of North Korean nationalism does not appear as dim as it does from the outside.
Finally, North Korean nationalism was founded largely on its historical experience with imperialism, and for a
country that has held such complete control over the ideological consciousness of its people for so many
generations, this aspect of their culture is an enduring factor that cannot be easily dismissed even with Kim Il
Sung’s death.
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A Political Perspective on North Korea
According to an Asian domino theory, if North Korea is allowed to go nuclear, then South Korea and Japan will
follow—all of which would create serious strains on Asia–Pacific stability. Concerning the role of North Korea
in this potential nuclear proliferation, Peter Hayes goes so far as to say, “Korea is the fuse on the nuclear
powder keg in the Pacific” (Kihl 1994, 29). Given the rapidly increasingly global economic and political role
that the Asia–Pacific nations have now come to play, the ramification of their nuclear strategy in Asia would
also echo throughout the world. In order to understand what drove North Korea to its nuclear brinkmanship in
1993, as well as to predict its future course of action, the political status of North Korea with respect to the
former Soviet Union, China, Japan, the United States, and South Korea must be examined. The purpose of this
paper is twofold: First, I investigate the general attitude and the broad development of diplomatic ties of each of
these countries to North Korea; and second, using this framework, I describe each of these countries’ nuclear
position in general, and toward North Korea in particular.
The Soviet Union and North Korea
The Soviet Union was the first among the nations to acknowledge North Korea when it was founded in
September 1948. During the Korean War (1950–1953) Stalin supported North Korea’s effort to unify the
country by military means, giving North Korea economic and military aid throughout the war. Originally,
Moscow’s ties to North Korea were based on two factors. First, at the heart of the Soviet–North Korean
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relationship was the ideological connection between the Korean Communist leader Kim Il Sung and the doctrine
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Second, there was the economic and strategic trade-off between
the two countries. For North Korea, the Soviet Union was an important provider of advanced weapons as well as
a critical political ally in the face of what North Koreans perceived as “security threats” from such countries as
the United States. In turn, in the pre-Cold War era, the principle strategic function of North Korea for the Soviet
Union was to deny the part of the Korean peninsula that adjoined Soviet territory to potential enemies (Clough
1987, 242). Since then however, the policy of the Soviet Union toward North Korea has been marked by
changes and instability.
The Soviets continued to give North Korea economic and military aid until their relationship started to
undergo dramatic changes after Gorbachev began initiating his reforms in the mid-1980s. In fact, in the post-
Korean War period (1954–1960) the Soviet Union provided grants and credits totaling 1.3 billion rubles. (North
Korea still owes 2.2 billion rubles to the former Soviet Union). The Soviets also dispatched six thousand
technicians and experts to help rebuild the North Korean economy, and more than twenty thousand students from
North Korea were trained in various institutions of higher education in the Soviet Union in the 1950s and
1960s. During this time, the Soviet Union was the source of 60 percent of North Korea’s electric power, 33
percent of its iron and steel, 60 percent of its petrochemical products, and 40 percent of its textile goods (Kihl
1994, 91).
After the death of Stalin and the de-Stalinization initiated by Nikita Khrushchev in 1956, the leader of North
Korea, Kim Il Sung, had to face up to many factional struggles in North Korean politics. He used Stalin’s tactic
of setting one faction against another to purge the pro-Soviet faction and the Chinese faction. In the end, he was
able to institute his own national ideology, called Juche. According to a former deputy minister of internal
affairs in the North Korean government, who was later exiled to the Soviet Union, Juche ideology “has nothing
to do with the ideology of Marxism or Leninism; it is Kim’s own ideology based on Korean tradition and his
own cult of personality” (Kihl 1994, 91). Thus the ideological bond between the Soviet Union and North Korea
ceased to exist with Stalin’s death, and it was formally declared dead in 1992 by the Russian leader Boris
Yeltsin.
The growing gap between the Soviet Union and North Korea widened in the 1980s following the economic
and political reforms that Mikhail Gorbachev brought to the Soviet Union. When Gorbachev assumed leadership
of the Soviet Union in March of 1985, he initiated dramatic domestic and foreign policies that came to be
embodied in the following three concepts: perestroika (economic and society-oriented political restructuring),
glasnost (frank public dialogue and self-criticism of past mistakes), and novoe myshlenie (“New Thinking”
aimed at restructuring the current international system). These policies changed the Soviet–North Korean
relationship dramatically. The strategic interests of the Soviet Union during the Cold War years now became
economic interests during the Gorbachev years (1985–1991).
In addition to these developments within the Soviet Union, there were also changes in the policies of the
South Korean government that drew the Soviet Union closer to it, which inevitably alienated North Korea in the
process. In 1988, Korean President Roh Tae Woo issued his 7 July “Northern Policy” (Nordpolitik), in which
he called for improvements in relations with the socialist countries, especially with the Soviet Union and
China. As a result South Korean overseas investment and markets with the Soviet Union expanded widely as
South Korea showed a willingness to provide a $3 billion loan for economic cooperation. In June of 1990 a
Soviet–South Korean summit was held in San Francisco, leading to a normalization of relations between the
two on 30 September 1990 (Kihl 1994, 92).
In contrast, the Soviet–North Korean relationship deteriorated dramatically during the 1980s and 1990s.
North Korea was important to the Soviet Union when it served Soviet strategic interests, but with the emphasis
on economic reforms, it was now South Korea that became important for them. For example, the Soviet Union
as North Korea’s largest trade partner (about 57 percent of total trade as late as 1990) virtually vanished in 1991.
The two-way trade for the first six months of 1991 dropped to 1.2 percent of the same period in 1990. There was
also a drastic reduction of Soviet supply of cheap oil (from 800 thousand tons in 1987 to 25 thousand tons in
1992) that dealt a severe blow to the already fledgling North Korean economy. In addition, beginning in 1991,
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the Soviet Union told North Korea it would have to start servicing its debt to Moscow (estimated at about $4.6
billion) and to start trading in hard currency (Kihl 1994, 53).
Despite these growing ideological and economic differences between the Soviet Union and North Korea, the
Soviet Union did not completely sever its relations with North Korea. For example, the treaty of friendship and
mutual assistance that had been concluded in July 1961 was automatically renewed in July 1991 for ten more
years. However, according to Ilpyong Kim, current Russian policy in Korea is “oriented toward peace and
stability in East Asia rather than toward military conflict” (Kihl 1994, 93). For example, Yeltsin announced in
Seoul in November 1992 that Moscow would consider repealing an article in the treaty of friendship and mutual
assistance that provided for the automatic intervention of Russia in the event of a war involving either North
Korea or Russia. Moreover in 1988, Gorbachev proposed a nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia. Accordingly, in
1993, when North Korea’s threat to withdraw from the NPT became an international crisis, Moscow took a
critical position toward North Korea, publicly denouncing North Korean intransigence (Attar 1993, 106).
China and North Korea
Unlike the Soviet Union, before the 1950s China participated very little, if at all, in North Korean politics. By
1958, however, a state of equilibrium between the Soviet and Chinese influence was reached in North Korea.
Contributing factors to the reduction of the Soviet and the concomitant increase of the Chinese influence in
North Korea were: 1) the successful seizure of power in China by Mao Zedong, whose world outlook was
largely shared by Kim Il Sung, 2) the massive intervention of Chinese troops on the side of North Korea during
the Korean War, when the Soviets were slowly pulling out, 3) the continued presence of the Chinese army in
North Korea following the 1953 armistice, 4) the reduction of Soviet aid and increase of Chinese assistance to
North Korea during and after the Korean War, and 5) the death of Stalin and subsequent de-Stalinization, and the
Soviet policies of peaceful coexistence with the West.
The growing affinity between China and North Korea was clearly witnessed when the Soviet Union and
China began their respective campaigns for support in the communist world. That is, in the late 1950s and
1960s, there was a growing rift between the Soviet Union and China over such issues as the Soviet–Yugoslav
rapprochement, the Sino–Indian border dispute, and the Cuban missile crisis. Initially, North Korea tried to steer
a neutral course in the worsening relations between the Soviet Union and China—mainly because of
Pyongyang’s desperate need for economic and military assistance from both Moscow and Beijing. However,
beginning in 1963, North Korea began to criticize the “modern revisionism” of the Soviet Union, a term with
which the Chinese were also criticizing the Soviets.
North Korean criticism of the Soviet Union reached its peak with Kim Il Sung’s denouncement of
Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence with the West. For example, the Soviet Union’s “retreat” in the
1962 Cuban crisis gave North Korea a good reason to question Moscow’s seeming willingness to “sacrifice” the
interests of other communist countries in the interest of its policy to normalize its relations with Washington.
At the same time, Beijing’s more militant policy toward the United States appeared to offer North Korea more
protection, for Kim Il Sung had long believed that the United States was still an imperialist country bent on
“obstructing the unification of North and South Korea” by stationing its troops in South Korea (Park, Koh, and
Kwak 1987, 173). In testimony to this growing friendliness between China and North Korea, there were frequent
visits to China by top-level North Korean government officials in the 1960s and 1970s. For example, in 1975
Kim Il Sung visited China, where he was given an elaborate reception as well as a chance to renew a personal
relationship with Deng Xiaoping. During this visit, Kim even obtained Chinese recognition of North Korea as
“the sole legal sovereign state of the Korean nation” (Clough 1987, 267).
During the 1980s and 1990s, however, the relationship between China and North Korea underwent a
transformation because of the changing domestic and international policies of China. As in the Soviet Union,
China’s changed policy during this time meant an emergence of the priorities that stressed economic
development. These changes led to a greater devotion on the part of the Chinese to deepen their domestic and
international economic reforms, which eventually led to an increased effort to initiate a measured opening to the
outside world. For instance, because of the Chinese economic reforms, Sino–South Korean trade steadily
increased whereas Sino–North Korean trade stagnated. In 1984 and 1985, China’s trade with South Korea, as a
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percentage of China’s total volume, easily surpassed that with the North. Sino–North Korean trade decreased
from 1.01 percent to 0.79 percent, whereas the total volume of Sino–South Korean trade made a quantum jump
in the period 1986–1989. For example, by 1989, China’s trade with South Korea reached more than $3 billion,
almost ten times that with North Korea. As a result of these growing trade negotiations between China and
South Korea, in August of 1992, their diplomatic relationship was also officially normalized.
Although these increasing ties with South Korea by China invariably had the effect of alienating North
Korea, the diplomatic relationship between China and North Korea still persisted on a friendly basis. For
example, in his thirty-eighth visit to Beijing in October 1991, Kim Il Sung was reportedly warmly welcomed
by Deng Xiaoping who promised political support to the North Korean regime even after Kim’s son, Kim Jong
Il, succeeded him. According to one North Korean national newspaper, Kim Il Sung’s visit was described in the
following way, “The main objective of Chairman Kim Il Sung’s visit is to further strengthen the traditional
friendship between the two parties, the two states, and the two peoples. . . . Regardless of whatever change
may take place in the international situation, the friendship between China and the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea will not change, and will remain permanent” (Kihl 1994, 102).
In short, the current relationship between China and North Korea can be characterized as being a mixture of
traditional ties and increasingly diverging economic and political interests. For instance, during the nuclear crisis
in which North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT, Beijing initially insisted that it “was not clear
about the scope of North Korea’s nuclear development program”. At the same time, the Chinese government
publicly stated that it did not want to see “any nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula” and expressed hope
that “all related parties will resolve that problem through negotiations for the goal of making the Korean
peninsula a nuclear-free zone” (Kihl 1994, 100). In the recent years, it appears that the approach that China is
taking toward North Korea is that of a cautious and moderate alliance. On the one hand, China pledged to
guarantee North Korea’s territorial integrity even as it underscores the North’s military vulnerability and
economic weakness. On the other hand, China publicly warned that North Korea should end its diplomatic
isolation and reform its economic structure. In this vain, China has been encouraging other nations to adopt a
moderate policy that will induce North Korea to open itself to the outside world.
Japan and North Korea
Historically bilateral relations between North Korea and Japan have been hostile. Japan’s Korea policy in the
post-World War II period was laid down at the time of the Japanese–South Korean normalization treaty in 1965.
In the treaty, Japan recognized the government of South Korea as the “sole legal” government of Korea as
defined by UN General Assembly Resolution 195 (III) in 1948. (This UN Resolution recognized the South
Korean government as a “lawful government,” and that “. . . this is the only Government in Korea) (Kihl
1994, 112, 302). After normalizing relations with South Korea, Japan virtually ruled out diplomatic relations
with North Korea and limited Japanese contacts to a minimum. Except for a modest amount of trade carried out
by some private Japanese firms, there were very few contacts between the two countries. In a sense, Japan’s
Korean policy strongly reflected the influence of the United States, which has long guaranteed South Korea’s
security while not recognizing North Korea. In view of the U.S.–Japan alliance then, it was natural for Japan to
maintain basically pro-Seoul and anti-Pyongyang policy throughout the Cold War period (Kihl 1994, 112).
In the early 1970s, Japan launched a movement to normalize Tokyo–Pyongyang relations, but there was no
real progress. Instead, the relationship between the two countries began to deteriorate. Perceiving that the
increasingly close ties between Seoul and Tokyo were detrimental to Pyongyang’s grand design to reunite the
two Koreas under its domination, North Korea demanded that Japan abrogate it. Moreover, in trade relations
between Japan and North Korea, Japan became increasingly burdened with extending credit to North Korea,
which further exacerbated their diplomatic ties. For example, Pyongyang owed more than $380 million to the
big businesses of Japan by 1976, of which $120 million was in arrears. Although Japanese creditors agreed to
reschedule Pyongyang’s repayment of trade debt three times (1976, 1979, and 1983), North Korea unilaterally
terminated the agreement after 1984.
During the 1980s, Japanese–North Korea relations were further strained by the North Korean “terrorist”
attacks against South Korea as well as on Japan. These events prompted Tokyo to impose sanctions against
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Pyongyang. For example, Japan imposed sanctions against North Korea in retaliation for a bombing by
Pyongyang in Rangoon in October 1983, which killed seventeen prominent South Korean leaders including four
cabinet members. In that same year, Pyongyang seized two Japanese seamen, the captain and chief engineer of
the eighteenth Fujisan Maru. They were allegedly arrested for helping Min Hong Gu, a North Korean, sail to
Japan on their ship. Pyongyang refused to release them unless Japan would repatriate Min to North Korea.
Because Min clearly indicated his intention to seek political asylum in Japan, Tokyo rejected Pyongyang’s
demand. Events such as these had the effect of worsening the relationship between Japan and North Korea.
It was only recently that the North Korean attitude toward Japan began to thaw (that led to normalization
talks between Pyongyang and Tokyo in 1990, although little progress has resulted). Japan’s relations with
North Korea began to improve for several reasons. First, the Japanese proposals for a normalization were
stimulated by the issuance of South Korean President Roh Tae Woo’s northern policy in July 1988 (Kihl 1994,
117). Among other things, Roh’s new policy indicated Seoul’s willingness to help its friendly neighbors to
improve relations with North Korea. Second, North Korea was shocked by the Soviet-Korean summit held in
San Francisco in June 1990. Pyongyang’s willingness to open diplomatic negotiations with the Japanese may
have come partly out of North Korea’s realization that it had to adopt a certain flexibility in response to the
changing international circumstances. Third, no less important was North Korea’s desperate economic need for
foreign capital and technology to replenish its fledgling economy. At the same time, for Japan, North Korea
represented a lucrative business opportunity, for North Korea conferred advantages of cheap and educated labor
(Gong, Sato, and Ok 1993, 80).
In this context, there were three rounds of preliminary talks in the fall of 1990. After that, there were
several full rounds of talks in 1991 that produced little results. One of the major obstacles to normalization was
the question of the international inspection of North Korea’s nuclear facilities. The Japanese government insisted
that North Korea approve full-scope international inspections of all of its nuclear facilities. Japan initially
demanded IAEA inspections. Because the two Koreas agreed on reciprocal inspections on 31 December 1991,
Japan has been promoting mutual inspections (Gong, Sato, and Ok 1993, 40). These demands were part of
Japan’s three long adhered to principles of non-nuclear policy, that is no manufacturing, owning, transporting,
or acquiring of nuclear weapons on the part of North Korea (Attar 1993, 108). North Korea rejected the Japanese
demand on the grounds that the nuclear inspection issue was not a proper topic for normalization talks and that
such a problem should be decided between North Korea and the United States. This conflict over the nuclear
issue, in addition to others led to an impasse between the Japanese and North Korean normalization process,
which has been on hold indefinitely since 1993.
United States and North Korea
The development of the relationship between the United States and North Korea can be examined roughly in
three phases: hostile relationship, application of “people’s diplomacy,” and inter-governmental contacts. The
relationship between the United States and North Korea, from the beginning, started as a confrontational one.
After the Korean peninsula was divided into North and South Korea in 1945 and a Communist government later
established itself North of the thirty–eighth parallel in 1948, the United States and North Korea became
ideologically and politically antagonistic. The United States treated North Korea as merely a satellite of the
Soviet Union because the latter did not accept the former’s proposal to establish a self-reliant independent nation
through free elections (Attar 1993, 67). In the eyes of the United States, Kim Il Sung’s regime was an adversary
of the free world and also a political force opposing and threatening U.S. policies toward the Korean peninsula.
North Korea, on the contrary, viewed the United States as a dangerous imperialistic force, ruled by monopolistic
capitalists. Furthermore, the U.S. intention to establish a unified government on the Korean peninsula was seen
by Kim Il Sung as a “guile aggression policy” to colonize the entire peninsula (Attar 1993, 67).
The hostility between the United States and North Korea reached a fever pitch when the Korean War broke
out with North Korea’s invasion in 1950. Thereafter, the United States increasingly strengthened its relationship
with South Korea, while maintaining hostile policies toward North Korea. For example, by concluding the
U.S.–Japan Security Pact in 1951 and the (South) Korea–U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty 1953, the United States
organized bilateral security systems to counter the threat of expansion of Communist forces in Asia, which
included North Korea. Furthermore, the United States consistently maintained its strict policy of economic
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sanctions against North Korea by continuing to invoke the Foreign Assets Control Regulations (the Trading
with the Enemy Act) and the Export Administration Act in order to prohibit almost all commercial and financial
transactions with North Korea by individuals or firms subject to U.S. jurisdiction (Kihl 1994, 73).
In response, North Korea also openly showed its anti-U.S. sentiments publicly during the 1950s and 1960s.
For example, in 1954, when there was a Geneva Conference for the post-war settlement of the Korean War,
North Korea insisted on the immediate withdrawal of the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea. In 1968, North
Korea captured the U.S. Navy ship Pueblo and in the following year, shot down a U.S. reconnaissance plane,
EC-121 (Attar 1993, 69). A report at the twentieth anniversary of the founding of the North Korean government
in 1968 read: “American imperialism is the most barbarous and shameless in the world. It is desperate now to
find a way to survive by means of intensifying international tensions and the arms race and stirring up new
aggressive wars. There is not a corner in the world where the U.S. imperialists’ devilish hands have not reached
and there is not a country beyond the threat of its aggression” (Attar 1993, 69).
During the 1970s, however, there appeared some signs of change in the U.S. and North Korean attitude
toward each other. In March 1977, during his speech at the United Nations, President Carter indicated that he
would pursue the normalization of relations with the countries in Asia, including North Korea. In response to
Carter’s flexible policy changes, North Korea appraised President Carter’s initiative to withdraw U.S. troops
from South Korea as “desirable”. However, as the plan for withdrawing U.S. troops was canceled completely,
North Korea regained its hard-line stance toward the United States, not to be relaxed until the 1980s and 1990s.
Beginning in October 1985, the United States somewhat eased its hard-line attitude toward North Korea by
issuing entry visas to three North Korean scholars for participation in an academic forum in the United States.
Then in 1987, the United States took the measure to allow trade with North Korea on a humanitarian basis.
With the explosion incident of a Korean Airlines (KAL) passenger plane in December of 1987, the United States
returned to its hard-line policy. But while retaining North Korea on the list of terrorist countries, the United
States also announced a series of moderate measures to alleviate tension between the two countries: 1) the
permission of non-political exchanges to U.S. citizens such as visits to North Korea, and academic and cultural
exchanges, 2) trade on a humanitarian basis such as food, medicine, and so forth, and 3) permission of informal
dialogues between the U.S. and North Korean diplomats (Attar 1993, 76).
Recently, North Korea has also shown a positive attitude to the United States. For example, at the first
session of the ninth term plenary meeting of North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly (May 1991), Kim Il
Sung asserted that the United States must play a “positive role” in the settlement of the Korean question because
it was directly involved with the Korean issue. In turn, the United States also softened its attitude toward North
Korea, recognizing the need to make North Korea more flexible in its foreign policy. To this end, unofficial
contacts have been established, in which reporters, scholars, and diplomats have been allowed to travel to and
from the two countries (Attar 1993, 72).
This attitude was further encouraged by the changing diplomatic policies of the United States, which
initiated a conciliatory posture toward North Korea in an attempt to buttress South Korea’s northern diplomacy.
On 31 October 1988, the U.S. government authorized its diplomats to “hold substantive discussions with
officials of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in neutral settings” and to encourage “unofficial, non-
governmental visits” from North Korea in academics, sports, culture, and other areas (Kihl 1994, 71). This
announcement was soon followed by formal talks between U.S. and North Korean political counselors at the
International Club in Beijing. The Beijing talks were held more than twenty times in four years, and in that
time the United States requested that North Korea adopt tangible steps for improving its relations with South
Korea, submit its nuclear facilities to full-scope inspections by the IAEA, account for about 8,200 U.S. soldiers
listed as missing in action during the Korean War, stop pursuing or supporting international terrorism, and also
asked North Korea not to export ballistic missiles to the Middle East (Kihl 1994, 72).
In general, U.S. nuclear policy toward the Korean peninsula has been to keep either of the two Koreas from
having a nuclear weapons program of its own. In accordance with this policy, President Bush announced on
September 1991, that all U.S. land and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons and U.S. artillery shells deployed in
South Korea would be withdrawn (Attar 1993, 107). When North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT in
1993, President Clinton insisted that “North Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb”. In October
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1994, the United States concluded a “Framework Agreement,” designed to ease tension on the Korean peninsula.
This “deal” is that over a period of about ten years, North Korea will dismantle the facilities that the United
States is most worried about. In exchange, the United States will insure that North Korea gets two 1,000
megawatt (MW) light-water nuclear power reactors (D. A. and K. O. 1995, 27). This deal, however, is
considered only tentative at best, with North Korea refusing to let South Korea supply the two new light-water
reactors (Greenhouse 1995, A6). Given the importance of the role that North–South Korean rivalry plays in the
international political arena, I now turn to the relationship between North and South Korea.
South Korea and North Korea
North Korea and South Korea were established in 1948 on the Korean peninsula as a byproduct of Soviet–
American cold war politics. Ever since 1948 the two Korean states have remained a symbol of mutual distrust
and have experienced high levels of conflict and tension. They fought a war for three years from 1950 to 1953,
killing almost ten percent of Korea’s population. Even after the armistice was signed in July 1953, both sides
invested enormous sums to maintain war-readiness (Attar 1993, 121). For example, the two Koreas continue to
confront each other along the 155-mile Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) with more than a million well-armed men
(Park, Koh, and Kwak 1987, 317).
The animosity between the two Koreas still persists, but beginning in the 1970s there were at least some
attempts to open up bilateral talks by the North and South Korean governments. In 1971, a North–South
Korean dialogue was begun to reduce tensions on the Korean peninsula, build mutual trust, and eventually
achieve the peaceful unification of Korea. Although this inter-Korean dialogue came to a deadlock in less than
two years, the talks were again resumed in 1979–1980. In 1984, a new era in inter-Korean relations was opened
to improve better relations between Pyongyang and Seoul, and this discussion led to an exchange of visits by a
few dispersed family members and artist troupes from both sides in 1985 (Park, Koh, and Kwak 1987, 318).
Overall, however, the inter-Korean dialogues in the 1970s and 1980s were brief and short-lived.
Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, South Korea also lifted the ban that prevented economic
exchanges with North Korea from inter-Korean trade since 1948. Since then, the trade between the two Koreas
has increased sharply, reaching $192.2 million in 1991. In the first eight months of 1992, inter-Korean trade,
which requires prior government approval, reached $151.4 million. This amounted to a 30 percent increase over
the same period in 1991. As a result, South Korea was the seventh largest trading partner of North Korea in
1991 (Gong, Sato, and Ok 1993, 83).
The 1990s also brought new prospects for greater possibilities for inter-Korean conferences. The changing
environment of world politics was one of the major sources of influence on the attitudes of North and South
Korea. In the new post-Cold War era after the collapse of East European and Soviet Communism in 1989–1991,
the two Korean states agreed, through a meeting between their prime ministers in December 1991, to initiate a
“new détente” and to build a cooperative relationship. North Korea reversed its stance on self-imposed isolation
by joining the United Nations and by initiating the new “diplomacy of promotive adaptation” (Kihl 1994, 134).
In this way, the new détente of 1991–92 recognized the importance of coexistence as a necessary condition for
maintaining peace and stability in the post-Cold War era.
These new efforts on the part of North and South Korea resulted in the signing of the two historical
documents by the two sides in December of 1991. The first document was an agreement of reconciliation, non-
aggression, exchanges, and cooperation. Following its ratification in February of 1992, this agreement
attempted to institutionalize the peace process by setting up a joint commission on reconciliation. The second
document was a joint declaration for denuclearization of the peninsula, in which both sides agreed to not
“manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons” (article 1), and to “establish and
operate a South–North Joint Nuclear Control Commission within one month of the agreement” (article 5) (Kihl
1994, 138).
To say, however, that the conflicts between North and South Korea are dissolving would be a gross
oversimplification. For example, even the first agreement described above failed to resolve several other key and
controversial issues, such as the recognition of each other’s government in the political arena, prohibition of
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arms buildup along the DMZ, and the on-site nuclear inspection guidelines. The second agreement also failed in
practical terms as the two sides could not agree on how to implement the terms of the agreement. For instance,
an important point in the agreement was about the formation and operation of a joint commission, but North
and South Korea could not agree on how to proceed on the verification procedures and inspection methods (Kihl
1994, 138).
There are still other continuing barriers to the strengthening of diplomatic ties between the two Koreas. One
of them is North Korea’s insistence that any improved bilateral talks for peace and unification must be preceeded
by a complete withdrawal of foreign (that is, U.S.) troops from Korean soil (South Korea) (Kihl 1994, 145).
For example, South Korea’s decision to proceed with Team Spirit 1993 (a very large, joint U.S.–South Korean
military exercise) was also offered as another reason for North Korea’s refusal to allow IAEA inspection in 1993
(Gong, Sato, and Ok 1993, 55). Another barrier is the ideological gap between North and South Korea, in which
the old rivalry and mistrust still plays a significant role in their view of each other. For example, this sentiment
was clearly manifested recently when North Korea refused to have the South Korean government provide the
light-water reactors in exchange for freezing its nuclear program. According to a New York Timesreport,
“. . . for the North Koreans, it would be humiliating for its long-time enemy, South Korea, to supply the
reactors because it would demonstrate the South is richer and more sophisticated. North Koreans also fear that
South Korea will somehow use the project to assert control over the North” (Greenhouse 1995, A6).
Given these difficulties between the inter-Korean relationship, it is not surprising that the nuclear policy of
the South Korean government presents a ground for further conflict between the two states. For instance,
President Roh strongly stated in 1991 that South Korea “will faithfully carry out the non-nuclear, no-chemical
weapons policy”. However, he also elaborated that the South Korean government would continue to be included
under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and that it would allow U.S. nuclear-armed submarines within South Korean
territorial waters, if necessary. In response, North Korea maintained that because South Korea keeps a U.S.
nuclear umbrella, its nuclear-free zone plan on the Korean peninsula will probably not be achieved.
Overview
The question as to what position North Korea will take in the future regarding its nuclear program must be
thought of in the context of these complex and changing world politics. A general pattern that emerges from
this study is an increasing strain that North Korea faces in its relationship with four of the world powers (the
former Soviet Union, China, the United States, and Japan), as well as with South Korea. In conclusion, it
appears that the North Korean regime is facing serious challenges that it must take into consideration before
working out its stance on the nuclear issue. Two of these challenges are, 1) the ideological crisis of the demise
of worldwide socialism and communism, and 2) the economic crisis that can only be alleviated by foreign aid
and cooperation.
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The North Korean Nuclear Question
Joseph Bermudez argued that North Korean nuclear weapons program was spurred by the United States intention
to use nuclear weapons to end the Korean War (Bermudez 1991, 101). Others have speculated that it was the
actual presence of the U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea during the 1970s and 1980s that had convinced
North Korea to develop their own nuclear program. Whatever its motivations, by the mid-1980s North Korea
was building a gas-graphite reactor capable of producing 50 MW. (Sources do not identify whether the output is
thermal or electrical.) In 1993, North Korea was suspected by the IAEA of already possessing a nuclear bomb
capability. Because North Korea’s nuclear program is still not fully exposed to the public, however, the precise
extent of its nuclear capability is hard to determine. The purpose of this paper is to trace this little known
nuclear development in North Korea, in order to formulate more informed evaluations about the North Korean
political position concerning the nuclear issue.
North Korea reportedly started its nuclear development project during the Soviet military occupation in the
late 1940s. However, it was not until the late 1950s that North Korea established a joint nuclear research
institute with Moscow. In 1956 Pyongyang signed a nuclear research agreement with the Soviet Union, and a
few of the North Korean nuclear physicists were sent to Moscow to be trained. With these Soviet-trained
physicists, the nuclear program in North Korea was labeled a National Project by 1959 (Attar 1993, 101). In
1964 the Research Institute of Atomic Energy was established in North Korea, and in the 1970s nuclear science
departments were set up at Kim Il Sung University and Kim chaek Engineering College to further support
nuclear research (Kihl 1994, 234).
North Korea’s first nuclear program was a small 1 MW “critical assembly”. The next one was built in
1965, when North Korea launched its major nuclear development program at Yongbyon, some 94 km southeast
of Pyongyang. It built an experimental 2 to 4 MW research reactor that was fueled with low-enriched uranium
(Kihl 1994, 234). Both of these facilities were supplied by the Soviet Union, and as a part of the agreement
with the Soviet Union they were both open to regular IAEA inspections in 1977.
In 1980 North Korea began constructing a 5 MW reactor without a major assistance from the Soviet Union.
This reactor, which was fueled with natural uranium and moderated with graphite, was similar to the early
Western and Soviet models of the 1950s. The technology used for this natural uranium type of reactor was
simpler than what was required for an enriched-uranium type. Given that the indigenous Korean nuclear
technology still lacked a high level of sophistication, this type of reactor was an obvious choice for the
burgeoning North Korean nuclear development.
Because this reactor was built without major Soviet aid, North Korea was not obligated by the Soviets to
place it under IAEA surveillance. Thus it was kept a secret until 1984, when the United States learned of its
existence through their satellite surveillance. The U.S. Intelligence sources believe that this reactor began
operating in 1986, but the North Koreans have been claiming that it had been operating only intermittently
(Albright and Hibbs 1991, 10). Given the uncertainties, it was speculated that if this reactor was running since
1986, it should by now have generated enough plutonium to make at least one nuclear weapon (Kihl 1994,
235).
In 1984 North Korea began constructing a second indigenously constructed natural-uranium reactor, which
was planned to be finished in 1995. This reactor is of 50 MW capacity, and according to Attar Chand, the reactor
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design appeared to be the most promising example of a plutonium producer for an “aspiring nuclear-have
country” (Attar 1993, 100). According to the U.S. officials, this reactor could produce about 40 to 60 kilograms
(kg) of weapon-grade plutonium a year, depending on its operating characteristics. Although North Korea
claimed that this reactor would be used for electrical generation, there were conflicting reports as to whether an
associated power grid was being put in place (Kihl 1994, 235).
In addition, North Korea was developing another 200 MW reactor, which was being planned for completion
in 1996. This reactor was to be built in Taech’on, sixty miles north of Pyongyang, and it could produce
between 160 and 200 kg of plutonium a year—that would give North Korea a total weapon-grade plutonium
production capability of about 200 to 260 kg a year (Albright and Hibbs 1992, 38). North Korea had also
planned construction of three or four enriched-uranium reactors for power generation, but they did not progress
beyond the planning stage because of the withdrawal of Soviet assistance. The Soviet Union cut its material and
technical support for the North’s nuclear reactor in 1990 and stopped supplying nuclear fuels in September
1990.
Thus on 4 May 1992, North Korea’s initial report to the IAEA listed only the following nuclear facilities:
1) A research reactor and a critical facility of the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Yongbyon; 2) A sub-critical
facility of Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang; 3) A nuclear fuel rod fabrication plant and storage in
Yongbyon; 4) An experimental nuclear power reactor (5 MW) of the nuclear physics plant in Yongbyon; 5) A
“radiochemical laboratory” of the Institute of Radiochemistry under construction in Yongbyon; 6) A 50 MW
nuclear power plant under construction in Yongbyon; 7) A 200 MW power plant under construction in Pyong-
An-Buk-Do; 8) Three reactors (635 MW each) for a nuclear power plant being planned; 9) Uranium mines in
Sunchon; and 10) Two plants for the production of uranium concentrate, in Pyongsan and Pak chon (Attar 1993,
83–84).
This list was submitted after North Korea had signed an agreement to allow the IAEA inspections, in
accordance with the NPT that it had signed earlier. North Korea had signed the NPT in 1985, presumably as a
condition for receiving Soviet nuclear assistance, but it had failed to sign the nuclear safeguards accord (NSA)
until 30 January 1992. The reasons for the delay were that North Korea claimed that the signing of the NSA
would jeopardize North Korea’s security, unless three conditions were satisfied: First, the United States had to
remove its alleged nuclear weapons from South Korea; second, the annual U.S.–South Korean Team Spirit
exercises (that the North Koreans called “nuclear war games”) had to be discontinued; and third, the North
Koreans would be allowed to “reserve the right to abrogate their NSA responsibilities depending on their
evaluation of the attitudes of the nuclear powers toward their country” (Kihl 1994, 235–36).
In late September of 1991 President Bush announced that the United States would withdraw all its overseas
land-and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons, including South Korea. Two months later, on 31 December 1991,
South Korea and North Korea initialed a joint declaration for denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, in which
the two sides agreed not only to renounce the possession and use of nuclear weapons and facilities for nuclear
fuel reprocessing and uranium enrichment, but also to institute mutual inspections of each other’s suspected
nuclear sites (Kihl 1994, 236). In addition, on 7 January 1992, South Korea announced that its annual Team
Spirit exercise with the United States would be canceled. Following these three events, North Korea finally
agreed to accept the IAEA’s inspection of its nuclear sites. When these IAEA inspections were conducted, they
revealed details about the North Korean nuclear program that were not originally included in the official North
Korean list of its nuclear facilities.
First, the IAEA inspection team discovered that North Korea was building a plutonium separation plant at
Yongbyon, which was 180 meters long and six stories high. The American officials declared that the building
was of a size large enough to handle several hundred tons of spent fuel annually when fully operational, and that
it could handle all the spent fuel from the three North Korean reactors (Albright and Hibbs 1991, 38). Although
the U.S. satellite photographs had identified it as a fuel reprocessing plant that was capable of transforming
spent fuel from operating reactors into plutonium, the North Koreans called it a “Radiochemical Laboratory”.
According to the IAEA Director General Hans Blix, however, the IAEA “would not have any hesitation” in
calling it “a reprocessing plant in the terminology of the industrialized world” (Albright and Hibbs 1992, 37).
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The North Koreans refused IAEA inspection of this site, but they later reportedly described the site as being
a reprocessing facility. They stated its use to be to experiment with plutonium extraction in case they should
choose to use plutonium to fuel a breeder reactor or to make mixed oxide fuel to power a light-water reactor.
They explained that they did not wish to depend on other nations for supply of plutonium or enriched uranium
and so were experimenting with the early stages of domestic production (Kihl 1994, 237). Although the North
Koreans had originally maintained that the facility was only 80 percent complete and only 40 percent furnished,
they later told the IAEA that this facility had separated minute gram quantities of plutonium from failed fuel
elements taken out of its 5 MW electric reactor in March 1990 (Albright 1993, 10). Officially, no evidence of
either laboratory-scale operations or a pilot facility were found, but because so little is known about this site,
one U.S. official went so far as to say, “Analysts would not be surprised if the plant were to begin operating
tomorrow” (Albright and Hibbs 1991, 10).
In the face of mounting international concerns about its reprocessing activities, North Koreans assured the
IAEA in the spring of 1992 that the only other time that they had separated plutonium was in 1975, with the
laboratory-scale “hot cells” in Pyongyang. However, by measuring the americium 241 in “smear” or “swipe”
samples from the “hot” insides of glove boxes that were located at the end of the separation process, the IAEA
agents discovered that there were distinct separation efforts in 1989, 1990, and 1991 (Albright 1993, 10). This
result led the IAEA inspecting agents to request a special inspection of the two undeclared nuclear waste sites at
Yongbyon, 100 km from Pyongyang. Both buildings were discovered to be camouflaged, and the North Koreans
refused to allow inspection.
For one of these facilities, the early photos of the site’s layout showed patterns of round and square holes
for liquid and solid nuclear waste, but later photos showed the same site covered and landscaped. The other site
was a large building that appeared to be connected to the Radiochemical Laboratory. Again, this building was
shown to be camouflaged; an earlier picture showed a two-story building, but later, it was turned into a one
story with the dirt pushed up around the lower story to turn it into a basement.
In summary, according to the official report generated by North Korea, there were basically two nuclear
reactors in operation and two more under construction as of October 1994: 1) an aging, small research reactor
under IAEA inspection for fifteen years; 2) a 5 MW experimental nuclear reactor at Yongbyon using natural
uranium, modified by graphite; 3) a 50 MW reactor that was under construction in Yongbyon; and 4) a 200 MW
reactor that was also under construction in north Pyongan province. The reprocessing plant in Yongbyon and the
two undeclared nuclear waste sites were unavailable for IAEA inspection, and their capability could only be
speculated upon.
In October of 1994, after sixteen months of negotiation that Jimmy Carter facilitated with the North
Koreans, North Korea and the United States concluded a “Framework Agreement”. Under the agreement, North
Korea agreed to freeze activities at the 5 MW reactor as well as to cease construction of the 50 MW and 200
MW reactors. Furthermore, North Korea stated that it would cooperate to make sure that spent fuel from the 5
MW reactor was stored safely and that it would be disposed of in a manner that did not involve reprocessing. In
return, the United States promised to help provide North Korea with two light-water reactors, worth $4 billion,
for electrical generation. According to the agreement, when a significant portion of the first light-water reactor
was completed (in about five years) North Korea was expected to comply with the safeguards agreements and to
allow special inspections of undeclared facilities. In this deal, South Korea and Japan were expected to pay more
than 80 percent of the cost of the light-water reactors (Greenhouse 1995, A6).
In February of 1995, however, this agreement came to an impasse, as North Koreans refused to let South
Korea supply it with the light-water reactors. According to the U.S. officials, “This dispute could be a real deal-
breaker,” for South Korea was the only country willing to play a central role in financing the light-water reactor
project (Greenhouse 1995, A6). In the face of these uncertainties, the precise capability of the North Korean
nuclear program is extremely hard to measure. Even if special inspections are conducted in the future, because
they could be delayed for as long as five years, North Korea could disguise its past activities and destroy
important documents or other information, making it impossible to clarify all the ambiguities surrounding their
nuclear program.
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North Korea’s Position on Extension of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
North Korea agrees to an indefinite extension of the NPT, given that the following conditions are added as
amendments. However, in case of any unforeseen difficulties that might necessitate measures other than
immediate amendments to the treaty, North Korea is also willing to agree to extending the NPT for a period of
five years, during that time the following conditions are to be met.
First, North Korea calls for a revision of the NPT to include a plutonium reprocessing ban. Currently, NPT
requires only that plutonium be safeguarded once it is extracted from nuclear-reactor wastes for reuse as reactor
fuel, which leaves countries like Japan and South Korea to invest heavily in lucrative government-controlled
plutonium industries. South Korea, for instance, has the world’s tenth largest commercial nuclear program,
which discharges enough plutonium in spent fuel to produce up to ninety bombs a year. In order to stop such
paranuclear states from achieving any further nuclear weapons capability, NPT must include a plutonium policy
of no production and no use.
Second, according to Article IV of the NPT, the nuclear powers are required to share with the non-nuclear
weapon states technology for the peaceful development of nuclear energy. However, for countries that do not
possess the economic and technological infrastructure to absorb such nuclear technology, this Article is of little
use. Thus North Korea calls for an establishment of a clause in the NPT, in which the nuclear states actively
assist the non-nuclear states in developing the necessary support structure for a meaningful transfer of nuclear
technology.
Finally, North Korea demands pledges by the nuclear powers to come to the aid of non-nuclear states, such
as North Korea, should they be threatened by nuclear weapons. For instance, North Korea sees the U.S. troops
in South Korea as posing threats of nuclear war, for the United States will be automatically and instantly
involved in any war on Korean soil. Accordingly, North Korea proposes that NPT adopt a policy to guarantee
direct and immediate international actions against any such threats by the nuclear states.
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Iraq
Jason Zych
An Explanation of Iraqi Culture
The modern state of Iraq is a meld of vastly different peoples and a product of historical strife and instability. In
order to understand the origins and policies of the Iraqi government, one must understand these cultural divisions
and past events, as they had a great effect in shaping the current government and its central figure, Saddam
Hussein.
Located around ancient Mesopotamia, where a civilization began, Iraq sits at a strategic position in the
Middle East, as well as a historically important one. Ancient Sumeria—which arose from the creation of
agriculture and whose people created irrigation, writing, and the structure of empire—rested in between the
Tigris and Euphrates Rivers in the Southern area of modern Iraq, and it was here that urban life first developed
(Marr 1985, 13). Throughout the region’s history, governments and empires have conquered the area and
struggled to bring together the diverse peoples of the region, often without success. Even today, Hussein’s
government faces the ancient problems faced by all the past rulers of the area: diverse peoples, hostile neighbors,
and difficult-to-defend lay of the land.
It is the way in which these problems were dealt with that marks the various governments historically
positioned on modern-day Iraqi soil. Some regimes were benevolent; many were installed and maintained by
force. The effects of these regimes, especially the more modern ones, have shaped the various cultures of Iraq and
have led to Iraq’s standing in the world today.
The Iraqi land is one of contrasts (Marr 1985, 2). Its most striking features are its twin rivers, the Tigris and
Euphrates. It is because of these two rivers that the civilization around them is able to survive, in that the
communities around the rivers depend on them a great deal (Marr 1985, 2). In the south, flowing into the
Persian Gulf, is the Shatt al-Arab, the single river formed by the merging of the Tigris and Euphrates. This area
resembles an oasis (Marr 1985, 2), and is the home to the date groves that produced one of Iraq’s exports before
many of them were destroyed in the Iran–Iraq war (Sciolino 1991, 40). Along the rivers to the north are
swamplands, and north of that are the very densely populated farmlands. Here, the land is flat and dry, and
irrigation is necessary. Further north, past Baghdad, is an area known as the Jazirah (Marr 1985, 2), which lies
between the widely diverging rivers. Farming occurs here as well, but it is mainly rainwater farming, rather than
irrigation. In the northernmost and northeastern parts of Iraq lie the foothills and mountainous ranges that house
the most isolated segments of Iraq’s population (Marr 1985, 2). The population of Iraq is also one of contrasts,
marked by its divisions rather than its unity. These divisions, both religious and cultural, have existed for
centuries, and no Iraqi government to date has been able to soften these divisions enough to create an effective
national identity.
The most troublesome division is a cultural one. While the majority of the Iraqi population is Arab, about
15 to 20 percent (Marr 1985, 5) consist of the Kurdish community in the northern part of the country (Pimlott
1992, 15). The Iraqi Kurds are part of a larger Kurdish community that also includes the Kurdish minorities in
Iran, Turkey, and Syria. They have posed many internal problems to modern Iraqi governments because of their
separate ethnic identity and language. In addition, this ethnic identity has blossomed in the twentieth century
into an almost nationalistic identity (Marr 1985, 8). Successive Iraqi governments have had to deal with this
very independent minority, sometimes through armed conflict when the rift between the Kurds and the central
government of the time was wide enough.
The second division in Iraqi society is a religious one. The historical division within the Islamic
community into Shiite and Sunni sects is apparent within the Arabs of Iraq (the Kurds are overwhelmingly
Islamic Sunni). The Shiite Arabs are the largest single religious-ethnic community in Iraq, and are located
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primarily in the heavily populated southern and western areas of the nation (Marr 1985, 6). Because of their
historical exclusion from Islamic centers of power under the Ottoman empire, the Shiites in Iraq have
traditionally been a minority politically, even though they comprise a slight majority of the total population.
As a result, they, like the Kurds, have posed problems to past Iraqi governments. The Sunni Arabs, on the other
hand, have traditionally controlled Iraqi government, especially the higher positions. The Sunni territories in Iraq
extend from the southern end of the country, where they are mixed with the Shiites, dominate the eastern areas,
and also reach slightly into the northern Kurdish-dominated areas (Marr 1985, 6). While the Shiites have tended
to live in the rural areas, the Sunni Iraqis have been more urban-oriented, and as a result, the Sunni community
is more loosely structured than the closely-knit Shiite tribal communities (Marr 1985, 5).
Finally, there are a number of smaller ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq, some of which have been
subject to persecution by Iraq’s more repressive governments. These include the Turcomans to the north and
Shiite Persians to the south, as well as smaller Jewish and Christian communities.
It comes as no surprise that as a result of these many contrasts, the history of Iraq has been one of
upheaval. Civilization after civilization in ancient Iraq was conquered, first by rival tribes, then by outside
forces. The continual re-conquering of the Iraqi region was due in part to the flat, open lands of the area, which
were not easily defended (Miller 1990, 59), and in part to the strategic location of the region. In any case, this
continual lack of stability and constant struggle of warring factions has had an important effect on the modern
Iraqi national character.
As mentioned above, the first civilization to take root in Iraq was that of the Sumerians. This civilization
was replaced over the next millennia by the Babylonians, in southern Iraq, and the Assyrians to the north. While
the Babylonians were society-oriented, and were concerned with developing technology and a legal code, the
Assyrians were warlike and had dreams of empire. Eventually, the Assyrians controlled the region, although they
would be the last of the ancient local civilizations to do so. The Persians conquered the area around 500 BC and
began to exchange it with the Greeks in various battles over the next eleven hundred years (Miller 1990, 61).
The seventh century AD brought with it a conquest of the region by the Islamic empire. The conquest
began in 633, and with the forming of the Abbasid Caliphate in 650, Iraq entered its golden age. The Abbasids
encouraged learning and research, and many great developments in mathematics, the sciences, and literature
occurred during the first three centuries of the empire’s existence (Miller 1990, 63). The Abbasids were also
ruthless, however, and their drive for power resulted in the killing of anyone who did not offer total subservience
to the empire. This alienated much of the Arab community under the Abbasids’ domination, resulting in the
Abbasid decision to hire Turkish mercenaries to keep the population in line. This proved to be a mistake,
because by the late 900s the mercenaries had acquired the real power in the Abbasid Caliphate (Miller 1990, 64).
This spelled the end of the golden age, and set Iraq into a centuries-long decline from which it has yet to
completely emerge. It is this decline and stagnation, not the golden age, that has most affected the character of
the modern state (Marr 1985, 18).
The emerging Muslim Ottoman Empire was at its peak when it first conquered Iraq in 1514. The Ottomans,
a Sunni sect of Islam, were at the time at war with the Shiite Persians, and from 1514 until 1634 the territory
of Iraq changed hands many times as the two sides turned it into a battlefield. The Ottomans finally won Iraq for
good in 1634 (Marr 1985, 19), and their victory heralded a badly needed, but short lived stability for Iraq.
Under the Ottomans, Iraq was divided into three distinct provinces: Kurdish Mosul, Sunni Baghdad, and
Shiite Basra. In addition, Iraq was exposed to modern government and law (Marr 1985, 19), as well as the
Ottoman policies regarding Shiite opposition. At first, such opposition was tolerated, but as the battles with
Persia continued, the Ottomans cracked down on the Shiites in Iraq to avoid fifth column-type activities (Marr
1985, 19). As a result, Ottoman attention began to fall increasingly on the Sunni Iraqis. This began the
historical trend toward Sunnis as the powers in Iraqi government and Shiites as the persecuted
“minority”(Pimlott 1992, 16).
A combination of the extensive wars with Persia, hatred between the two religious sides, and the great
distance between Iraq and the center of the Ottoman Empire resulted in a general Iraqi weakness within the
Empire. It is in this context that the British wrested Iraq from the Ottomans during World War I.
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After the Ottomans, it is the British who have had the greatest influence on modern Iraq (Marr 1985, 29).
The influence of Britain began with its conquest of the Ottoman–Iraqi provinces during World War I, and
persisted up to the overthrow of the British-supported Iraqi monarchy in 1958. It was the British who established
the current boundaries of Iraq, and it was they who started Iraq’s first administrative government. Thanks to the
British, modernization was accelerated after World War I, and it was in large part British interests that first
developed Iraqi oil fields. Ironically, it was also the involvement of the British in Iraqi affairs that kindled the
hatred of foreign interference that marked many of the revolutionary leaders of 1958 and beyond.
Britain’s first major involvement with Iraq was the occupation it began in 1914. Concerned by Turkey’s
intentions to join the Central Powers in the First World War, Britain invaded Iraq through the Gulf border in
order to protect its emerging interests there. By the end of 1918, Britain had conquered almost all the area of the
three Iraqi provinces (Marr 1985, 31), and had begun an administration there based on its imperial structure in
India. Although this administration soon collapsed, its policy of tribal involvement in government affairs
continued. In contrast to the Ottoman policy of weakening the tribes, the British strengthened them, as well as
their leaders, whom they used in place of administrators. As a result, it was with the tribes that future pro-
British governments had their largest support.
In 1920, the Allied powers placed the pieces of the Ottoman Empire under European rule. Iraq was awarded
to Britain, which made Iraq a class A mandate (a status meant to lead to independence) (Sciolino 1991, 44). This
announcement of new foreign control sparked a revolt in Iraq. Believing that it was necessary for the sake of
Iraqi stability to establish an Arab government there, Britain set up a monarchy in Iraq, with Faisal I as king.
During Faisal’s reign, the first organized nationalist opposition began to form. Its first manifestation was
the revolt in 1920, but it was put down very decisively and was the only armed conflict with the British forces
through the achievement of Iraqi independence in 1932 (Marr 1985, 43). The later protests centered on the treaty
of cooperation that Iraq signed with Britain, presumably to enlist the British as advisors, but in actuality to keep
Britain’s hold on the government through indirect methods.
A new British government in 1929 began to negotiate a new treaty recognizing Iraq’s independence. By this
time, King Faisal and his political strongman, Nuri al–Said, were beginning to take over the reigns of power
from the British (Marr 1985, 50–52). They remained, however, strongly pro-British, a position evident in the
eventual independence treaty. The treaty included provisions for British access to Iraqi facilities (in return for the
training and aiding of the Iraqi army by the British) and necessitated that all foreign advisors to Iraq must be
British (Marr 1985, 51). Needless to say, this treaty, although granting Iraq its independence, was also
unacceptable to the nationalist forces. Increasingly, the nationalists wanted an end to all foreign ties, and it was
this sentiment, suppressed, but never eliminated, that built up to the eventual overthrow of the monarchy in
1958.
From 1932 to 1958, the monarchy ruled the first independent state of Iraq. This period, especially the pre-
World War II era, was increasingly dominated by the military (Pimlott 1992, 16). The death of King Faisal
came suddenly in 1933, and his son and successor, Ghazi, was not strong enough politically or forceful enough
personally to achieve the control and respect his father had. It was under these circumstances that the military
got its first taste of power.
An insurrection by the Assyrian minority in Northern Iraq, which normally would have been glossed over
by the conciliatory King Faisal, was now dealt with by military means. First, the Kurds were encouraged to
attack the Assyrians. Then, the army itself moved in, massacring unarmed Assyrians and leveling villages (Marr
1985, 58). The leader of the action, General Bakr Sidqi, became a hero, and later used his new popular leverage
to force Ghazi to install a new government cabinet.
Along with the rise in military power, many Iraqis were observing the rise of fascist governments in
Europe with admiration (Marr 1985, 69–70). By the outbreak of World War II, Iraq had ousted and sent into
exile the monarchy and its regime. These actions angered the British to a great degree, prompting Iraq to ask
Germany for some protection. At this point, Britain promptly invaded Iraq, occupied it, and restored the old
regime to power (Marr 1985, 85–87).
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Britain occupied Iraq throughout World War II, and upon its departure from the country, Nuri al–Said
assumed effective control of the country. He was best known for his ability to engineer elections to get the pro-
British majority desired by the new regent (Ghazi died in a car crash in 1939; his son was still an infant), and he
was the central player in the government until the 1958 coup.
The nationalistic movement finally built to a head in 1958 with the overthrow of the monarchy. This coup
was to set the stage for a very unstable decade, highlighted by continual ousting of whatever government
happened to be in power. During this period, governments run by the communist-backed Abdul Karim Qassim,
the Nasserite-supported Abdul-Salam Arif, and the Baath regime all had a turn in power. The shuffle ended in
1968 with the rise to power, maintained to this day, of a second Baath regime.
The success of the Qassim coup, which occurred in 1958, was welcomed by its supporters after failed
attempts in 1941 and 1948. The initial executive structure set up by the new government made great strides
toward including minority views and encompassing all the major cultural and ethnic divisions. However, this
inclusive government soon disappeared, as challenges to Qassim’s leadership led him to acquire increasingly
greater power in the new regime. As he did this, he alienated greater numbers of Iraqis, until he had no solid
block of support left.
Among the domestic reform measures taken by the new government were a number of actions meant to
equalize the economic disparity that had helped to hold up the old regime. Landlords’ legal rights were lessened
and those of tenants were increased. Land ownership was restricted to a certain level to end the days of massive
tracts of land owned by one individual. The rights of women were also increased by the Qassim government, and
education and housing projects were expanded. In addition, Qassim took measures to gain more national control
over Iraq’s oil resources.
Other policies proved to be mistakes, however (Marr 1985, 176). An extended civil war with the Kurds cost
Qassim much of his political strength (Miller 1990, 82). He increasingly alienated fellow Arab nations with his
foreign policy. He also had no support from the Western nations.
His final mistake was a disastrous dispute with Kuwait. In 1961, Kuwait became an independent state.
Qassim soon laid claim to Kuwait as a past province of Iraq under the Ottoman Empire (a claim that would also
be made by Saddam Hussein in justification of his invasion of Kuwait in 1990). The British rushed to assist
Kuwait militarily, as did the Arab League. Iraq subsequently ended diplomatic relations with all countries that
recognized Kuwait’s independence. This action isolated Qassim from all his potential allies, and failed to help
him in any way (Marr 1985, 181).
It was under this situation that the Arab nationalists overthrew Qassim’s government. Composed of many
groups, the nationalists were led by the Nasserites (those Iraqis supportive of the policies of Egyptian leader
Gamal Abdel Nasser) and the Baath party. The Baath party was the main organizer of the coup, and initially
controlled the government, but internal divisions left them ripe for a coup themselves, and within the year, the
Nasserites, led by Arif, seized power.
Arif had been a partner of Qassim’s in the 1958 coup, but had soon been exiled in Qassim’s drive to
eliminate rivals and opposition. His group could not muster any greater support than Qassim’s government. In
addition, the Arabs’ loss in the Six-Day War humiliated the party beyond recovery, and the Baath party, now
more practical and experienced, executed a coup nearly ten years to the day after Qassim’s 1958 coup (Marr
1985, 210). This brought the Baath party to power for good in Iraq, and it is in the context of the government
the Baath set up and the principles that the Baath stood for that the social changes of the last three decades can be
examined.
The Baath Government that came to power in 1968 was able to achieve the political stability necessary to
implement the reforms that the revolutionists had desired since the 1958 coup. By doing so, it proved to be the
most organized of the opposition forces that had helped topple the monarchy (Marr 1985, 183). This political
stability came about as a result of the Baath regime’s views on political opposition. Believing that it was the
presence of opposition that caused governmental instability and revolution, the Baath regime suppressed the
seeds of opposition, trading individual liberties for national stability.
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It was within this new government that Iraq’s current President, Saddam Hussein, emerged politically. As
strongman for the new regime, Saddam Hussein built up a culture of fear throughout the nation by disposing of
all the party’s enemies and all of his personal rivals and critics. Slowly eliminating his opposition and
improving his support, Hussein had consolidated national power into his own hands by the time he officially
assumed the presidency of Iraq in 1979.
The key lesson the Baathists had learned from the coup that drove them out of power in 1963 was that if
they hoped to stay in control, they could not share power with any non-Baathists (Miller 1990, 91). Very
shortly after taking control of the government, they removed from power all of the non-Baathist partners who
had helped in the coup, and replaced them with loyal Baathist party members. In fact, the new government was
not only completely Baathist, but was also dominated by military men and was made up largely of relatives of
President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr and others from his hometown of Takrit (Marr 1985, 212–213). Included
among these Takriti relatives was Saddam Hussein, who chose to be anonymous at first (he was worried the
Baath would be overthrown again themselves) (Miller 1990, 93), but in 1969 took a role in the government
second only to Bakr’s.
From the start, the Baathist regime sought to neutralize any opposition and to demonstrate to the nation
that resistance would not be allowed. Charges of spying, conspiracy and treason were leveled at party enemies,
who were subsequently arrested, tried, and often executed. Although the charges were often leveled at pro-
Westerners and Iraqi Jews, these charges were often accompanied by the simultaneous arrests of Arab Iraqis who
were enemies of the Baath. Next, the main political body of the new regime, the Revolutionary Command
Council, was enlarged in order to lessen the military influence. These remaining military leaders were then
ousted from the council, and exiled or killed. A 1973 coup attempt led by the party’s security chief gave Hussein
an excuse to rid the government of all of his remaining rivals, leaving Bakr, the only remaining military man,
in charge with Hussein as second-in-command and unquestioned strongman.
The Baath regime’s elimination of opposition did not stop at enemies of the government. It pursued a
policy of humiliating respected Iraqi public figures in order to establish itself among the Iraqi public as the sole
authority (Miller 1990, 96). Kidnappings, torture, and murder were common, and were undertaken to
demonstrate to the general public the necessity of total obedience. The regime went so far as to send a security
agent to randomly kill entire upper class families in the interest of increasing fear. (Miller 1990, 95–96).
By 1973, the party had stabilized its position and driven out all visible opposition. For the next six years,
Saddam Hussein, already the true power behind the regime, gradually began to acquire more power, and to
establish a mythology around himself designed to make him into a hero and legend in the eyes of Iraqis,
especially Baath party members (Sciolino 1991, 64). At the same time, Bakr began to recede from an active role
in the government because of deteriorating health and family tragedies. By 1979, Saddam was, in fact, President
and Bakr’s resignation gave him the official title.
By the time of the Gulf War, Iraq had become, in the words of Middle East Watch, “a nation of informers”
(Miller 1990, 50). Members of the Baath Party were required to inform the government of any overheard insult
to the party or Hussein himself. Children were quizzed by their teachers about their parents’ statements, making
parents afraid to talk even in the security of their homes (Miller 1990, 50). Again, opposition and failure to
report known opposition were dealt with by the torture and or execution of the offender and sometimes other
family members as well.
Outside of building an informer society, Hussein’s biggest cultural emphasis has been to forge a true
national identity. Because of Iraq’s nature as three separate cultures merged into one, no true national spirit has
ever prevailed. Whenever the government in power was democratic enough to allow significant Kurdish and
Shiite participation, their respective demands threatened to shatter Iraq into its three ancient provinces. However,
such demands were kept in check only by oppressing the two political minorities altogether.
Hussein attempted to find the mission or national goal that would unite the diverse peoples of Iraq in a
common cause, rather than attempt to negotiate a solution to the minorities’ various complaints. He found his
cause in the past prominence of the region. Saddam has taken to educating the Iraqi people of the glory of
Mesopotamia, relating stories and fabricating myths designed to instill a regional pride in the Iraqis (Sciolino
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1991, 39). It is his contention that the great ancient civilizations of the region were Arabic and that those
civilizations are the basis for Iraq’s inherent superiority among the nations of the world. Through this
mythology, he urges the Iraqi people to help restore Iraq to its former greatness (Sciolino 1991, 39).
To further assist cultural unity, Hussein embarked on an ambitious project to rebuild Babylon. Major
archaeological sites were restored or recreated (with some fantasy thrown in), and Hussein portrayed himself as a
modern-day Nebuchadnezzar. History has been re-written to depict the rulers of the ancient cities as Iraqi cultural
heroes, with Saddam the next in the long line (Sciolino 1991, 50).
In the past, Ataturk, Turkey’s leader in the 1920s and 1930s, and more recently the shah of Iran, have both
attempted to inspire their people through ancient myths. In those countries, it was never taken seriously
(Sciolino 1991, 40). In Iraq, because dissent is not allowed, it is hard to find admitted skeptics of Hussein’s
claims. Still, it is believable that the stories have penetrated the Iraqis, especially the youth.
The stability that the Baath regime created in Iraq allowed it to engineer social policies that have had many
positive effects. The Baath’s position on development was to create a modern Arab nation that could stand as an
equal in the world. As a result, backward trends were frowned upon in favor of modernization and education.
The Baath party, recognizing the necessity of an educated public in bringing Iraq respect as a modern nation,
came out strongly against illiteracy in both its 1963 National Conference and the provisional constitution set up
after the regime’s rise to power in 1968 (Niblock 1982, 102). The vast rise in oil profits following
nationalization of oil interests in the early 1970s provided the funds to begin to effect the eradication of illiteracy
among the Iraqi population. A 1974 law gave the state responsibility for providing free education through the
university level. Later legislation made primary school mandatory (Niblock 1982, 103), and mandated two years
of literacy instruction for all adults ages fifteen to forty–five (Marr 1985, 263).
Even more interestingly, the Baath party strongly endorsed women’s emancipation. This may have seemed
out of place in an Islamic society; the Baath movement was not religious, however, but progressive (Niblock
1982, 77). As stated above, the Baath party wanted to see Arab society restored to a prominent role in the world,
and declared the inferior status of women in Iraq as an “integral part of the . . . tribal society”. As such, this
inferior status had no place in a modern Arab state (Niblock 1982, 77).
The Baath regime of 1968 subsequently followed through on its statements. Hussein himself has stated that
“any segregation of women . . . deprives the homeland of half its productive capacity” (Niblock 1982, 78).
Under the Baath regime, women’s education was promoted, and a serious attempt was made to increase
employment opportunities and reduce social prejudice.
Under the old regime, agriculture had been promoted at the expense of industry because of pro-British
feelings among the tribes. The Baath regime reversed this policy, lowering national expenditures on agriculture
and increasing support for industry (Marr 1985, 249). A large part of the industrial development occurred in the
areas of construction materials, textiles, and food processing, although iron, steel, and petrochemical plants
could be seen in the late 1970s (Marr 1985, 256). Agriculture stagnated early in the regime because of the focus
on industry, and in the late 1970s the Baath took a more serious look at their agricultural policy. It remains
subservient to industry, however (Marr 1985, 259).
While earlier revolutionary regimes tried to affect some of these changes, the instability of the coup decade
made it difficult to pursue an efficient national policy. In addition, the governments of that time were not around
long enough to achieve lasting effects. It was only under the relative stability of the Baath regime that such long
term policies could be realized.
The stability and progress in Iraq during the first decade of the Baath regime stands in marked contrast to the
chaos of the previous decade, the years of revolution. In addition, Iraq, under the Baath, began to achieve
prominence in the Middle East and respect in the international community that it was unable to assume while
under control of the British or in the midst of revolution. In spite of Iraq’s historical turmoil, the Baath regime
had begun to create a nation out of the diverse Iraqi people. It is the cultural and political history of Iraq through
Saddam Hussein’s ascension to President that set the stage for the subsequent political events in Iraq.
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The Political Evolution of Contemporary Iraq
In 1979, Iraq was a nation with a bright future. The population was educated, many social reforms had been
undertaken, and industry and infrastructure were developing rapidly. The profits Iraq earned from the sale of its
oil were put to use improving the lives and land of the Iraqi people, and it was not too difficult to imagine Iraq
joining the ranks of the developed nations within a decade or so.
By 1995, however, the story had changed. Today, Iraq must deal with an economy that is near collapse, the
declining morale of its people, and its international reputation as a reckless nation that must be monitored
constantly. The past fifteen years have seen Iraq through two wars and an international export sanctions regime
that has combined to practically destroy the country. Where the Iraq of 1979 showed promise, the Iraq of 1995
brings to mind images of despair.
This gradual shift in the fortunes of Iraq can be traced through the political events it has experienced over
the last fifteen years. The Iran-Iraq War, the invasion of Kuwait and subsequent Gulf War, and the sanctions
regime together illustrate a clear picture of how Iraq reached the situation it is in today. By studying these events
and their effects, we can better understand the policies of present and future Iraq.
By the time Saddam Hussein became President of Iraq in 1979, the leadership of the Baath party was secure.
Oil profits brought in $23 billion a year (Sciolino 1991, 106), and this was used to improve the country’s
infrastructure, social programs, and defense forces. The Iraqi military was one of the best in the Middle East, and
the government treasury had a surplus of $30 billion (Miller 1990, 9). With control of the country fully in
hand, Saddam increasingly began looking beyond Iraq’s borders. The Arab states were without a clear leader, and
Saddam saw himself as being in the perfect position to take that role. He hoped to inspire the entire Arab
region, and rally all the Arab states behind his dreams of greatness for the region.
Saddam’s plans were thrown off course, however, with the revolution in Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini’s new
Islamic republic also had dreams of leadership, and like Saddam, endorsed a collective strength among the states
of the region, especially in their struggle against Israel. However, Khomeini’s message carried more weight than
did Saddam’s because, where Saddam appealed to Arab unity, Khomeini appealed to the stronger tie of religious
unity (Sciolino 1991, 107). The tensions caused by this regional vie for power were increased when Khomeini
stated that the next target for his Islamic revolution would be Iraq. His government provided support to
underground Iraqi Shiite groups, and he encouraged the Iraqi Shiites to overthrow Saddam’s government and
recreate Iraq in Iran’s image.
Hussein finally took action against the Ayatollah and his threats and invaded Iran on September 22, 1980
(Pimlott 1992, 26), beginning the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. He had three goals in attacking Iran. First, he wanted
control over the strategic Shatt al-Arab waterway and the Iranian province of Khuzestan. Second, he wanted to
end the support Iran was giving to the Shiite dissidents in Iraq. Finally, Hussein thought it possible that he
could bring down the Khomeini regime and end the threat of takeover by a religious state permanently (Sciolino
1991, 108).
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Immediately before the war, all of Hussein’s advisors had assured him that Iran would be an easy target
(Miller 1990, 109) and would mount no credible defense. Hussein soon learned differently, however. He had
hoped to emulate Israel’s military strategy in the Six-Day war and crush Iran with a massive attack of great
breadth. For the first few days of the invasion, this strategy worked. However, Hussein, who had bestowed upon
himself the title of Field Marshal (Sciolino 1991, 112), insisted upon directing the war effort himself. His title
was merely honorary, however, and he had no real education in military strategy. The Iraqis tried to attack
quickly, but they were not quick enough; Iran had enough time to take advantage of Iraq’s poor strategies and
mount an effective defense.
The war on the front lines was a battle between the well-trained and well-equipped, but poorly led Iraqi army
and the hastily recruited, but devoted Iranian soldiers (Sciolino 1991, 113). Soon after solidifying their defense,
the Iranians began human-wave assaults, overwhelming the Iraqi forces with hordes of Iranians willing to die as
martyrs. By June 1982, Iran had pushed the Iraqis back out of Khorramshahr, across the Shatt al-Arab, and back
into Iraq, prompting Saddam to declare a unilateral cease-fire (Miller 1990, 114).
Khomeini, however, wanted no part of a cease-fire. He hated Hussein, and was determined to conquer Iraq.
Beginning in July, Iran launched its own offensives, with the intention of driving Hussein from power. It was
with these offensives that the war began to bog down. For the next six years, the war was largely static, with
the Iranians making some modest gains into Iraqi territory, but never winning the important battle that would
give them victory in the war.
By 1988, Hussein had given control of the war to his military, and they responded with some striking
victories. At the same time, more nations around the world were supporting Iraq in the conflict. Iran recognized
these factors, as well as the toll the war was taking on its own citizenry. On 18 July 1988, Khomeini finally
accepted a cease-fire (Miller 1990, 124), and with that acceptance confined his Islamic revolution to the borders
of Iran.
The war was essentially a stalemate; both Hussein and Khomeini had intended to drive the other from
power, and neither had succeeded. However, it had been Saddam who first attempted a cease-fire and thus became
the defender rather than the aggressor in the eyes of much of the world. In addition, Saddam had contained the
revolutionary Islamic fundamentalism that worried the world. The trend, therefore, was to see Saddam as the
victor in the war.
Although the Iraqi citizenry joyously celebrated the end of the war, the country had paid a heavy price for its
excursion. To begin with, the treasury surplus was gone, and was replaced with a war debt that exceeded $70
billion (Miller 1990, 126). In addition, 120,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed in the war, and nearly three times as
many were wounded (Miller 1990, 127). Further, Iraq had very little to show for those losses (Pimlott 1992,
33).
It was soon after the Iran-Iraq war ended that the problems that led to the Gulf war began to surface.
Wanting to rebuild Iraq and invest further in the army, but unable to do so without money, Hussein became
increasingly more belligerent toward the other Arab states. He first asked for, and then demanded, money from
his regional allies. Kuwait’s positions on the financial issue were especially infuriating to Saddam, and so it
was that, dreaming about the economic boost annexing Kuwait would give Iraq and thinking no one would care,
Hussein directed his army to invade Kuwait, setting the Gulf war in motion.
Hussein still had dreams of being the local Arab power, but his dreams of grandeur often surpassed what
was actually possible for a nation in Iraq’s condition (Sciolino 1991, 185). Burdened by the tremendous war
debt, Saddam could not hope to rebuild his country, fund the military, and pay back his loans from the other
Arab nations; something had to give. To Saddam, the simplest solution was to not pay back the loans. Most of
the Arab countries did not have a serious problem with this, because they had not really expected Iraq to pay
them back anyway (Miller 1990, 9). However, Kuwait frequently brought up Iraq’s debt and would not let the
issue die. The long-standing Kuwait-Iraqi border conflict was surfacing again, and Kuwait made the offer of
forgiving the debt in exchange for Iraqi recognition of Kuwaiti borders (Miller 1990, 10).
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Hussein was increasingly angered by Kuwait’s persistence, as well as the refusal of the other Gulf states to
give him more money to help rebuild Iraq. He felt that Iraq had done the Arab world a great service by holding
Iran at bay, and that the Gulf states should be much more grateful to him than they were (Miller 1990, 8).
While in public, Saddam continued to call the Arab world to greatness with talk of pushing Israel and the U.S.
presence out of the region. When talking privately with other Arab leaders, however, he was more concerned
with money (Miller 1990, 12). Finally, he stated to some Arab leaders, “if they don’t give it to me, I will know
how to take it” (Miller 1990, 12).
Between March and August of 1990, Iraq increasingly drew attention to the strains between the Middle East
and the United States. Meanwhile, it began to move troops to the Kuwaiti border. The movements were noticed
by intelligence agencies, but no one thought Hussein would attack Kuwait. On 25 July, a meeting, later to be
very controversial, took place at Hussein’s request between himself and U.S. Ambassador Glaspie (Miller 1990,
18). Apparently, Saddam left the meeting with the impression that America would do nothing if Hussein were
to invade Kuwait. So, over the next week, Hussein initiated even more troop movements, all the while diverting
world attention with fiery anti-West, anti-Israel rhetoric.
On 2 August 1990, Iraqi armed forces stormed across the Kuwaiti border and conquered Kuwait within six
hours (Miller 1990, 20). At the United Nations, ambassadors worked all night to release a resolution
condemning the invasion and demanding a complete withdrawal. The resolution also threatened Iraq with
economic sanctions if it did not withdraw (Sciolino 1991, 222). The United States began mustering
international support for sanctions, and the idea passed resoundingly in a UN resolution on 6 August, that
imposed a worldwide trade embargo with Iraq (Sciolino 1991, 223).
Iraq soon dropped any pretense of having some reason for being in Kuwait, and simply annexed the country
as Iraq’s nineteenth province. At the same time, a coalition of military forces was collecting on the Saudi
Arabia-Kuwaiti border. Over the next few months, a stalemate ensued, as various diplomatic means were used to
try to get Saddam to leave Kuwait. None of them, however, bore fruit. Finally, on 29 November 1990, the
United Nations passed resolution 678, approving the use of force to remove Iraq from Kuwait after 15 January
1991 (Sciolino 1991, 239).
After some last-minute diplomacy attempts failed, the allied military coalition sprung into force. The war
went overwhelmingly against Iraq, as the coalition established air supremacy relatively soon. When the ground
war began, it took about 100 hours to push through Kuwait and about a third of the way into Iraq before the
mission was declared over. The coalition forces, with very few casualties, had forced Iraq out of Kuwait.
Saddam Hussein had lost the Gulf war, but had no intention of relinquishing control of Iraq itself. The civil
war that followed the Gulf war was another demonstration of the Baath party’s effectiveness in quashing internal
rebellion. Using the methods that first suppressed opposition when the Baath came to power, Hussein again
imposed the state over the Iraqi people, and once again, the trade-off was made: personal liberties for internal
stability.
As the Gulf war ended, the situation in Iraq was a disaster. There was no electrical power, very little
gasoline, and severe shortages of medicine. Schools were closed, deserters refused to rejoin the army, and people
openly criticized Hussein. In the south and north, the political minorities—the Shiites and Kurds, respectively—
began to battle government forces (Sciolino 1991, 264).
Hussein first attempted to appeal to a sense of nationalism, getting on national radio and discussing the
fighting. He stated that a patriotic nation should not be dividing into separate warring sects, and that it was the
Baath party that had brought success and modernity to Iraq. As he used this approach, he also used what was left
of the army to recreate the former police state. Crowds were strafed with gunfire and dissenters hung as
examples. Again on the radio, he urged that the survival of the nation was at stake (Sciolino 1991, 265).
By early April 1991, fighting was decreasing in the Shiite communities, and massacres in the Kurdish
communities were reducing unrest there. The fear of the state returned, so much so that some of the rebellious
Kurds fled to Turkey and Iran, fearing retribution by the Iraqi state (Sciolino 1991, 266). In mid-April, U.S.
troops entered northern Iraq for about three months to set up refugee camps and to safely escort back into
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northern Iraq those Kurds who fled the country (Pimlott 1992, 278). Politically, at this point (excepting the
U.S. troops there), Iraq was back to pre-Gulf war status (Matthews 1993, 253). The nation had been stabilized,
opposition had been dealt with, and the fight had been taken out of the people.
A few years after the Gulf war, in July 1993, Iraq faced more fallout from the war. Rumors surfaced in
Kuwait and the United States that during ex-President George Bush’s April 1993 visit to Kuwait, there had been
an attempt on his life by Iraqi agents. Kuwait had apparently captured some Iraqis who confessed to a plot to kill
Bush with either a car bomb or with a suicide belt-bomb (Turque 1993, 17). The Clinton administration
investigated the charges, concluded they were true, and as retribution fired twenty-three Tomahawk cruise
missiles at the Iraqi intelligence headquarters (Turque 1993, 16).
Some applauded Clinton, while others questioned how conclusive the supposed proof was (Hersh 1993, 81).
In any case, however, there was enough evidence to convince most observers of Iraq’s intentions. A Kuwaiti
court acted upon much of the evidence and sentenced six Iraqis to death (although an appeals court upheld only
two of the death sentences). Throughout the affair, the Iraqi government has continued to deny that it was
involved in any way.
In October of 1994, there was another Gulf war flashback on the international stage. It appeared that Iraq had
finally begun to cooperate with the UN resolutions. Eager to have the oil embargo lifted, Hussein had been
“untypically sensible” (Economist 1994, 15). There were even some talks of oil deals once the embargo was
lifted (Tanner 1994, A3).
Perhaps tired of waiting for the Security Council to decide to lift the sanctions, Hussein directed troops to
again amass near the Kuwaiti border. He claimed they were on a training exercise; others, however, saw it as
another threat to Kuwait. The United States quickly sent 40 thousand troops, thirty-three warships, and about
six hundred fighters to the Gulf region to counteract a possible re-invasion (Economist 1994, 25). Hussein
promptly withdrew the troops on 11 and 12 October (Rossant 1994, 59).
There are many speculations as to what Hussein hoped to accomplish with this maneuver. If he hoped to
scare the Security Council into removing the sanctions, he incorrectly guessed the probable reactions of the
United States and its allies. If he intended to re-invade Kuwait, he underestimated the continuing strength and
resolve of the coalition, as well as overestimated the strength of his military, considerably reduced since his last
invasion (Rossant 1994, 59).
At any rate, an event designed to hasten the end of sanctions merely served to extend them. At its
subsequent bimonthly review meeting on 14 November, the Security Council voted to retain the sanctions
(Lyons 1994, A6).
Perhaps recognizing the likelihood of this result, and eager to stave it off, Iraq recognized Kuwait’s
independence and borders on 10 November (Crossette 1994, A1).
Most recently, Iraq has faced more problems in its northern areas, this time not from the Kurds, but from
Turkish forces that have occupied parts of northern Iraq. In an attempt to capture Turkish Kurd separatists who
killed fifteen Turkish soldiers, Turkey has sent an invasion force of 35 thousand troops and air units into the
Kurdish areas of Iraq. Iraq has protested the violation of its sovereignty, and has demanded that the Turkish forces
leave the country. Turkey, however, maintains that it will not leave until it has established a buffer zone to
insure that the rebels will not move back into Turkey or the Turkish–Iraqi border areas (Chicago Tribune, 24
March 1995). International response to the occupation has mainly been limited to concern for any civilians that
may be harmed by the Turkish forces (Chi ago Tribune, 23 March 1995).
The political successor to the Gulf War has been the international export sanctions regime. Under this
regime, a continuation of the sanctions placed on Iraq shortly after its invasion of Kuwait, there exists an
international embargo on Iraqi oil. In addition, no one can sell anything else to Iraq without violating the
embargo, outside of food and medicine. The embargo will not be removed until Iraq has destroyed all of its
facilities for creating weapons of mass destruction and a regular long-term monitoring system has been put in
place to keep Iraq from acquiring these weapons again. The other sanctions depend upon the Iraqi government’s
“policies and practices” (Economist 1994, 47).
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The sanctions, however, have taken their toll on Iraq. Saddam Hussein has had to take drastic steps to keep
the economy from collapsing, and even so, it still just barely functions. Inflation is rampant in sanctioned Iraq;
prices are doubling every few weeks (Waldman 1994, A10). Families are often forced to sell furniture,
heirlooms, even pots and pans, in order to afford food (Economist 1994, 46). Except for the most wealthy in
Iraq, buying power has almost been reduced to nothing.
Even the wealthy have cause for concern. Not only is the economy a shambles, but the social fabric of the
nation is as well. Without revenue to enforce its rule, the government of Iraq has reportedly had to resort to
extortion and protection rackets. It is said to be nearly impossible to get any kind of state job, such as renewing
a driver’s license, completed without bribing an official. The party enforcement officers have been known to
simply take various goods from ordinary Iraqis. Despite the fact that Saddam Hussein tripled the cost of an exit
visa, people are leaving Iraq in droves, escaping even to Yemen and Libya, countries with problems of their own
(Waldman 1994, A10).
Apart from the problem of affording food, even finding it is getting to be a problem. Medicine, too, is hard
to come by; doctors in Iraq say there is not even enough for the children. The death rate among children under
five in Iraq has doubled since 1990 (Economist 1994, 46).
Hussein, however, is insulated from these effects. The Iraqi government has spent large amounts of money
on construction work, and while some of it was infrastructure repairs, an estimated $500 million has been spent
restoring governmental palaces and building new ones, palaces that are the exclusive reign of Hussein and his
family. Saddam often claims that the sanctions are starving his people; however, the Security Council has heard
evidence of Saddam’s palace construction and has decided it is not yet time to remove sanctions (Lyons 1994,
A6).
The Security Council has offered a plan whereby Iraq can sell $1.6 billion worth of oil to buy food and
medicine for Iraq, but Hussein refuses to go along with it, claiming that setting a limit on how much oil he can
sell violates his nation’s sovereignty (Gordon 1994, A3).
The sanctions have been the subject of much international debate recently. France has been pushing
especially hard for their removal, with some support from Russia as well. France has gone so far as to reopen
diplomatic relations with Iraq and establish a French interest section in an embassy building in Iraq (Riding
1995, 6). The United States, on the other hand, would like to keep the sanctions in effect until Hussein changes
his ways, or barring that, until he is gone. The French, eager to do business in Iraq, are willing to be a little
more lenient with Iraq than are the United States and Britain, who are wary of Iraq’s intentions after its troop
movements in October 1994.
In addition, Iraq has further worsened relations with the United States by recently taking captive two
Americans who entered Iraq from Kuwait. The two Americans are aircraft contractors who were in the UN
neutral zone between Iraq and Kuwait trying to visit some friends nearby. According to the two men, they
accidentally crossed into Iraq when they took the wrong road. The Iraqi authorities picked them up for
questioning immediately and have held them ever since.
Iraq maintains that the two men are not innocent bystanders, but rather possible American spies sent to
sabotage Iraq. To that end, an Iraqi court has recently sentenced the two men to eight years in prison for entering
Iraq illegally (Chicago Tribune, 26 March 1995). The United States has enlisted the aid of other nations in
pressuring Iraq to free the men, but has refused to link the captives’ situation to the question of removing the
international sanctions.
When the sanctions are lifted, Iraq will have a new problem to worry about: war reparations. Two and six-
tenths million claims for damages have been filed with the United Nations—claims totaling $162 billion. The
United Nations has allowed claims as diverse as lost wages, environmental damage, and personal injury (Schmitt
1994, B9). Because the claims were meant to be paid from Iraq’s oil profits, and the sanctions have not been
lifted, the United Nations must, for now, ask for either donations or loans to countries that have frozen Iraqi
assets. Once the sanctions are lifted, the total claim amount is so high it could take many years to recover it
from Iraq (Schmitt 1994, B9).
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Meanwhile, Iraq has been managing to circumvent some of the sanctions. Recent reports indicate that Iraq
was able to smuggle enough oil out of the country to earn about $700 million to $800 million last year
(Ibrahim 1995, A1). Aided by a network of traders, Iraq has been selling its oil at a discount. By transporting the
oil across the border to Turkey or Iran, Iraq can sell the oil quickly without having to re-export it. Because the
middlemen traders purchase the oil at a discount, they can make a profit that is larger than the one they could get
if the oil was sold to them at the going rate. Overall, Iraq’s revenue from smuggled oil is only about 6 percent
of what it would be were the sanctions not in effect (Ibrahim 1995 A1). However, Iraq so desperately needs
money that even that small amount can help.
Iraq has been completely transformed over the past fifteen years. What was once a nation bursting with
potential has become a nation barely able to exist. The longer the sanctions stay in effect, the more damage will
be done to Iraq and its people. Eventually, efforts to keep the sanctions in effect may drive Saddam Hussein out
of power; then again, they may not.
What is almost certain, however, is that if Saddam remains in power, Iraq will remain a factor in the Middle
East. He has been synonymous with Iraq and Iraqi policy since ascending to the presidency and given time and
the profits of future oil sales (once he is again allowed to sell it), he will doubtless be able to rebuild Iraq. Iraq is
currently stagnating under extreme international pressure, but with free reign and sufficient resources, it is likely
that Hussein will bend the nation to his will for the next fifteen years, just as he has done for the last fifteen.
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The Development of Iraq’s Nuclear Program
The story of Iraq’s nuclear program and its discovery is one of determination, luck, and mistakes by both Iraq
and the international non-proliferation community. The methods by which Iraq was able to come within three or
four years of having a nuclear weapon, while at the same time keeping its efforts from being detected by the rest
of the world, helped to illustrate the problems and loopholes in the international efforts to check the spread of
weapons technology.
Although Iraq had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty , Saddam Hussein remained determined to acquire
nuclear weapons. This determination was borne out of a yearning for international status and a desire to counter
Israel’s nuclear capability. Hussein was a proponent of the policy of Charles de Gaulle, who set France on a
nuclear course because he believed that the important nations were the ones who possessed nuclear weapons.
Hussein reasoned that a nuclear weapons capability would make Iraq a regional superpower and the leader of the
Arab world, as well as bring Saddam and his country greater international respect. In addition, he felt the Arab
world must develop an “Islamic bomb” to balance the suspected nuclear power of Israel and even the scales of
the Arab–Israeli conflict (Miller 1990, 156).
It was under this motivation, then, that Iraq set about developing a nuclear program. Its first efforts were
not very extensive, consisting of a few bomb-related materials acquisitions and the French-supplied Osirak
reactor at Tuwaitha, on which construction was completed in 1981 (Miller 1990, 155). A few days before the
reactor was to go critical, Israel, increasingly worried about the possibility of the reactor being used to produce
nuclear weapons materials, destroyed the reactor in an air attack. At the time of the attack, the facility had
already been under the IAEA safeguards, and Iraq had made no violation of the NPT, so the attack by Israel was
condemned by, among others, the U.S. State Department and the IAEA itself (Weiss 1991, 11).
Although the reactor was up to that point used only for training and research (Weiss 1991, 11), Hussein had
stated that it was an element of the Arabs’ first nuclear weapons program (Miller 1990, 156). However, any
plans that Iraq may have had to use the reactor as part of a nuclear weapons program were ended with the
destruction of the reactor. It became apparent that if Iraq wanted to pursue a weapons program, it would be best
to do so along a number of parallel lines, making the program so widespread that any single, quick attack would
not be able to end all development efforts (Miller 1990, 156). Indeed, our more detailed knowledge about Iraq’s
second, more extensive and more decisive attempt to develop a nuclear program indicates that it did just that.
The program was diverse enough and spread out enough physically that it would have taken a major war to
destroy Iraq’s nuclear potential. In the end, the Gulf War proved to be what was necessary, and it was only after
the war that a weakened Iraq, under heavy international pressure, was forced to reveal all of the details of its
extensive nuclear program.
The information we have about Iraq’s second, more recent effort to develop nuclear technology, and its only
proven effort to develop nuclear weapons was acquired for the most part by the UN inspection teams that were
sent into Iraq after the Gulf War ended. These teams were charged with locating all aspects of Iraq’s military and
nuclear programs and reporting on what they found.
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The first postwar inspections began in late May of 1991. Administered through the IAEA, the inspections
were guided by international intelligence information, and were first directed toward the sites most strongly
suspected to involve nuclear research and technology. Iraq strongly objected to these efforts, and the early
inspections were hindered by confrontations with Iraq. However, diplomatic pressures soon forced Iraq to let the
inspectors proceed (Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear . . ” 1991, 15).
Iraq at this point admitted three separate, parallel programs to enrich uranium, but claimed that its
enrichment efforts were directed toward civilian uses of nuclear energy. Evidence also indicated that Iraq had
produced some uranium oxide and enriched a small quantity of uranium. As an NPT signatory, Iraq was required
to report such efforts and materials, but it had not. This is the only actual, technical violation of the NPT that
Iraq has reportedly committed (Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear . . ” 1991, 15).
Of the three enrichment efforts, Iraq had concentrated most heavily on calutrons, electromagnetic isotope
separators developed in America during the early stages of its own nuclear program. The United States had used
the devices during enrichment of the uranium for the Hiroshima bomb (Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear . . ” 1991,
19), but had long since discarded the technology as too expensive and energy intensive to be practical in a
modern nuclear program. Iraq, however, had considered calutron enrichment to be the best path to take, in part
because it was much easier to acquire the needed technology for calutrons than it was for other enrichment
methods. Iraq’s other two paths toward enrichment, gas centrifuges and chemical enrichment, had also seen some
progress, but had, in general, developed more slowly than the calutron efforts (Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear . . ”
1991, 15).
The first clue the international community had that Iraq was pursuing calutron technology came not after
the first inspections, but before the actual Gulf War even began. During the interim period between the invasion
of Kuwait and the start of the coalition’s military efforts, Iraq had used some hostages as “human shields,”
placing them near key Iraqi installations so that the allied forces would be reluctant to bomb those installations
because of the side-effect of harming the hostages, as well. The release of some of these hostages was
negotiated, and when those hostages left Iraq in December 1990, they were inspected by scientists and doctors. In
the clothing of people who had been held near nuclear sites the scientists found particles that were indicative of
calutron activity (Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear . . ” 1991, 16).
In the spring of 1991, again before the inspections began, more information surfaced about Iraq’s nuclear
efforts, provided by an Iraqi defector. The defector had been educated in America, and had been pressed into the
service of the Iraqi nuclear program when he returned to Iraq to get his family. Because of his involvement, he
had a rough idea of the extent of the Iraqi program, and indicated that Iraq had spent several billion dollars over
the course of the previous decade developing nuclear weapons technology. The majority of the resources,
according to his statements, had gone into developing the calutron enrichment program (Albright, “Iraq’s
Nuclear . . ” 1991, 16).
The efforts of the inspection teams bore out this early evidence of calutron technology. In July Iraq
acknowledged eight operable calutrons, again stating they were for civilian and scientific purposes. In addition,
Iraq indicated that it had seventeen additional calutrons being fabricated. The inspectors believed that there were
plans to eventually build hundreds of calutrons; Iraq, however, had not yet made the transition from research and
development efforts to large scale production (Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear . . ” 1991, 16).
Other information provided by the Iraqi defector was also helpful in directing the inspection team’s searches.
He described how Iraq’s efforts had been split into two separate branches. At the Tuwaitha nuclear research
center, located to the south of Baghdad, much of the weapons and enrichment research work was carried out. The
lessons learned there were then applied to the large scale production efforts being carried out at Tarmiya, a
facility about 60 km north of Baghdad.
During the May and June inspections, these facilities were examined. At Tuwaitha, the inspectors found the
remains of Iraq’s known nuclear program, the structure of which had been greatly damaged by the bombing raids
on Iraq during the Gulf War. Curiously, though, all of the nearby buildings were absent of any records or
equipment whatsoever (Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear . . ” 1991, 16). The inspectors later found some calutron
equipment near the site, and also evidence indicating Iraq could have operated 5–10 calutrons at the site.
Iraq—35
Additional evidence declared by Iraq indicated that the Tuwaitha center had supported research on ion sources,
magnets, and insulators for high voltage equipment (Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear . .” 1991, 17).
The results of the Tarmiya inspections were even more suspicious. A great deal of the ventilation and
electrical equipment had been ripped out of many of the buildings at the site, and there were indications that
large amounts of various materials had been moved around by bulldozers. As the inspections continued, there
were clear indications that the facility had been devoted to uranium enrichment. One of the key observations was
the large power supplies that were fed in to the buildings. One of the larger buildings had a power input of 100
MW, while another, smaller building had an input of 40 MW (Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear . . . ” 1991, 17).
These power requirements were indicative of a calutron enrichment process, which has enormous power
demands. Other evidence included nearby chemical processing buildings, cranes for disassembling calutrons, and
large cooling systems. Finally, inspectors agreed that the general layout of the buildings was consistent with a
calutron program. The estimates were that the larger building could hold 100 calutrons. These would have been
responsible for the initial stage of uranium enrichment. The final stage of enrichment would then have been
undertaken in the smaller building, which inspectors believed could hold about 40 calutrons. Operating with
such a set-up, Iraq would have been capable of enriching up to 20 kg of uranium per year (Albright, “Iraq’s
Nuclear . .” 1991, 17).
During the middle of July, the inspection teams uncovered another calutron production facility similar to
that at Tarmiya. This facility was located at Al Sharqat, which was located in the northern areas of Iraq, near
Mosul. The inspectors believed that this site was the only other calutron production facility Iraq had set up.
The only piece of the calutron puzzle that still remained to be found was the actual calutron equipment
itself. It was believed that such equipment existed, but the inspectors had not found it on any previous search.
They believed, therefore, that Iraq had moved the equipment to storage sites and had every intention of keeping it
hidden. Motivated by these beliefs, the team announced a surprise inspection of the Abu Gharaib military
barracks on 23 June. The Iraqis, however, refused to let the inspectors in. The team was delayed for three days,
and when they were finally let in to search the complex, they failed to find any calutron equipment (Albright,
“Iraq’s Nuclear . . ” 1991, 17). Two days later, the team made another surprise inspection, this time at
Fallujah, near Baghdad. The inspectors were again denied entrance to the facility, but one of them climbed a
tower and saw from that vantage point a convoy of sixty–eighty trucks leaving the back entrance of the
complex. The inspectors chased after these trucks, and got close enough to film calutron equipment inside the
trucks. However, Iraqis on the trucks then began shooting at the inspectors, and they were forced to end the
chase. The film that the inspectors took seemed to confirm their suspicions regarding the previously inspected
facilities (Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear . .” 1991, 17).
There were two other discoveries of major importance made by the inspection team. The first occurred in
late September, when the seventh inspection uncovered nuclear weapons program archives at the program
headquarters in Baghdad. These archives were richly detailed, and included records of Iraqi development plans as
well as details of the progress the Iraqi nuclear program had made (Albright, “Iraq’s Bomb” 1992, 30).
Throughout the inspections, the Iraqis had stated that nothing more remained to be found, and that the inspection
teams were basing their inspections on speculation about an extensive nuclear weapons program that did not
exist. The documents found by the seventh team, however, seemed to put any doubts concerning the extent of
the Iraqi program to rest (Albright, “Iraq’s Bomb” 1992, 30).
According to the discovered documents, Iraq had invested heavily in a nuclear program starting in the late
1980s. By about mid–1990, Iraqi scientists had made some progress in understanding the workings of a crude
nuclear device, and had begun experiments geared toward implosion techniques. The inspectors’ estimates, based
on the documents, were that at the start of the Gulf War Iraq was still a year or two away from having a working
weapon design, and was two or three years away from having its uranium enrichment plant working (Albright,
“Iraq’s Bomb” 1992, 30).
After the inspectors discovered the documents, they were held hostage for four days by the Iraqis. It took
diplomatic negotiations to set them free, and the information contained in the documents was then reported by
the inspectors (Albright, “Iraq’s Bomb” 1992, 32).
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The other major plant uncovered by the inspections was the Al Atheer laboratory, which was similar in
function to the Los Alamos laboratory in the United States. Inspectors described it as a dream research lab, full
of high-tech equipment for sophisticated research (Albright, “It’s All Over . . ” 1992, 9). Iraq had apparently
begun transferring weapons-relevant information from the research plant at Tuwaitha to the Al Atheer
laboratory. Much of the technology present at Al Atheer was geared to the nuclear program, but some of it was
unrelated or only loosely related, indicating that some Iraqi scientists may have been using the facility as a front
to perform unrelated research that they were personally interested in pursuing (Albright, “It’s All Over . . ”
1992, 9). The facility was finally destroyed on 14 April 1992.
There were also some minor facilities uncovered by the inspection teams. One of these was a plant near
Mosul that was set up to produce uranium tetrachloride, a feed material for enrichment. Near Zaafarniyah, 300
km southeast of Baghdad, the inspectors found two factories that were built to manufacture the calutron
equipment for the enrichment efforts at Tuwaitha, Tarmiya, and Al Sharqat (Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear . . ”
1991, 17).
There were also many international rumors concerning facilities that Iraq had that turned out to be false. The
rumored vast uranium mines were never located either, and there was no sign of an underground reactor.
Although Iraq had made some progress on gas centrifuge technology, a working enrichment plant using the
technology had never been set up and Iraq never actually even perfected the centrifuge technology itself
(Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear . . ” 1991, 17).
From the inspections, the international community gained a clearer picture of the progress, extent, and
future plans of Iraq’s nuclear program, in addition to the facilities involved. While details of Iraq’s progress had
been hyped and exaggerated at times to further the purposes of the coalition forces (Albright, “Iraq and the
Bomb . . ” 1991, 26), the information gleaned from the inspections presents a clearer picture of Iraq’s nuclear
timetable and how far along that timetable the Iraqi program had progressed.
The calutron efforts had shown the most promise early on, and it was those efforts with which Iraq had
hoped to generate its early enriched uranium supplies. One of the reports acquired by the inspection teams
detailed a plan to install 70 alpha (first stage) calutrons and 20 beta (second stage) calutrons from August 1989
through December 1992. The plan was to initially install 6 alpha calutrons by the end of 1989. A second group
of 16 alpha calutrons was to be installed within the next year, along with 4 of the beta calutrons. The increases
would then continue at that rate, with the number of alpha calutrons being increased to 38, 54, and finally 70,
adding 4 beta calutrons with each addition of alpha calutrons (Albright, “It’s All Over . . ” 1992, 9). This plan
was consistent with the inspectors’ rough estimates of 100 alpha calutrons and 40 beta calutrons at Tarmiya.
However, Iraq was at least a year behind schedule in its calutron installation. As stated before, only 8
calutrons had ever been installed by the time of the Kuwaiti invasion, and only 17 more were ready for
installation. In addition, no beta machines had yet been installed, and, in fact, only six were being built at the
time production ceased (Albright, “It’s All Over . . ” 1992, 9).
It is estimated that had the embargo against Iraq not been put into place, Iraq could have imported some of
the final parts it needed and finished enough of the calutron system to have enriched 15 kg of uranium by early
1994 (Albright, “It’s All Over . . ” 1992, 9).
In addition to Iraq’s progress on a weapons program, its exact holdings of enriched uranium could be
determined for the first time. The inspectors located 12.3 kg of 93 percent enriched uranium that had been
supplied by France to be used in the Osirak reactor. This quantity was known, and therefore came as no surprise.
The teams discovered, however, that only .5 kg of it was fresh; the rest would have been harder to use in a bomb
because it was slightly irradiated (Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear . . ” 1991, 21). Iraq also had a small, Soviet–
supplied research reactor at Tuwaitha, and this reactor contained a small, safeguarded quantity of 80 percent
enriched uranium. The actual amount was unknown, but was believed to be about 10 kg (Albright, “Iraq’s
Nuclear . . ” 1991, 21). The inspectors were surprised to find that the actual amount was more than three times
the suspected amount. A total of 33 kg of the 80 percent enriched uranium was found, but only 13.7 kg was
fresh. Four point four kg was still in the reactor core, and the remaining 14.9 kg was fully spent (Albright,
“Iraq’s Nuclear . . ” 1991, 22).
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The inspectors also were able to put to rest speculation on Iraq’s progress in other key areas of weapons
development. It was apparent from the Gulf War that Iraq had very little potential warhead missile delivery
efficiency; many of the Scud missiles Iraq launched against the United States broke up in mid-flight (Albright,
“Iraq’s Nuclear . . ” 1991, 22–23). A nuclear warhead can be very sensitive to gravitational forces and other
stresses, and the Iraqi Scuds could not have provided such protection (Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear . . ” 1991, 22–
23). In addition, the Iraqis lacked machining skills, and thus had difficulty making highly accurate parts for the
various aspects of its program (Albright, “Iraq’s Nuclear . . ” 1991, 23). Even the theoretical background was
not fully developed. In some cases, calculations did not fit experimental results; in other cases, the Iraqi
scientists could not get the experiments to work (Albright, “Iraq’s Bomb” 1992, 33). Iraq had also not
progressed very far on the neutron initiators needed to start a nuclear reaction in a bomb (Albright, “Iraq’s
Nuclear . . ” 1991, 23). The inspectors’ estimates were that, even working at an extremely fast pace, Iraq was
still more than a year away from just having a functional bomb design.
The relevance of the Iraqi nuclear program to future non-proliferation efforts is found in the details of Iraq’s
procurement network. While general construction materials are easy to acquire, more nuclear-relevant materials
are supposedly tightly controlled by the countries that manufacture this technology. Iraq’s methods of
circumventing these controls provide a case study of the shortcomings of the non-proliferation regime.
Iraq had very little trouble purchasing factories, power equipment, and other general materials that it used to
build the framework of its program. However, as its requests became more specific, it found that it could not
directly buy everything that it needed (Albright, “Iraq’s Shop . . ” 1992, 27). One method that Iraq used to
circumvent this problem was to establish middlemen and fronts for its efforts (Albright, “Iraq’s Shop . . ”
1992, 28). When the fact that Iraq was the true destination was disguised, the controls on material were often
easier to get around. Iraq also seized any uncontrolled equipment that was available. Often, this was done
regardless of whether the nuclear program had progressed enough to be able to use such materials or not. It was
in part these actions that made observers think Iraq was closer than it really was to a functional weapon
(Albright, “Iraq’s Shop . . ” 1992, 28).
Iraq’s efforts to develop calutron technology were successful largely because calutron technology is not
highly controlled (Albright, “Iraq’s Shop . . ” 1992, 28–29). The elements of calutrons are not as nuclear-
specific as those of other technologies, and the nuclear powers also had few concerns about calutron technology
because they had found it inefficient and therefore could not imagine anyone wanting to use it. Iraq’s gas
centrifuge program, on the other hand, developed more slowly precisely because its elements are more tightly
controlled by the non-proliferation regime.
Iraq was able to circumvent centrifuge controls to some degree, however (Albright, “Iraq’s Shop . . ”
1992, 29). They had been able to smuggle German materials and components into Iraq, and the blueprints for
Iraq’s centrifuges closely matched the Urenco gas centrifuge designs (Albright, “Iraq’s Shop . . ”1992, 37). By
the time of the Gulf War, Iraq had not settled on a final centrifuge design, but knew what was necessary to make
key components.
At various times, though, the international controls were able to hinder Iraq. In July 1990, German and
Swiss customs agents stopped the shipment of an order of computer numerically controlled machines from
reaching Iraq. These machines were likely going to be used to manufacture endcaps and baffles for centrifuges
(Albright, “Iraq’s Shop . . ” 1992, 29). Earlier, there was an attempt to smuggle detonation capacitors out of
CSI Technologies in California, and this attempt was also stopped (Albright, “Iraq’s Shop . . ” 1992, 29). The
Gulf War embargo, itself, kept out of Iraq some parts that otherwise would have gotten in, including an order of
aluminum pipe that would have been used to connect an array of centrifuges in a cascade (Albright, “Iraq’s
Shop . . ” 1992, 30).
Many of the sales to Iraq were undertaken because of the West’s sympathy for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war.
The feeling was that Iran was the enemy, and Iraq, who was fighting Iran, must be our ally. The operative
policy among parts manufacturers seemed to be “The enemy of my enemy is my customer”. However, as Iraq
became more of a threat, the manufactures continued, nonetheless, to supply Iraq with the materials it wanted
(Albright, “Iraq’s Shop . . ” 1992, 30).
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The development of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program helped to point out the deficiencies in the
international non-proliferation regime and how Iraq was dealt with by the international community will serve as
a blueprint for conflicts yet to come. As for Iraq, if they are determined, there is good reason to believe that they
will continue to attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. After all, while the materials have been dismantled and the
laboratories shut down, the knowledge of the Iraqi scientists remains intact. If given the chance, it is likely that
Iraq will again attempt to use that knowledge to balance the scales of the Mideast nuclear situation and provide
the Arab world with a nuclear weapons capability.
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Iraq’s Position on Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
When the international community negotiated the NPT twenty-five years ago, the intention was to end nuclear
proliferation among all the nations of the world. Instead, we find today three distinct groups of nations. First,
there are the vast majority of signatories, the nations who desire peace and signed on to the treaty with the
intention of exploring only peaceful nuclear power. These nations do not approve of nuclear blackmail, and
believe it is in the best interests of all nations to end the threat imposed by the nuclear few. Second, there are
the five nuclear powers, nations who, by way of the wording of the NPT, can possess large nuclear arsenals
without fear of diplomatic repercussions. These nations are were required upon ratification of the treaty to make
efforts toward disarmament, but instead have enlarged and modernized their arsenals in blatant disregard of their
treaty obligations. Finally, there are the most dangerous group of nations: those that have not yet signed the
treaty. These nations, some of which already possess nuclear arsenals, can develop sophisticated weapons and
gain military strength while feeling little or no pressure from the international community.
Iraq is most concerned with the nations of this third group, in particular Israel. Although Israel has never
admitted the existence of its nuclear program, and its western allies have cooperated in its charade, it is widely
recognized that Israel possesses such a program, and in fact has a nuclear arsenal capable of destroying Arab
states. Meanwhile, the Arab nations have faithfully adhered to their treaty obligations. The result is that a
tremendous disparity exists in the Middle East. Israel has the military power, backed up by its nuclear threat, to
hold the Arab states hostage to any of its demands. Such a disparity can be erased in only one of two ways:
either one or more Arab states must develop their own nuclear weapons, or Israel must accede to the NPT and
open its own nuclear program to inspection and, if necessary, dismantling.
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Iraq therefore feels that it cannot support an indefinite extension to the NPT while Israel remains a non-
signatory. Such an extension would permanently bind Iraq to non-nuclear status while allowing Israel to develop
nuclear weapons at will. Should Israel accede, however, and be subject to the same nuclear controls as the Arab
states, an indefinite extension would perhaps be in order, as the non-proliferation regime would then protect all
nations of the Middle East equally, and would create a nuclear peace in the region.
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Iran
Ben Halperin
Iranian Cultural Background
Nationalism is the multi-faceted characteristic of a large group of people that embodies the idea that this group
of people comprises a political community, one that is entitled to its own national state. Nationalism rests
firmly on the pillars of independence and dignity of the people. The nation of Iran is a unique example of this
manifestation of nationalism. Iran’s sense of national consciousness can be traced back for many centuries. In
addition, Iran’s nationalism is frequently characterized by other nations as a kind of “negative nationalism”.
Nationalism frequently calls for a relatively homogeneous population, the existence of a definite territory, a
distinctive historical and cultural tradition, a common language, and a common religion (Cottam 1964, 6).
Iran is essentially set apart geographically from its Middle Eastern Neighbors. It is bordered by the Zagros
Mountains, the Elburz Mountains, the Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and by vast desert expanses. Therefore,
Iran is easily defensible by land and was infrequently invaded during its history.
In addition, traditionally, travel in Iran was unthinkable. People identified with their tribe and for the most
part stayed in one place their entire lives. However, merchants, clerics, and intellectuals traveled frequently.
These were the people who would later plant the seeds of nationalism amongst the people of Iran. These were
the people who would build the roads and lay the railroad tracks. These were the people who would join together
the people of Iran.
The seeds of nationalism are frequently first strewn with a new, sudden presence of a foreign nation. Such
was the case with Iran. The first hints of modern nationalism in Iran began to appear around 1890, coinciding
with the appearance of English tobacco traders. However, Iran has a more ancient sense of nationalism.
Strains of nationalism can be found in the Shahnameh, or Chronicle of the Kings, a vast epic written about
1000 A.D. This work blends actual romantic history with romantic mythology. It has always appealed to a wide
cross-section of Iranians, and regardless of its factual content, it has created a predisposition for a rapid infection
with genuine nationalism (Cottam 1964, 27).
Iran has one of the oldest cultures in the world. While the classic poems of Sa’di, Hafez, Ferdosi, Rumi,
and Nezami may not contain nationalistic elements, per se, they are a source of great pride for many Iranians.
Indeed, even today, Iranians can quote these classic poems by heart (Cottam 1964, 28).
Many countries with a strong sense of nationalism sometimes contain a linguistic patchwork of different
languages, so one unified language is not necessarily the trademark of a nationalistic state. However, in Iran,
most of the people speak Persian—more than half claim Farsi as their first language (Congressional Quarterly,
213). Iranians can easily communicate with each other and this has always been a strong characteristic of their
nationalism.
More than 99 percent of Iran is Muslim. The remaining minority of Iranians are mostly Jewish, Christian,
or Zoroastrian. However, most of the non-Muslim population has recently sought refuge elsewhere. The absence
of non-Muslim religions merely increases identification with Islam and nationalism. Moreover, ninety-five
percent of Iranians are Shiite Muslims (Congressional Quarterly, 212). There are many variations of Shiite
Islam, but the sect to which most Iranians belong worships the male descendants (Imam) of Ali, the son-in-law
of Mohammed, particularly, the twelfth descendant. Iranian Shiite Muslims believe this twelfth descendant is in
hiding and is waiting to return and assume Islamic leadership (Cottam 1964, 134).
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On the other hand, most of the other Arab Muslims are Sunni Muslims. Shiite Islam has traditionally
appealed to Iranian Muslims mostly out of nationalistic concerns, to no great surprise. Ali’s son Hossein
married the daughter of an Iranian tribal king, Yazdgerd III. Iranians, therefore, could directly identify their
religion with their own history. In addition, because Shiite Islam is not the most popular form of Islam in the
world, perhaps this reinforces Iran’s feeling of independence. Iranian Muslims feel distinct from other Arab
Muslims, and this adds to Iran’s nationalistic sentiment.
In western countries, nationalism usually evolves independent of religion; nationalism in Christian
countries is a very secular creature. This is probably because of the fact that there was no one unifying religion,
as there is in Iran. In Iran the political is married to the religious. All aspects of life—social and political—are
based on the Koran and its interpretations.
England and Russia are a definite economic presence in Iran in the early 1900s. In 1906 Russia had
established a powerful bank; it owned important mining and communications concessions; and it controlled the
sugar, match and fishing industries (Cottam 1964, 161). However, Iran turned to the British for support in the
1906 revolution and it was the British model of a constitutional monarchy that the Iranians copied for their own
constitution of 1906–07. In 1906–07 Iran went through a modernizing revolution of sorts and ratified
constitutional documents that, in theory, converted Iran from a traditional society into a constitutional monarchy
(Miklos 1983, 23).
In 1917, after the Russian revolution, Soviet influence in Iran waned, and British influence grew, igniting
fears that England had imperial designs on Iran. Nevertheless, on 19 August 1919, England proposed a treaty,
wherein England promised territorial independence and integrity to Iran, along with a £2,000,000 loan. However,
the Iranians were not fooled by the transparency of the terms. England’s presence was already too great in Iran.
The British Foreign Minister of the time, Lord Curzon, was quoted as saying, “. . . in general, we should
assume toward Persia the role of a determined, although liberal protector”. The aristocratic elite were in favor of
the treaty. The press and the populace were decidedly opposed to it. Statements like Curzon’s were only more
fuel for the nationalistic fire. A secret society, the Mojazaad, was formed, with the expressed policy of
murdering “all lovers of England,” and launched a campaign of assassination and terror (Cottam 1964, 185). The
British backed down. On one hand, this was a great victory for Iranian nationalism. On the other hand, Iran
might have been able to work out a real treaty with England, had England recognized how strongly the Iranians
felt about nationalism.
In 1921 Iran signed a treaty of friendship with Russia. To some extent the rulers of Iran were seen as British
puppets. In any case, things were rather peaceful until around 1940 when Reza Shah began to support Hitler’s
German regime. Russia and England invaded in 1941. This invasion convinced many Iranians that Russia and
England had been acting in concert for years to overthrow Iran. By 1946, Azerbaijan had folded in to Russia, and
British influence shrank rapidly. Russia agreed to leave Iran in exchange for oil. Russian and British influence
was quickly replaced by the far-reaching powers of the United States.
In the 1950s Iran became a major player in the game of world politics because of its vast oil reserves. This
was another key factor in nationalistic pride. Fifty years earlier, Iran was the poorest of countries. At this time it
was a greatly sought-after world ally. However, Iran was hesitant to deal with the United States because of the
alliance between the United States and Britain. Anti-English sentiment was still running rampant through Iran.
In 1952 the British left Iran.
In the middle-and late-1950s there were allegations of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) involvement in
Iran. Supposedly, in the summer of 1953, the CIA helped to depose then-Premier Mohammed Mossadegh and
replace him with Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. However, the truth of this story is questionable. Other
accounts cite power plays between the Shah and Mossadegh and the public’s loss of confidence in Mossadegh as
the reason why he was deposed.
In the 1960s the Shah began a widespread reform policy based on six main issues: a land reform law, which
distributes the Imperial States to the peasantry; a law nationalizing the country’s forests, a law permitting the
sale of state-owned factories to the private sector to provide finances for the land reform program; a law requiring
that 20 percent of the net profits of factories and industrial establishments be shared with the workers; a law to
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amend election procedures toward the establishment of universal suffrage; and a law providing for a nationwide
literacy corps (Miklos 1983, 30). The Shah wanted the people to vote on these issues in a referendum election.
These issues all had one thing in common, they all sunk their roots deep in Iran’s nationalistic soil. The
general population loved the reforms, the clergy and the landed aristocracy, not surprisingly, did not. The Shah
won, so to speak, and the government was able to overcome the riots of the clergy. One of the many clerics
who were arrested and banished was the then relatively unknown Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The reform acts
ended up failing and the Shah was overthrown by Khomeini in 1977.
Often, the sense of Iranian nationalism is harshly criticized. For example, it was Iran’s sense of nationalism
that brought about the formation of the Mojazaad that was formed to assassinate British people. Indeed, later on
during Khomeini’s rule, Iran began its attacks on the United States. This is partially why Iran’s Nationalism is
so unique. The Iranians have such a strong sense of national pride, perhaps to a point that cannot be understood
by Westerners. Perhaps Westerners might also be put off by a non-understanding of Islam, which leads to an
anti-Arab, anti-Iranian attitude. Westerners probably also might be a bit miffed about having to purchase their
oil from a country that has hated them, or their allies, for so long.
It comes as no surprise that Iran is a nation rich with nationalism. Iran has a relatively homogenous
population, a definite territory, a distinctive historical and cultural tradition, a common language, and a common
religion—more than 95 percent of its population is Shiite Muslim. However, to most of the Western world,
Iran’s nationalism is viewed as a negative nationalism, partially because of the way the Western world has been
negatively affected by Iran’s nationalism.
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Iranian Politics From Khomeini to Rafsanjani
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is the foremost figure in modern Iranian history. His rise to power in Iran in the
late 1970s was the defining event in Iran’s recent history. He turned the Iran of the Shah on its head and replaced
it with the Iran of the Ayatollahs.
Khomeini was born in 1902. His father, a mullah, was killed by agents of rich landowners a few month’s
after his birth. Although Khomeini denied it, rumors still abound in Iran today that Reza Shah, who was a
soldier at the time, had direct involvement with the death of Khomeini’s father (Heikal 1981, 134). This rumor,
if true, begins to set the stage for the rest of Khomeini’s life. It was Shah Reza’s son, Shah Mohammed Reza,
who exiled Khomeini in 1963, and who, through the Iranian secret police (SAVAK), killed Khomeini’s son,
Mustafa, in 1977.
In many ways the riots of 1963 were antecedents of the revolution in 1977. The riots were organized by
religious leaders and were composed by common people demanding their rights from the oppressive Shah. The
Shah used SAVAK to squelch the voice of the religious revolutionaries—many religious leaders, including
Khomeini, were exiled. Others were tortured or killed (Heikal 1981, 121–123). For example, on 13 August
1978, SAVAK, in its efforts to terrorize the middle class, burned down a cinema, killing 430 people (Heikal
1981, 143).
Khomeini was exiled to Iraq, but he maintained contact with his religious pupils. From Iraq, he sent a
weekly tape-recorded message by messenger back to Iran. These cassettes started out highly theological in
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nature, and then, as time passed, became increasingly political. The cassettes were copied, Khomeini’s lessons
were transcribed, and soon his word spread across Iran. His lessons preached for Iranian democracy through
Islamic theocracy. Khomeini, from his distant perch in Iraq, quickly became the populist Iranian leader.
As early as 1974, the threat of revolution was in the air. The Iraqi President, Ahmed Hassan el-Bakr
approached him and asked him for support in his campaign against the Shah. Khomeini turned him down,
claiming that the time was not right.
In 1975, Iran and Iraq signed a peace treaty of sorts, agreeing not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs.
In 1977, the Shah invoked this treaty to ask Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi leader, to stop Khomeini’s activities.
Hussein was forced to consent and asked Khomeini to leave Iraq. However, the Shah quickly recognized that
Khomeini’s power would only grow if he went to another country, for he would still be able to spread his
teachings.
Just before Khomeini left Iraq for France, his son was killed by SAVAK (Heikal 1981, 135). All of
Khomeini’s followers mourned with him. On the final day of the traditional mourning period, Khomeini told
his followers, “We have shed enough tears . . ..What we need now is action”. In his final taped message from
Iraq, Khomeini instructed his followers to boycott all government institutions, withdraw from any form of
cooperation with the government, not to cooperate in any activity that might benefit the government, and to
initiate new Islamic institutions in every field, from the economic to the social to the cultural. (Heikal 1981,
141). The revolution had begun.
From France, Khomeini’s messages reached their highest intensity. Khomeini told the soldiers in the
Iranian army that the Shah was the devil, and that they should desert, taking their weapons with them. (Heikal
1981, 144). All of a sudden, it seemed as if all of Iran was against the Shah, and that the Shah’s army was a
phantom army, composed only of officers.
The Shah sneaked out of Iran on 16 January 1979, on a supposed State visit. For the next two weeks, Iran
was in utter turmoil. Officials in the Shah’s government moved to close all airports on 25 January, to prevent
Khomeini from returning to Tehran as he promised. Riots started on 26 January and ended on 1 February, when
Khomeini returned to Iran. His first actions were the immediate execution of all the Shah’s advisors and officers
who had not yet killed themselves. The Islamic Republic of Iran was declared on 1 April 1979.
As far as the West is concerned, the defining moment in terms of relations between Iran and the West was
on 4 November 1979, when revolutionary religious students took over the American embassy in Iran. The
takeover was essentially bloodless—the students practically walked in and disarmed the guards, as the guards had
no orders to shoot, and the students did not open fire. The takeover immediately received the support of
Khomeini, as well as the ire of the Western world, as the Iranian students held fifty-two of the embassy’s staff
members and other foreign service workers for what would be 444 days.
As soon as the students overtook the embassy, they began to uncover the secret CIA documents that
outlined the United States’ extensive role in Iranian politics (Congressional Quarterly, 219). The United States
demanded the return of the hostages, who were primarily civilians. Iran refused to even negotiate. Iran’s demands
were simple—the United States would deliver the Shah to Iran and officially apologize for its past behavior in
Iran—both of which the United States regarded as totally unacceptable (Sick 1991, 40). The Western world saw
Iran’s actions as belligerent and pointed to a disorganized power base as the source of Iran’s refusal to negotiate.
Appeals were made to Khomeini to follow the international law that was implicit among nations. Khomeini
again refused, claiming that for years Iran had been the victim of this supposed international law; so why should
Iran all of a sudden have to follow it? Eventually Iran consented, and the hostages were returned to the United
States. However, the hostage crisis had long-lasting effects on its relations with the United States, as well as on
affairs inside the United States.
The 1980s marked a decade of war with Iraq. In a typical underestimation on his part, Saddam Hussein
invaded Iran, hoping to capitalize on the supposed chaos in Tehran. Khomeini’s government responded with
lightening-quick reflexes and moved to counteract Iraq’s invasion. In June 1982, Iran had forced the Iraqi army
back to Iraq. Hussein offered to make peace with Khomeini. Perhaps Khomeini was still smarting from
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Hussein’s insults in 1977 when Hussein asked Khomeini to leave Iraq. In addition, Iraq was home to many
Shiites, who were treated as second-class citizens. Iran has their interests at heart, too. Maybe Khomeini and
Hussein just hated each other. Nevertheless, Khomeini rejected Hussein’s overtures and pushed his army into
Iraq. The war waged on until 1986, when a cease-fire agreement was signed. Hundreds of thousands of Iranian
soldiers were killed by the war, and the war sent Iran into economic depression.
However, the key issue with the Iran-Iraq war was that the hostage crisis overlapped with the beginning of
the war. Iran needed arms to fight Iraq. Surprisingly, the supplier of those arms was the United States itself.
There is evidence that suggests that during the 1980 Presidential campaign, the Republican campaign of Ronald
Reagan acted in concert with Iran. The deal was simple: Iran would keep the hostages until after Reagan was
inaugurated, in exchange for arms, which were provided to Iran by Israel (Sick 1991, Introduction, Ch. 4–8).
The war had further isolated Iran from the rest of the world. The war affected the world’s oil supply, for
example. The United States was forced to escort Kuwaiti oil tankers through the Persian Gulf during the latter
part of the war. Without a doubt, the hostage crisis and the Iran–Iraq war had long-lasting effects on its
relationship with Western nations, particularly with the United States. To this day the United States and Iran are
still at odds over other issues as well, such as Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
Khomeini died on 6 June 1989. Once again, it appeared that Iran was set for more turmoil. Amidst the
nation’s grief, Ayatollah Khamenei, Khomeini’s protégé since 1963 and Iran’s President, took over. Ali
Rafsanjani was elected in August to serve as President. The August elections also marked an official shift of
power from the Ayatollah to the President. By 1990, with Ayatollah Khamenei’s backing, Rafsanjani emerged
as the leader of Iran.
The 1990s marked quieter times for Iran. The nation was sick of revolution and still licking its wounds
from the war with Iraq. The Gulf War was an unusual success for Iran, based on the fact that it participated very
little in the war itself. For one thing, Iran was able to sit back and watch its two biggest enemies, the United
States and Iraq fight each other. Their old enemy Iraq would suffer enormously at the hands of the United States.
In addition, Iraq flew 137 warplanes to Iran for safekeeping. When Iraq asked for the planes back, Iran refused.
Iran continues to capitalize on Iraq’s weakness and currently is funding a number of Shiite rebellions in Iraq.
Currently, as in the 1970s and 1980s, it is Iran’s strong nationalistic identity, based on common religion,
which is keeping Iran together. Iran is still rebuilding from the war with Iraq. Iran is still dependent on Western
oil sales and Western technology as Rafsanjani continues to modernize Iran. Rafsanjani was re-elected in 1993,
but his support decreased to 63.2 percent of the electorate, down from 94.5 percent in 1989 (Congressional
Quarterly, 225).
The outlook for Iran is mixed. On one hand, the United States is set on continuing its campaigns to isolate
Iran from the rest of the world. Iran’s debts continue to mount. Actions such as placing missiles along the Strait
of Hormuz, as Iran did last month, only antagonize the West further. However, the Iranians are a proud people,
and their strong sense of nationalism will keep their nation together for a long time to come. Rafsanjani is
continuing economic and political reforms. However, Iran’s angry youth, the younger generation of Iranians
who were born after the fall of the Shah, know only war and economic hard times. However, the Iranians
outlasted colonization efforts by the Russians and the British. Iran has survived the oppressive rule of the Shah.
Iran has lived through Ayatollah Khomeini and the war with Iraq. Iran has persisted in one way or another for
more than 2500 years; Iran will continue to endure.
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The Position of Iran on the NPT
Last fall, Israel gave intelligence reports to Washington detailing supposed Iranian efforts to purchase gas
centrifuges in Germany and Switzerland. This report is false; the fears of Israel and the United States are
misplaced. Another irrational fear surrounds Iran’s deal with Russia to build a two-reactor power plant in Iran.
The United States should not have interfered with our deal—this is just another example of the United States
meddling in the affairs of other nations, especially ours. United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher
recently said of Iran, “No other nation employs terror more systematically as an instrument of national policy—
to destroy the (Middle East) peace process, to intimidate its neighbors, and to eliminate political opponents.”
This is a pack of lies as well and is detrimental to the process that we are about to undertake. Iran is committed
to the safe use of nuclear power and nuclear research. We have done nothing to intimidate other countries. As a
signatory state to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran is entitled to nuclear technology. We have simply been in
the process of getting what is duly ours. Iran is fully committed to the renewal of the NPT, if and only if we are
granted what is rightfully ours. We have not acted in violation of Article II of the treaty—no country can prove
that we have received the transfer of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, or that we have control over
those devices. Since signing the treaty, we have been waiting for the rest of the world to comply with Article
IV.
We are fully ready to comply with any safeguards that the IAEA wishes to impose on the nuclear reactors
that our country is not only entitled to, but desperately needs. Iran is no longer a third-world nation. We need
power to run our country. Nuclear technology for peaceful research and for power purposes has always been the
ideal to which Iran has subscribed. We hope that the rest of the world can realize this and give Iran the
technology it deserves.
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Adam Ciralsky
Israeli Cultural Background
The state of Israel came into being on 14 May 1948. As a new link in the chain of history, one for which Jews
had waited 1,878 years, the inhabitants of the state were deeply affected by the tragedies that had befallen their
forefathers. Israel had come into being contrary to all prevailing reason: in the course of its founders’ lifetimes,
on ancient land, through a modern Volkerwanderung of outcasts and idealists. Such things had happened before,
of course, but never so quickly, within the life span of a generation of founding fathers. Although other budding
territories had enjoyed the powerful military and political support of a mother country, the Zionist settlers had
accomplished their task alone, with only financial aid from their co-religionists abroad (Elon 1972, 16).
Orphaned from birth, Israelis seized upon Zionism’s component parts—Judaism, nationalism, and self-
reliance—as the guiding principles for their nation.
Over the past forty-six years as Israelis have struggled to put both achievements and disappointments into
context, they are constantly confronted with a sense of déjà vu. Nothing surprises this “old-new nation,” as the
first Prime Minister of Israel David Ben-Gurion often referred to his country. Israel, as a nation and a people, has
indeed come full circle.
Modern Jewish history began in the year 70 c.e. (common era) with Titus’ destruction of the second temple
in Jerusalem. As a result, the dispersion of Jews to all corners of the earth that had begun following the fall of
the Northern Kingdom (Israel) in 722 b.c.e. (before common era) and the destruction of Solomon’s Temple in
586 b.c.e. was complete. With no center of worship, as the temples in Jerusalem had formerly been, differences
in culture, ritual and social customs emerged among Jews exiled in Europe (Ashkenazim) and those relegated to
Spanish and Mediterranean countries (Sephardim). As reluctant immigrants, attempts by Jews to assimilate in
their places of refuge met with varying degrees of success.
The appointment of Jews to high government positions in the courts of Europe and the Mediterranean led
many in the Ashkenazi and Sephardic communities to believe that Jews could enjoy broad acceptance and a
meaningful existence in the Diaspora. Such wishful thinking was dispelled by subsequent events. In the
thirteenth century, the Catholic Church established a tribunal to discover and punish heretics. The Inquisition
quickly settled upon the Jews of Spain and Portugal presenting them with an ultimatum, conversion or death.
Soon thereafter, the Inquisition was set up in the Spanish and Portuguese dominions in Mexico, Peru and Goa.
Many Sephardic Jews who fled the terrors of the Inquisition in the old world found they could not escape its
reach in the new world (Bridger 1976, 219).
Ashkenazi Jews fared no better than their Sephardic brethren. The Crusades, begun toward the end of the
eleventh century ostensibly to recapture Palestine from the Moslem infidels, turned into a bitter and prolonged
ordeal for the Jewish communities in Europe. Ignorant mobs were incited by the leaders of the Crusades to
pillage and massacre whole Jewish communities. The cry was: “Before attempting to revenge ourselves upon the
Moslem unbelievers, let us first revenge ourselves upon the ‘killers of Christ’ living in our midst!” Thousands
of Jews perished, and entire Jewish communities were annihilated. To this day the Jewish liturgy contains
prayers commemorating the martyrs of that dreadful period (Bridger 1976, 101).
Unmitigated persecution, begun on a large scale with the Crusades and followed in close succession by the
Inquisition, raised serious doubts in both the Ashkenazi and Sephardic communities about the meaning of and
prospects for assimilation. Jewish men continued to pursue mobile professions as bankers, lawyers, doctors, or
merchants; portability allowed the breadwinner to reestablish his business in a less hostile environment if
conditions warranted. Education, long a centerpiece of the Jewish family structure, managed to remain
independent of the host state thereby guaranteeing its integrity and continuity. Jewish separatism, resulting from
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a lack of acceptance on the part of the non-Jewish populations in the first instance, fostered further resentment
toward the proverbial “wandering Jews”.
The Jewish communities of Europe were buoyed by the emancipation’s promise of equal religious, civil,
and political rights during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Bridger 1976, 130). Assimilation once again
seemed plausible as Jews curried and received favor with the courts of Europe. Jewish businesses and schools
flourished in the glow of tolerance. Anti-Semitism, seemingly under wraps, however, was quick to rear its ugly
head.
Pogroms, or anti-Jewish riots and massacres, began in Russia as early as 1881. Frequently instigated by
Tsarist and later by Soviet authorities, these outbreaks numbered in the hundreds and resulted in thousands of
Jewish deaths (Bridger 1976, 380). In France, Jews emancipated as a result of the Declaration of the Rights of
Man in 1789 had to contend with the anti-Semitic outbreaks that accompanied the trial and conviction of Alfred
Dreyfus for high treason in 1894. Dreyfus, a Jewish artillery captain assigned to the French army’s general staff,
was falsely accused of selling military secrets to Germany and was convicted on the basis of forged documents.
Theodore Herzl, a Viennese journalist covering the case was so shaken by its result that he vowed to devote the
rest of his life to freeing the Jewish people from their precarious existence through the establishment of a
Jewish national home in Palestine (Bridger 1976, 117).
Herzl wasted no time in his effort. In 1896, he published the Zionist manifesto, “Der Judenstadt”. One year
later, the World Zionist Organization convened with Herzl as president and began a world-wide campaign to
restore the Jewish nation and assert its right to settle in its ancient homeland (Ben-Gurion 1963, 4). Zionism
was for its devotees a fervor born of despair with societies that had made anti-Semitism official state policy
(Elon 1972, 44). The Zionist movement gave voice to the decision by thousands of Jews, desperate to escape
the anti-Semitic climate of late-nineteenth century Europe, to settle in Palestine as part of the First Aliya.
In 1917, British Foreign Secretary Lord Arthur James Balfour in a letter to Lord Rothschild, a leading figure
in the British Jewish community at the time, bestowed upon the Zionist effort its first measure of great power
sanction:
His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the
Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly
understood that nothing shall be done that may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish
communities in Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
The Balfour Declaration, as the letter to Lord Rothschild became known, proved an illusory promise. The
“best endeavours” that the British pledged to use in bringing about the creation of a Jewish State were not
clearly enunciated and, in any case, never materialized.
British intransigence over the disposition of the Palestinian Mandate coincided with the Second Aliya that
began in 1904 and culminated with the entry of more than sixty thousand Jews into Palestine in 1935. Arabs,
who had been selling land to Jews continuously since the First Aliya (1882), came to resent the return of
Palestine’s long-lost inhabitants and orchestrated a series of murderous attacks against the fledgling Jewish
communities beginning in 1936. British authorities in Palestine, believing Jewish Aliya responsible for the
hornet’s nest the mandate had become, did little to protect the Jews. As a result, the murderous assaults only
grew in ferocity (Ben-Gurion 1963, 14).
In London, the British Foreign Office, concerned about growing instability in Palestine, submitted the
infamous “White Paper of 1939” that, at the very moment when millions of European Jews were facing
merciless destruction, sought to limit the number of Jewish entrants into Palestine to seventy-five thousand for
the year. At the same time Neville Chamberlain was appeasing Hitler and the Nazis, he was undermining
Britain’s commitment to the Jews and pacifying Arab concerns about Jewish immigration (Ben-Gurion 1963,
15).
Nazism forced Zionism to become a straightforward rescue mission: a desperate attempt to salvage the
scattered seeds of European Jewry and replant them in ancient, if only marginally more hospitable, soil. Sadly,
the eclipse of civilization that culminated in the Nazi extermination of six million European Jews made the
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progress and ultimate breakthrough of Jewish nationalism irresistible. Persecution, generated by the failure of
emancipation and democracy in Europe, was the defining experience that lay at the origin of Israel as a modern
state and shapes the collective psyche to this day (Elon 1972, 43, 45).
In the wake of the Second World War, the United Nations voted on 29 November 1947, to partition
Palestine into independent Jewish and Arabs states joined in an economic union. Arab leaders announced, both
before the resolution was adopted and after, that they would fight it tooth and nail (Ben-Gurion 1963, 28). On 30
November 1947, Arabs opened a reinvigorated terrorist campaign against the Yishuv (the Jewish community in
Palestine). Six months later, Arab leaders, faced with the prospect of a Jewish state, dispatched their forces at
midnight on 15 May 1948, some eight hours after David Ben-Gurion declared Israel’s independence. To the
centuries-old Jewish conflict with Christianity, a new, unprecedented collision between Judaism and Islam was
added (Elon 1972, 28). Arabs who spoke fondly and frequently of “driving the Jews into the sea,” were
considered by the Israelis to be surrogates bent on perfecting Hitler’s Final Solution. The Mufti of Jerusalem
had in fact gone so far as to meet with Hitler during the War to find ways in which Arabs and Nazis might
collectively address the “Jewish problem”.
The Zionist revolution, it seemed, had failed in one of its major aims: it did not automatically secure Jews
from assault. However, a people who for centuries had been the helpless prey of innumerable massacres by
religious and political bigots, were at least now in a position to undertake their own defense. Zionist
nationalism became synonymous with Jewish self-defense, a transformation that the prevailing external threat
only served to reinforce. The Arabs by their continuing enmity reduced Zionism to that most basic of human
instincts, the will for self-preservation (Elon 1972, 27, 39).
Ashkenazim and Sephardim alike imbued in the young state their firm conviction that only a strong Israel
could vindicate the souls of the untold millions who died in exile. For Israel to be strong, however, she would
have to be independent. Israel’s leaders were not about to entrust her security to those who only years before
turned a blind eye to the destruction of one-third of world Jewry.
Israel’s founders also injected into the cultural and political milieu of the Jewish state a strong social ideal
derived from their shared experience in Eastern Europe. Collective farms, or kibbutzim, dotted the landscape as
Histradrut, the national labor union, emerged a force to be reckoned with. Socialism’s reach, however,
diminished over time as moshavim, or farms-for-profit, outnumbered kibbutzim and the exigencies of the free
market gave greater voice to management concerns. Kupat Holim (national health care) and a rapidly decreasing
number of state-owned enterprises are today the vestiges of Israel’s socialist experiment.
The role of Judaism, like that of socialism, has changed over time. With the exception of the American
Jewish experience, the centrality of religion for Jews in the diaspora had rarely been at issue. Zionism, however,
eliminated any previous distinction between Judaism as a religion and Judaism as a culture. Whereas United
States Jews continually grapple with whether to consider themselves “Jewish Americans” or “American Jews,”
Israelis were spared the metaphysical debate. To this day, non-religious Israelis cannot understand the
bewilderment of nominally religious United States Jews when confronted with the statement: “if you were a real
Jew you’d live in Israel”.
Judaism has, for many Israelis, been eclipsed by nationalism. One’s presence in and defense of the land
promised by God to Abraham are widely considered consummate acts of devotion. It is startling to many
observers that large numbers of Israelis have never attended synagogue, this in a country where Jewish holidays
are national holidays. Historians have been quick to cite the ambiguous place Judaism occupies in Israeli society
as Zionism’s greatest failure. Nothing could be further from the truth as even the most secular Israelis have
consistently fought and died for the right of their countrymen to decide if, how, and when to practice their
Judaism; a right long denied Jews in the diaspora.
For a sizable minority of Israeli society, the so-called “neo” and “ultra” orthodox, Judaism and Zionism
have remained separate, but compatible entities. Within this group there are even those who, while making their
home in Israel, reject the very idea of a Jewish State as incompatible with messianic dogma. The parallel
existence of secular nationalists and conscientious objectors is perhaps the greatest testament to the pluralism of
Israeli society.
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Self-reliance, like Judaism and nationalism, remains a distinguishing trait of Israeli society. A hallmark of
the diaspora existence, Israelis now consider the independence, which was once a matter of necessity, a matter of
pride. The strong Jewish emphasis on education has continued unabated along with the traditional preference for
mobile careers. Interestingly enough, the recent exodus of Jews from the former Soviet Union has produced the
opposite of “brain drain:” Israel now boasts more physicians, hard scientists and musicians than it can possibly
absorb. Long before the Russians arrived, however, Israelis engrossed in a multitude of pursuits found it difficult
to believe what collectively they had accomplished:
In one short lifetime, a modern welfare state had grown up in what had been a backward, partly barren,
thinly populated Ottoman province. In one short lifetime, a nation, spirited and cohesive, had developed out of a
horde of frightened refugees, the outcasts of Europe, survivors of concentration camps and primitive, half-literate
masses from the shoddy souks of the Near East and North Africa. A common language, painfully resurrected
from the dead, had emerged from a babel of tongues. In one short lifetime, big cities, theaters, orchestras, ballet
troupes, had sprouted in a confusion rarely found in much larger nations. Zoos, ports, and airfields, industries,
superhighways, traffic jams, great universities; all were the realization of their dreams (Elon 1972, 18).
One finds today an Israel that looks backward at least as often as forward, a society that scours history in an
attempt to account for modern day events. It is as if Americans, desperate to find their country’s place in an
uncertain world, unconsciously reverted to the colonialists’ and pre-colonialists’ experiences. Sabras, or native
Israelis, need not look nearly as far back in history as their parents, the past forty-six years having been
sufficiently illustrative. While Israel’s very existence has, at times, looked as tenuous as those of the Jewish
communities of the diaspora, there has remained one distinguishing characteristic: Jewish self-determination.
Be it Judaism, socialism, nationalism, or self-reliance, the choice of which path to pursue has been that of
the Israelis alone. Today, some 1,925 years after the Roman destruction of the Second Temple, there is even talk
of building a Third Temple. The circle is complete.
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The Political and Nuclear Situation in Israel
Israel is a nation preoccupied with security. This collective rapture serves to erase the distinction between
domestic and foreign policy issues oftentimes made in democratic states. When a border town like Kiryat
Shemona is pelted with Katyusha rockets from Lebanon, it is both a domestic and foreign policy crisis. Because
present political divisions are dictated by—what Americans would consider—”foreign policy” issues,
specifically, the amount, if any, of territorial compromise a party or individual supports, this paper will address
itself to the concept of “land for peace” as the well from which present day political divisions are drawn.
If Israel’s founders were concerned about fomenting a national identity quite apart from the lingering
“Holocaust mentality” of its populace, the “siege” or “bunker mentality” brought about by the 1948 War of
Independence soon assuaged their concerns. The inhabitants of the new state could barely mourn for family
members murdered at the hands of the Nazis before confronting the dim reality that their new neighborhood was
as dangerous as the old. Moreover, the nascent state itself could hardly get its bearings straight before having to
defend its very existence.
“Sabra” is the Hebrew word for a fruit endemic to the Jewish state and is frequently used to describe persons
born in Israel after its establishment in 1948. The fruit, prickly on the outside and sweet on the inside, is an
appropriate metaphor describing the way in which the state and its inhabitants were forced to develop.
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Israel is a state without a constitution. While counterintuitive perhaps, considering how democratic and
western-looking the Jewish state is, the reasons are rather straightforward. The first meeting of the Knesset,
Israel’s parliament, noted that the nation’s precarious security situation and changing social conditions (as a
result of mass immigration and deep divisions over the role of religion in the state) would plague any attempt at
writing a far reaching document. Several areas of national consensus quickly emerged, however, and together
with various “fundamental laws,” have served as an unwritten constitution and helped define the parameters of
Israel’s political system (Long 1986, 253).
Israel, influenced by years of British rule under the mandate, adopted the parliamentary system of
government and the fundamental laws adopted prior to 1985 have largely proscribed the functions of the Jewish
State’s coordinate political branches. A recently promulgated “basic law” concerning human dignity and freedom,
circumscribing state action—most notably in the area of criminal law—portends a commitment to civil rights
and civil liberties that has previously been largely unspoken.
The definition of Israel as a Jewish state is an important area of consensus among Israel’s ruling elite. In
spite of the fact that the “in-gathering of the exiles” in a Jewish state served as the impetus for Israel’s
establishment, the role of religion in the State has been a source of disagreement ever since. Israel’s character as
a social-welfare state, in which all citizens are provided equal access to health and social services, is also an area
of accord. As with the definition of Israel as a Jewish state, however, views differ widely regarding the scope and
method of implementation of this principle (Long 1986, 254).
The dominant area of political consensus in Israel today concerns the State’s security posture. Accord
generally centers on the maintenance of Israel’s territorial integrity and the protection of Israel’s citizenry from
terrorism. Once removed from these areas of agreement, political fissures quickly develop and divide Israel’s
body politic into camps.
Political parties in Israel have, over time, undergone numerous mergers, splits, disagreements, and
personality clashes (Long 1986, 257). Whereas pundits in the United States speak quizzically about third party
candidates, Israelis are unfazed by the prospect of twenty-third party candidates on their election ballots. The
sheer number of parties—thirty-one in 1981, twenty-six in 1984—demonstrates how impetuous a people
become after waiting nearly two thousand years for their sovereignty (Elon 1972, 299).
Smaller parties, which collectively form ruling coalitions, represent the socioeconomic and religious-secular
concerns of their members. The coalitions themselves, on the other hand, offer as their raison d’être divergent
views of accomplishing agreed upon security goals. Historically the cardinal issue dividing Likud and Labor, the
two largest voting blocs, has been whether to offer territorial concessions in exchange for peace. As Israel’s
territorial constitution has changed over time, it is imperative to any understanding of the modern day political
dynamic to examine Israeli military history.
The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia invaded the Jewish State within hours
of its declaration of independence on 15 May 1948. An amalgamation of Zionist fighters, although poorly armed
and gravely outnumbered, countered the Arab onslaught. Having previously rejected the 1947 United Nations
partition plan, the Arab nations sought to “drive the Jews into the sea” and envelop the land set aside for the
Zionists. To the Arabs’ surprise, after nearly a year of combat, separate armistice agreements based on cease-fire
lines—reflecting Israeli appropriation of the land set aside for a Palestinian state—were signed with Egypt,
Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. The temporary armistice agreements were intended to facilitate transition to a
permanent peace between Israel and her neighbors. Peace agreements marking an official end to hostilities,
however, were not concluded until 1979 and 1994 and then only between Egypt and Jordan, respectively.
Following Arab violations of the 1949 armistice agreements, including escalating acts of terror and
sabotage and culminating in the Egyptian blockade of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, in October 1956
the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) moved against Egyptian bases of attack in Gaza and the Sinai Peninsula, seizing
both areas. The coordination among Israel, Britain, and France in formulating a response to Egyptian action
irked the Eisenhower Administration that had deliberately been left in the dark about the attack. The United
States, in an unprecedented act of cooperation with the Soviet Union, subsequently demanded and received an end
to hostilities and an immediate Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and Sinai. Israel for its part received Egyptian
52—Israel
assurances that fedayeen (guerrilla) attacks would cease and that maritime blockades would not again be imposed.
Egyptian promises, however, proved illusory.
In June 1967, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser ordered UN peacekeeping forces out of the Sinai
peninsula and replaced them with Egyptian troops. Reneging on his promise, Nasser once again closed the
Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping. Syria, for its part, continued to shell Israeli kibbutzim and moshavim from
fortifications on the Golan Heights (Davis 1989, 36). These terror attacks—totaling forty-one separate incidents
throughout 1966 and thirty-seven incidents in the first four months of 1967 alone—were accompanied by Syrian
efforts to cut off Israeli access to fresh water. In the face of mounting tension, Israeli leaders ordered a
preemptive strike against Egypt and Syria. Jordan, forewarned by Israel to stay neutral, joined the fray. Israel,
fighting on three fronts, ultimately seized territory from each of the belligerents: Judea-Samaria from Jordan,
Gaza and Sinai from Egypt and the Golan Heights from Syria.
Following the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel sought to return captured territories in exchange for peace
agreements with her Arab neighbors. Hopes for territorial compromise, however, were soon dispelled by the
“Three No’s” promulgated by the Arab nations at the Khartoum summit in September 1967: No recognition,
No negotiation, No peace. In accordance with the spirit of Khartoum, Egypt in 1969 launched a series of
shelling attacks across the Suez Canal. Israel responded on several occasions with air power, knocking out
Egyptian positions. This series of altercations collectively known as “the War of Attrition” lasted well into
1970.
The standstill agreement that ended the War of Attrition was violated three years later as Egypt, along with
Syria, attacked the Jewish State. For Syria, the Yom Kippur War of 1973 was another in a series of attempts to
eradicate Israel. Egypt’s motivation, however, was not as obvious. Anwar Sadat took the reigns of power in
Egypt following Nasser’s death in 1970. Less inclined toward pan-Arab hegemony than his predecessor, Sadat
was also deeply resentful of the Soviet presence in Egypt. Sadat estimated that irrespective of Soviet support,
Egypt could not defeat Israel militarily. Furthermore, only the West had the financial wherewithal to solve
Egypt’s most pressing problem, a burgeoning population. Egypt’s aim in attacking on Yom Kippur 1973,
then, was limited to securing a palatable settlement with Israel that Sadat could parlay into badly needed capital
for his impoverished state.
The Yom Kippur War brought home to Israel a renewed sense of vulnerability. In the early stages of the
war as the IDF suffered heavy losses and prospects for survival were considered dim, then Prime Minister Golda
Meir put the State on nuclear alert (Raviv 1994,  393). Days later the nuclear alert was lifted, as attacking forces
were repelled and Israelis troops were within sight of Cairo and Damascus. A cease-fire agreement was
subsequently signed with Syria in which Israel ceded control of the town of Kuneitra. Cease-fire agreements
signed with Egypt were quickly superseded by a series of interim agreements and ultimately replaced by the
Israel–Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979. The Camp David Accords, of which the Israel–Egypt Peace Treaty was a
part, represented the apex of Sadat’s realignment with the West. For Israel, the Camp David process
demonstrated that territorial compromise was practicable. In exchange for relinquishing control of the Sinai
Peninsula, Israel received a peace treaty with its most dangerous adversary.
Throughout the remainder of the 1970s and well into the 1980s, Israel was forced to defend against a new
and increasingly innovative threat to its national existence, namely, terrorism. Between 1965 and 1982, 689
Israelis died and another 3,799 were wounded at the hands of Palestinian terrorists (Davis 1989, 128). While
different factions of these so-called “freedom fighters” were responsible for the bloodshed, the target of choice
was often the world’s airports and airliners, Table 1.
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For the terrorists, indiscriminate killing was insufficient to satisfy their ostensible goal of national
deliverance. In many instances Jews—including, but not limited to Israelis—were targeted, evoking painful
memories of selektion in the German death camps. To Israel’s leadership, the difference between Arab neighbors
bent on Israel’s annihilation and Palestinian terrorist groups targeting Israel’s supporters worldwide was
semantic if not meaningless. In essence, Israel’s foes were perceived as monolithic. The “honor among
terrorists” perception, in fact, continues to divide Israeli political thinking with those on the left discounting the
notion.
The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was created in 1964 at the behest of Nasser who sought to
harness the Palestinians’ militant spirit. The establishment of the PLO was a reflection of the mounting
pressure for the Arab states to do something for the Palestinian cause (Long 1986, 289). After the Arabs’
humiliating defeat in the Six-Day War, the Palestinian national movement formed an identity of its own,
becoming a credible force in both Palestinian and Arab politics. A symbiotic relationship soon developed
between the PLO and Israel’s Arab neighbors—as the PLO’s financial backers. The Arab nations could attack
Israel by proxy and retain a degree of plausible deniability while the Palestinians felt as though they were
providing for their own liberation. In 1968, the Palestinian National Council, the PLO’s quasi-governing body,
drafted the Palestinian National Covenant, committing the organization to Israel’s destruction:
Article 9: Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine and is therefore a strategy and not tactics
[sic]. The Palestinian Arab people affirms its absolute resolution and abiding determination to pursue the
armed struggle and to work for an armed popular revolution, to liberate its homeland and return to it to
maintain its right to a natural life in it, and to exercise its right of self-determination in it and sovereignty
over it.
Whether acting through its armed wing Fatah or admiring the handiwork of other Palestinian terrorist
groups—most notably the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)—trying to “one-up” Fatah, the PLO wasted no time in fulfilling the terms
of its Covenant. In 1974, for example, fifty-two persons, mostly women and children, were killed and more than
one hundred wounded in separate attacks in Kiryat Shemona, Ma’alot, Nahariya and Shamir. Four years later,
PLO terrorists after landing on a Tel Aviv beach commandeered a public bus and used it to hurl grenades and
shoot civilians, killing thirty-four and wounding eighty-two.
By 1980, Palestine Liberation Organization terrorists had moved their base of operation to southern
Lebanon, adjacent to Israel’s northern border. Taking full advantage of the newfound proximity to their nemesis,
the PLO launched heavy artillery and rocket attacks against northern Israel. Israelis living in the Galilee were
forced to take shelter underground to avoid the almost daily barrages. At the urging of Defense Minister Ariel
TABLE 1 Death Toll from Palestinian Terrorists at World Airports
Year Target Death Toll
1970 Swissair (midair explosion) 47
1972 Lod, Israel 26
1973 Munich, Germany 1
1973 Athens, Greece 5
1973 Rome, Italy 31
1976 Istanbul, Turkey 4
1976 Entebbe, Uganda 2
1985 Beirut, Lebanon 1
1985 Valletta, Malta 67
1985 Rome, Italy 13
1985 Vienna, Austria 3
1986 Karachi, Pakistan 21
1988 Nicosia, Cyprus 2
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Sharon, Prime Minister Menachem Begin ordered the IDF to enter Lebanon to destroy the Palestinian terrorist
infrastructure thereby restoring some degree of normalcy to the lives of Israel’s northern residents. Operation
Peace for Galilee, although successful in uprooting the bulk of PLO forces and leadership from Lebanon,
ultimately became a quagmire as Sharon expanded Israel’s war aims. Israel’s experience in Lebanon is often
compared to the experience of the United States in Vietnam, as neither country was able to fully comprehend,
much less affect, the chaos in which it found itself embroiled. The analogy is strengthened by the striking
similarity between Ariel Sharon and General William Westmoreland, both of whom lied to their respective
civilian commanders.
Israel has fought at least one war during each decade of her existence: 1948, 1956, 1967, 1969–70, 1973,
1982, 1990 (?). This fact, more than any other, accounts for the near obsession with national security that
serves to divide the nation into political camps.
The governing Israel Labor party of today was formed in 1968 when three smaller left-of-center parties—
Mapai, Ahdut Ha’avoda and Rafi—merged. Mapai, a predominantly socialist party, is Labor’s largest component
that traces its roots back to pre-state Israel. Founded by David Ben-Gurion in 1930, Mapai, was by far the most
prominent party in the Yishuv and later in the Israeli Knesset (Long 1986, 263). Mapai, in fact, consistently
obtained the largest single percentage of votes for the Knesset from 1948 until Labor’s defeat in 1977 (Long
1986, 263).
Governing Israel prior to 1977 was the exclusive province of the left. Labor’s reign, however, was as much
a matter of numbers as ideology. Ashkenazim were the first Jews to settle in large numbers in Palestine and
later the state of Israel. Like Ben-Gurion himself, these Jews of European descent had been indoctrinated in
Eastern European political thought and sought to establish their state accordingly.
With the remnants of European Jewry safe within her borders, Israel faced an influx of Jews from Arab
countries. Spared the fate of their European brethren during World War II, Sephardic Jews faced persecution of
their own following Israel’s establishment in 1948. Arab countries were unwilling to distinguish between Jews
and Zionists when, in fact, many of the Jews within their borders knew little if anything about Israel.
Beginning in the 1950s, Israel organized a series of airlifts to bring the bulk of Sephardic Jewry to safety:
Operation Magic Carpet (45 thousand Jews were flown out of Yemen), Operation Ali Baba (123 thousand Jews
flown out of Iraq) and Operation Moses (10 thousand Jews flown out of Ethiopia) (Long 1986, 244). The new
immigrants airlifted to Israel had no experience with European socialism, but, upon arrival, received the short
end of it. After years of substandard living in tent communities with few prospects for employment, Sephardic
Jews—once beholden to Ashkenazi politicians for their freedom—were in no mood to support Labor. By 1977
Sephardic Israelis had joined forces with those disaffected by a series of government scandals to oust the
seemingly unbeatable Labor party. The Likud Party, although triumphant, was an unproven entity.
Likud was formed in 1973 as a collection of right-of-center interests. Its roots, however, lie in the 1920s
revisionist movement with its dreams of a greater Israel. Founded by Vladimir Zeev Jabotinsky, Revisionist
Zionism shared Theodore Herzl’s premise that a Jewish state ought to be established in Palestine, but insisted
that the boundaries of such a state include all land promised the Jews by God. This philosophy, while of lesser
importance today, has influenced Likud’s position against territorial compromise. It was surprising, then, that
within a year of its unprecedented election victory in 1977, Menachem Begin’s Likud government promised to
return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. In 1981, however, Menachem Begin extended Israeli law to the Golan
Heights that in the eyes of the international community amounted to annexation.
The Labor Party’s return to the Israeli political landscape was not long in coming. Begin’s government that
had generated good will both at home and abroad by trading land for peace, was sidelined by the Achilles’ heel
Operation Peace for Galilee had become. Awash in national malaise, Israelis elected a government of national
unity in 1984. “National unity,” however, was something of a misnomer considering what followed.
Because neither Labor nor Likud was able to secure a clear electoral majority, a power-sharing arrangement
was concocted in which the two parties divided the several cabinet posts. Labor’s Shimon Peres and Likud’s
Yitzhak Shamir each took a turn as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The Israeli economy suffered and
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inflation skyrocketed as each party undermined the other’s achievements. Territorial compromise with all its
promise in the wake of Camp David further estranged the governing parties as Likud declared its unwillingness
to relinquish control of Judea–Samaria and Gaza.
A second coalition government was formed after the 1988 election in which no clear majority was
established. The question of Jewish settlements in the administered territories of Judea–Samaria and Gaza served
to erase any last vestiges of agreement between Labor and Likud. Shamir looked upon the settlers as fulfilling
the Jabotinsky’s vision. After all, Judea and Samaria were explicitly mentioned in the Torah. Labor’s Peres,
however, saw the settlements as an obstacle to peace and favored their dismantlement. By March 1990,
internecine fighting had so paralyzed the power structure that the second national unity government fell.
Likud emerged victorious from the 1990 power struggle only to face a potentially grave threat to Israeli
security. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the international coalition assembled in response to it placed Israel in
a precarious position. On the one hand, the United States, in leading the coalition, was about to strike a major
blow to Israel’s largest and most unpredictable adversary. Yet Israel’s leaders feared that the lack of Israeli
participation in the anti-Iraq force would lead to a further downgrading of Israel’s strategic value in the eyes of its
most important ally, the United States. The Bush administration that had worked only months before to topple
the shaky Israeli coalition, however, had no intention of allowing Shamir to spoil its efforts at coalition
building (Raviv 1994, 413).
Israel remained impassive as the Gulf War began, preferring to allow the United States to do her bidding. In
not providing for Israel’s own defense, however, Shamir strayed from Zionism’s guiding principle, self-defense.
Within hours of the U.S.-led air assault on his country, Saddam Hussein launched SCUD missiles against
Israel. As his frightened countrymen huddled in sealed rooms awaiting a determination as to whether the Iraqi
missiles were laden with chemical or biological agents, Prime Minister Shamir pleaded with President Bush for
the coalition Identity Friend or Foe (IFF) codes. The codes would have allowed the Israeli Air Force to attack
Baghdad, presumably, without being construed by coalition pilots as hostile Iraqi planes. Concerned about the
adverse impact Israeli participation would have on the coalition, however, Bush denied Shamir’s request
providing instead Patriot anti-ballistic missiles to defend Israeli cities.
The Iraqi SCUD attacks, generally considered militarily insignificant, deeply affected the Israeli psyche.
Israel had chosen reliance over self-defense with Shamir’s decision to keep Israel out of the Gulf War, based at
least in part on nebulous U.S. assurances. Within months after the Gulf War the Bush administration organized
the Madrid Conference, the first public face-to-face meeting between Israel and her neighbors. Bush and Baker
had by then forgotten Israeli restraint and demanded Shamir make concessions toward peace.
Shamir, for his part, deeply resented U.S. pressure. If only to snub Baker, Shamir infused still more money
into settlements. Infuriated by Shamir’s intransigence, Baker in turn used the $3.3 billion in annual aid to Israel
as leverage, subtracting from it the money used to build additional settlements. Yitzhak Rabin, Labor’s new
party chief, meanwhile, took advantage of Shamir’s preoccupation with fighting Washington to secure Labor’s
political base at home. The strategy paid off as Labor won resoundingly in the June 1992 election.
The face-to-face discussions that began at the Madrid Conference in 1991 continued, albeit with several
cessations in the discussions. The Israeli–Jordanian track was by far the most successful, leading to a peace
treaty between the two former enemies signed in September 1994. The PLO replaced the joint Jordanian–
Palestinian delegation that had previously represented the Palestinian cause at Madrid and for some time
afterward. The Israel–Syria and Israel–Lebanon tracks, which for all intents and purposes are one, have failed to
produce anything tangible. Progress in the Middle East, however, may be measured as much by a reduction in
tension as actual changes on the ground.
Secret negotiations between Israeli and PLO representatives in Oslo, Norway produced a breakthrough when
in August 1993 Arafat and Rabin signed the Declaration of Principles (DOP) on the south lawn of the White
House. In signing the DOP, Arafat recognized the state of Israel and committed his organization and the
Palestinian people at large to the pursuit of peace. The DOP, in turn, fostered the Gaza–Jericho Accord in which
Israel relinquished control of Gaza and the West Bank town of Jericho. Israel’s accession to the Accord, however,
was in part predicated on Arafat’s promise to control extremists within Palestinian ranks.
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The Gaza–Jericho process, which has served as a rallying cry for Arafat’s foes, has also begun to divide
what had previously been a largely supportive Israeli public. With every car bomb and bus attack in which
civilians and citizen-soldiers perish, Israelis who would normally describe themselves as centrist become more
receptive to the notes of caution coming from the right. Rabin and Peres, as the Accord’s great defenders, have
now begun to resort to the Zionist concept of “ein brerra” (no alternative) as the reason for moving forward with
the relinquishment of territory. In their estimation, Israel has no alternative to the Gaza–Jericho formula. Those
on the right, however, counter by suggesting that fewer civilians died when no process existed. Land for peace is
by no means a proven entity.
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The Position of Israel on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
As discussions begin this week over whether to extend the twenty–five–year–old Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, attention has again focused on the State of Israel’s refusal to take the vow of destructive celibacy that
Treaty accession requires. Israeli refusal to sign the NPT manifests a desire to maintain a nuclear deterrent that is
both flexible and covert. Disclosure would remove Israel’s ambiguous deterrent and aggravate an already
precarious security predicament.
Among the handful of nations refusing to sign the NPT, Israel stands apart as an example of “quasi-
proliferation,” understood to have nuclear weapons ready to fire, but never having proved as much (Quester
1973, 102). Direct evidence of an Israeli weapons program, like a nuclear test or an outright declaration, is
lacking. Circumstantial evidence, however, is overwhelming. As with all things covert, any attempt to detail
the Israeli nuclear program is likely rooted in conjecture. By piecing together various revelations, though, a
glimpse into the cloudy window of the Israeli nuclear program is possible.
The decision to harness the power of the atom for the sake of Israel’s defense appears to have been made by
David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first Prime Minister. The War of Independence that came on the heels of Jewish
extermination during World War II persuaded Ben-Gurion and others that the Jewish State had no alternative
other than to provide for her own defense. The Israeli Defense Forces, consolidated and strengthened as they were
following the Israeli victory in 1949, would, Ben-Gurion figured, always be at a numerical disadvantage. Israel
was obliged to pursue the ultimate force multiplier if she were to contend with the Arab hordes bent on her
destruction.
Israel received its first reactor, IRR-1 or Nahal Soreq, in 1954 as part of the Eisenhower Administration’s
“Atoms for Peace” Program. Exclusively a research reactor, Nahal Soreq was subsequently placed under IAEA
safeguards. In the same year, 1954, the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC) was founded under the
watchful eyes of Ernst Bergmann, considered by many to have been Israel’s Oppenheimer. Bergmann and his
team of scientists, while adhering to U.S. demands on IRR-1, were in close contact with the French nuclear
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scientists busy fashioning the Force de Frappe. The independent French nuclear arsenal figured heavily in Israel’s
strategic calculations inasmuch as Israel’s leaders viewed their nuclear program as a logical reaction to the
absence of security guarantees (or in France’s case, unacceptable guarantees).
France had served as a patron to the Jewish State from inception, supplying arms and moral support. The
1956 Suez Crisis in which Israel did much of France’s bidding only strengthened the kinship that had developed
among the “socialist” nations. French Prime Minister Guy Mollet was quoted as telling an aide at the time, “I
owe them the bomb, I owe them the bomb (Hersh 1993, 43)”.
IRR-2, frequently referred to by its location, Dimona, was constructed with French assistance beginning in
1958, but was not subject to French or IAEA safeguards (SIPRI 1972, 28). Dimona went critical sometime in
1962 and has been characterized as particularly well-suited for producing the fissionable material used in nuclear
bombs. The desert facility is reportedly similar to the American reactor at Savannah River, South Carolina,
which has been the source of a large part of the US plutonium stockpile (Pranger 1975, 12). While blue prints
for Dimona set the reactor size at 24 MW thermal, engineers with Saint-Gobain Techniques Nouvelles (SGN), a
French firm involved in the construction, described building a reactor capable of operating at three times that
capacity (Hersh 1993, 45).
U.S. intelligence agencies followed Dimona’s development and on numerous occasions made policy makers
aware of its bomb-building potential. President John F. Kennedy took stock of U-2 photos shown him,
determined to have Israel’s desert reactor inspected. Kennedy did make this inspection request in a 1961 meeting
with Ben-Gurion in New York. The fact that the President appears not to have pushed the inspection issue
suggests that the United States may have considered the Israeli bomb a welcome bulwark against Soviet
influence in the Middle East. If President Dwight W. Eisenhower was determined not to cover Israel with
America’s nuclear umbrella, President Kennedy was perhaps equally as inclined to allow Israel to cover herself.
Kennedy, apprehensive about the precedent of an unsafeguarded Israeli program, sweetened the inspection
request by offering advanced Hawk Surface-to-Air Missiles in exchange for a visit by U.S., not IAEA,
inspectors to Dimona. Ben-Gurion accepted the deal, allowing U.S. inspectors in 1962 to visit a hastily-built
mock control room portending to show a reactor capable of operating at 24 MW (Hersh 1993, 111). Israel had it
both ways, upgrading conventional air defenses and pursuing a covert weapons program.
At the same time American inspectors were coming home empty-handed, French firms were busy
constructing a reprocessing facility virtually identical to the one at Marcoule, the French nuclear weapons
complex. Charles De Gaulle, unlike his predecessor Mollet, found distasteful the prospect of French
responsibility for an Israeli bomb, ordering an end to French assistance in building the reprocessing plant at
Dimona. SGN, observing de Gaulle’s command, stopped construction on the facility only to find that another
French contractor had arrived to complete the job (Hersh 1993, 69). The Israeli program continued if by inertia
alone.
President Lyndon B. Johnson publicly chided the Israelis for not allowing IAEA inspections of IRR-2. In
private, however, Johnson had begun to incorporate the projected Israeli arsenal into U.S. strategic planning.
Johnson, paying lip service to international non-proliferation efforts, was privately very comfortable with the
progress at Dimona. For a time, however, Johnson sought Israeli accession to the NPT offering fifty F-4 jets
for it. When the Israelis refused to sign the Treaty, Johnson, unwilling to push the issue, provided the F-4s
anyway (Hersh 1993, 186). The Israeli military attaché to the U.S. Department of Defense, obviously aware of
the United States’ lack of resolve in securing an Israeli signature, asked that the F-4s be fitted with the Low
Altitude Bombing System (LABS), that facilitated the delivery of nuclear payloads (Hersh 1993, 194). The
request was ignored.
On 7 July 1970, CIA Director Richard Helms, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, admitted for the first time publicly that Israel had nuclear weapons in her arsenal. The Israeli nuclear
deterrent however, failed to deter Egyptian and Syrian forces from attacking on Yom Kippur 1973. Deterrence
likewise failed eighteen years later when, after Israel’s leaders intimated they might resort to nuclear retaliation,
Iraq fired some forty SCUDS against Israeli cities (Raviv 1994, 393). Irrespective of strategic considerations, by
1976 the CIA calculated that Israel possessed between ten and twenty nuclear weapons ready for use (Feldman
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1982, 215). Ten years later, a disgruntled Dimona employee confirmed for the world what had previously been
confined to national intelligence estimates.
Mordechai Vanunu began work as a nuclear technician at Dimona in 1977. By the early 1980s, Vanunu was
disillusioned with Israeli involvement in Lebanon and the second-class status of sephardim, or Jews of non-
European lineage, within Israel. After first joining the ranks of pro-Palestinian groups protesting in Beersheba,
Vanunu found another outlet for his discontentment. Armed with a 35-millimeter camera and a security card
stolen from a supervisor, Vanunu set about to document the full extent of the Israeli nuclear program (Nordland
1988, 15). In a move strengthening the credibility of his story, Vanunu was kidnapped by the Mossad in Italy
and returned to Israel. This would seem to suggest that the Israeli government, at the very least, had no desire to
see Vanunu interrogated by foreign experts in the field of nuclear weapons research.
The London Sunday Times, a virtual tabloid, was first to publish Vanunu’s sensational photographs. The
Israeli nuclear program, the existence of which had for decades been assumed, stunned proliferation experts the
world over with its sophistication. Vanunu’s images confirmed that Israel had developed a thermonuclear device,
the tritium facilities at Dimona suggesting an advanced boosted fission design (Nordland 1988, 15). In addition,
Israel possessed in her arsenal a low-yield neutron bomb, emitting enhanced radiation while producing minimal
blast.
If Vanunu’s photographs “exposed” the Israeli program, as the London Sunday Times headline promised,
why has Israel not come clean on the existence of or reasons for her weapons program? The answer has to do
with Israel’s choice of deterrent postures. Shai Feldman in his book, Israel  Nuclear Deterrence off rs three
nuclear deterrence postures that help categorize and explain a nation’s program:
Nuclear Option Posture: Implies that operational nuclear weapons have not yet been assembled, but that
the capability exists to do so within a relatively short time.
Bomb-in-the-Basement Posture: Implies that nuclear weapons have been assembled, but that this fact
has not been disclosed.
Overt Deterrence Posture: Implies that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is disclosed and becomes part
of the public domain (Feldman 1982, 7).
Israel maintains a “bomb-in-the-basement” posture that is almost uniformly considered overt. During the
Gulf War, for example, when Iraqi SCUDS were raining down on Tel Aviv, Haifa and Dimona—hardly a
coincidence—the world press made repeated references to Israel’s state of nuclear alert.
The mystery that surrounds Israel’s nuclear weapons capability has always been and continues to be
deliberate. Some commentators, overcome by Dimona’s intrigue, have gone so far as to claim that Mordechai
Vanunu was an Israeli agent—a calculated leak designed to enhance Israel’s ambiguous deterrent. An ambiguous
deterrent is said to produce deterrence through uncertainty. If Israel’s Arab neighbors cannot be sure that Israel
does not have nuclear weapons, they might be deterred from taking undesirable action (Feldman 1982, 10).
The decision to shroud Israel’s nuclear efforts in secrecy was both conscious and contentious. Two camps
developed during the late 1960s: those who agreed with Defense Minister Moshe Dayan that Israel ought to
declare her capability publicly and do so immediately; and those who followed Prime Minister Levi Eshkol’s
line of thinking that Israel ought to retain a bomb-in-the-basement posture (Nordland 1988, 16). Needless to
say, Eshkol’s camp prevailed and Israel’s nuclear program has been closed for public discussion ever since. The
only statement on the topic ever to have been delivered officially—and frequently for that matter—is that Israel
will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, nor will she be the second. This
nebulous assertion, first made by Foreign Minister Shimon Peres during a 1963 visit to Washington, remains
government policy to this day.
The caveat, that Israel will not be the second to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, denotes a
missionary zeal on the part of the Jewish State in maintaining a strategic advantage in the Middle East. The
Israeli government is not opposed to non-proliferation regimes, only those that fail to take account of regional
realities.
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Arab leaders have until recent weeks been reluctant to speak publicly about Israel’s nuclear capability for
fear that an admission of Israel nuclear superiority would expose them to enormous domestic pressures to
produce an adequate response (Feldman 1982, 13). Egypt, however, has taken the NPT renewal conference as an
opportunity to force Israel’s hand: if Israel does not join the NPT, Egypt and several other Arab nations will not
support the Treaty’s renewal. The Israeli government considers the Egyptian demand one more barrier thrown in
the way of normalization of relations between Israel and her neighbors.
Israel has long favored the NPT’s promise of a safer world, but its leaders have over time been discouraged
by the Treaty’s track record. The patent answer to questions regarding the NPT is that the Jewish State endorsed
the Treaty in principle when it voted in favor of UN Resolution 2373 XXII commending the text of the NPT
and remains engaged in a ‘deep, thorough, prolonged study to establish its attitude toward the Treaty’ (SIPRI
1972, 29). Ambiguous deterrence remains intact because by not rejecting the Treaty outright, Israel has not
admitted that possession of nuclear weapons precludes accession. While the Israeli position, at least in theory,
holds out the possibility of a signature, the inadequacy of safeguards, the make-up of the IAEA and the Treaty’s
failure to address regional concerns in a comprehensive fashion make Israeli adherence to the NPT unlikely.
The means by which the IAEA, as the NPT’s enforcement arm, verifies the integrity of nuclear weapons
technology are collectively referred to as safeguards. By installing surveillance cameras and tamperproof seals in
some six hundred nuclear facilities, the IAEA tries to provide timely detection of weapons programs (Gold 1990,
92). The sheer number of facilities under IAEA jurisdiction, however, make a hermetic system a virtual
impossibility. Henry Rowen, an Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Bush Administration, warned in 1980
that “[t]he international regime established by the NPT was [imperfect] from the beginning [and] with the
passage of time, doubts [have only grown] about the ability of safeguards to prevent the misuse of reprocessing
and enrichment facilities for military purposes (Yager 1980, 2)”. The dissection of the Iraqi weapons program in
the aftermath of the Gulf War only deepened Israeli concerns about the inadequacy of safeguards.
How Iraq, as a Treaty signatory subject to regular inspections, could develop as widespread a weapons
program as it had, vexed both critics and defenders of the NPT. In states that have sought to acquire nuclear
weapons, materials and facilities under the guise of a peaceful nuclear program, the safeguards system is
technologically obsolete and understaffed (Gold 1990, 93). Israeli leaders question the efficacy of allowing IAEA
inspections of the Dimona reactor—jeopardizing the state’s ambiguous deterrent and inviting considerable
international pressure—when similar inspections had failed to detect, much less divert, the Iraqi program. A two-
minute Israeli strike against the Iraqi reactor at Osirak in 1981, did more to delay the Iraqi program than years of
IAEA inspections. The current IAEA safeguards system simply does not provide a satisfactory alternative to the
deployment of a deterrent force by Israel (Gold 1990, 96).
UN inspections of the Iraqi nuclear program following the Gulf War revealed a program not more than two
years from completion.
The problem of Israel’s adversaries possessing nuclear weapons is compounded by geographical realities that
oblige nations in the region to adopt highly unstable launch-on-warning policies (Gold 1990, 89). Were an Arab
nation, like Iraq, to acquire the tools to inflict nuclear punishment on Israel, the disparity in area and numbers
would allow the Arabs to win nuclear confrontations because they would be willing to run higher risks
(Feldman 1982, 84).
Apart from the inadequacy of safeguards, Israel has taken issue with the very makeup of the International
Atomic Energy Agency. As a United Nations agency, the IAEA is composed of a Board of Governors chosen on
a regional basis (Quester 1973, 84). The likelihood of an Israeli being elected to an oversight position oscillates
between slim and none. Israel’s experience with other regionally-elected UN bodies (that is the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and World Health Organization (WHO)) makes it
all the more unlikely that Israeli interests would be protected in the IAEA.
Israel’s inability to affect the decision-making processes of an organization with the power to expose its
weapons activities engenders mistrust.
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Israel has criticized the discrimination between nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states inherent in
the NPT (SIPRI 1972, 29). Because NPT is predicated on adherence to the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC), the Treaty functionally disregards the large quantities and proven destructive capability of chemical
weapons possessed by Israel’s adversaries. The government of Israel advocates a more comprehensive regional
approach to arms control that would take into account the disparity between Israeli and Arab stockpiles of both
conventional and non-conventional weapons.
A Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) could serve as a credible alternative to unilateral adherence to the
NPT and provide an effective measure of non-proliferation in the region. Israeli leaders have observed that, in the
past, disarmament became a function of peace only when it was reciprocal, regulated, controlled and
meticulously safeguarded in all the details of its mutual application (Marom 1986, 5, 15). A NWFZ would
function as more of a confidence-building measure than the NPT simply because of the fact that it is, by
definition, regionally-tailored.
Israeli refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty must not be construed as opposition to the
principles it sets forth. Israel’s leaders, rather, have found that externally imposed restraints, characteristic of the
various non-proliferation and technology transfer regimes (NPT, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
and the Australia Group), have had limited success in preventing the proliferation of non-conventional weapons
in the Middle East. As long as restraints are imposed from the outside and resisted by the countries involved,
various forms of evasion will inevitably occur (Gold 1990, 91). One can expect that only a comprehensive
regional solution that takes into account both conventional and non-conventional proliferation will stand a
realistic chance of obtaining Israeli support.
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Algeria
Mitchell Rovner
The Cultural Background of Algeria
Algeria is a country unique in the world. It is mostly desert, yet the majority of the people are employed in
agriculture. It has a strong infrastructure, yet is extremely under-industrialized. These seeming inconsistencies
are the by-products of Algeria’s tumultuous history. Algeria began as a state of Berber tribes, became a part of
the Roman Empire, was taken over by the expansion of Islam, became a part of the Ottoman empire, was taken
over by the French, and then finally achieved independence. Algerian society is a representation of the different
influences it has faced throughout its history. To fully understand the culture of this country, its history must
first be investigated. Once the historical bases are known, their applications to the culture and society of today’s
Algeria can be understood.
The Berbers were the earliest recorded inhabitants of the Maghreb (The habitable area of North Africa that
lies north of the Sahara. When the Phoenicians began trading along the north coast of Africa in the 1100s B.C.,
Berbers were already occupying and controlling much of what is today Western Algeria and Morocco. Berbers
also lived in present-day Eastern Algeria and Libya, but in the time of the Phoenicians were under the control of
the city-state of Carthage. Very little is known of the Berbers in this period, in fact of the next thousand years,
until the fall of Carthage in 146 B.C. to the Roman Empire (Julien 1970, XV).
The destruction of Carthage began three centuries of Roman occupation of North Africa. The Romans
explored and developed farther into the interior of the Maghreb than the Phoenicians, but, in general, held largely
to the coastal areas. The Berbers, living to the south in the mountain and plains areas, remained relatively
independent. As was common with Roman expansion, Roman provinces coexisted with local monarchies in a
type of indirect colonial rule. It was a relatively prosperous time, and many ruins of Roman buildings,
aqueducts, and other infrastructure are visible today. In the mid-fifth century A.D., the Romans lost to the
Vandals, who operated along the coast for about a century. The Vandals, in turn, were defeated by the Byzantine
Emperor Justinian I in his attempt to restore the Roman Empire to North Africa (Julien 1970, XV). Byzantine
control was lost, however, to the first Arab invasions in the mid-seventh century A.D. The Arabs converted
most of the Berbers from Christianity, Judaism, and Paganism, and their successes were bolstered by continuing
penetrations throughout the next five hundred years. A second wave of Arab invasions came from Egypt in the
1100s, effectively solidifying control of the area (Julien 1970, XVI).
From the 1100s on, the territory of Algeria was ruled by successive Muslim dynasties most notably the
Almoravides and the Almohades (Julien 1970, 83). With the decline of the latter, power rested within small
autonomous kingdoms and tribes with little leverage over one another. In the late 1400s, the Spanish expanded
their crusades against the Muslims in Spain with a campaign in North Africa (Oliver 1981, 65–66). The
relatively chaotic political situation in Algeria facilitated the Spanish aims. By the early 1500s, the Spanish had
occupied a number of cities on the Algerian coast and had laid siege to Algiers (the area’s main port city and
later capital of Algeria) itself (Oliver 1981, 66). The inhabitants of Algiers enlisted the aid of the Barbarossa
brothers, Arouj and Kheir al-Din, Turkish corsairs who had a strong reputation for attacking Spanish shipping
and aiding Muslims in Spain (Oliver 1981, 66). They were able to drive the Spanish out of Algeria, and then
carved out a kingdom that became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1518. The Regency of Algiers (the kingdom
that was created) was headed by a BeylerBey, or Pasha, nominated by the Sultan of Turkey. Kheir al-Din was the
first Pasha of Algiers (Oliver 1981, 67).
Much of the prosperity that Algeria enjoyed in this period was because of the continuing actions of the
corsairs. The wars in the Mediterranean between the Spanish and Turkish navies had exacted a great toll on both
sides and the waters were open to privateering (Wolf 1979, 175). Turks, Berbers, Moors, Jews, and Christians
from all over the Mediterranean area who took to privateering were rapidly gaining power (Oliver 1981, 69).
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This was balanced however, by the growing power of the Ojak, the soldiers recruited under commission by the
Sultan of Turkey (Oliver 1981, 69). In matters relating to the interior, they grew in power much faster than the
corsairs, and soon took over the real power in the provinces. The corsairs kept the power in the city of Algiers,
as the profits they brought in held immense weight to the people. Everywhere else however, the Ojak reigned.
They set up administrative centers, and garrisons were posted in main towns. Those living in the countryside
remained under the control of their tribal and religious leaders, but were subject to taxation at any time a
garrison decided to march through and collect. The Ojak organized the kingdom into four provinces, each under a
Dey who functioned as a governor, and then subdivided the provinces into qa’aids. The military government
functioned very efficiently, with a chancellery controlled by four state secretaries who kept records of the profits
brought in by the corsairs and the taxes collected from the people. The chancellery also received orders from the
Sultan that it relayed in weekly meetings to the military commanders. This arrangement lasted for almost two
hundred years, until 1711, when a Pasha selected by the Sultan was rejected, and the office of Pasha and Dey
were combined (Oliver 1981, 69–70).
The growth of Algiers through the profits of the corsairs did not go unnoticed in the Mediterranean
community. The French were losing a great deal of their shipping because of the pirates. The French protected
shipping for almost every European power except the Dutch and the English at that time (Wolf 1979, 180).
Conflicts between the French and the Algerian corsairs began to arise in the 1600s and continued throughout the
1700s (Wolf 1979, 137–138). Concurrently, the military in Algeria continued to grow in power and distance
itself from the Ottoman Empire. Throughout most of the 1700s, Algeria acted independently and without much
incident, but that arrangement was due to change. Algerian agreements with certain European governments,
combined with the decline of good privateering crews, led to a decline of the corsairs at the end of the eighteenth
century (Wolf 1979, 285). The prosperity of Algiers began to subside as a result, which affected trade
throughout the country. This continued into the 1800s, and in 1830 France saw its opportunity.
On June 14, France launched a military action against Algeria. The French acted for three main reasons: in
response to an insult leveled at the French Consul General by the Dey Hussein, to end the reign of the corsairs,
and to revitalize the political efficacy of Charles X (Gordon 1966, 14). The Dey signed an article of surrender on
5 July, but the French conquest took many years to complete. The people of Algeria resisted from the
beginning. In 1832, under Emir Abd al-Qadir, the Algerian government organized to resist French advances, and
for years achieved political and military success. The Emir himself was not captured until 1847, but even that
did not spell the end of the resistance (Gordon 1966, 14). Revolts constantly occurred in the mountains and
southern plains areas until 1871. France, however, continued southward and by 1902 had controlled to what are
the present-day boundaries of Algeria (Gordon 1966, 14).
More than half a century before establishing control, in 1834, France proclaimed Algeria a French
possession. Although not its original goal, France began to encourage the colonization of Algeria by 1840
(Gordon 1966, 15). The best land was made available for French settlers, and economic assistance was provided.
Algeria began to be viewed by the French as an actual extension of French soil. Their eagerness to colonize was
shown by their offering of immediate French naturalization to other Europeans who would settle in Algeria
(Gordon 1966, 15). Following the military rule that characterized the first forty years of the conquest, civilian
governmental structures began to emerge in 1870. Local government and courts were set up in areas populated
by Europeans, and a policy of close integration between Algeria and France was practiced (Gordon 1966, 17).
Algerian Muslims were given the opportunity to become French nationals at the time, although most refused
because of the conflicts of adherence to both French civil and Islamic law (Gordon 1966, 36). The laws of the
Islamic religion require that no other laws be regarded as importantly. As a result, most Algerians entered the
twentieth century without such basic rights as the right to vote or involve themselves in the political processes
of their own country.
For the first half of the twentieth century, the status quo of Muslims as second-class citizens persisted, but
a new importance was thrust upon Algeria during World War II. Algiers became the seat of the French
provisional government during the occupation by Germany, and Algeria served as an Allied base of operations
for North Africa. In 1947, France decided to allow the Muslims political representation without requiring them
to forfeit Islamic law. Two electoral colleges were created, one for native and naturalized French citizens, and the
second for the Muslims. Although the Muslims outnumbered the French ten to one, they were allowed to elect
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the same number of representatives (Gordon 1966, 52). This arrangement was doomed to fail however, as
nationalist fervor began to grow in Algeria around this time.
On 1 November 1954, guerrilla actions were begun by the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) (Humbaraci
1966, 33). The rebellion received strong support and quickly spread throughout the country. By 1958, the FLN
began to consider itself the provisional government of the Algerian Republic (Humbaraci 1966, 40). In the same
year the European settlers and French military forces rebelled against their own government in Paris for fear that
Paris was about to negotiate with the FLN. This chaos allowed General De Gaulle to return to power in France.
De Gaulle sought to improve the situation of the Muslims in Algeria. In July of 1958 he replaced the two-
college system with one, and in October proposed a long-term economic and social reform program known as
the Constantine plan. De Gaulle was also concerned with the political and economic costs of a continued war,
and tried to reach an agreement on a policy of self-determination for Algeria. An agreement was reached in 1962,
and a referendum on an independent Algeria was accepted by the French people (Humbaraci 1966, 55–56).
The period from Algerian independence to the present-day can be considered “current” and has not had a large
impact on Algerian culture. Cultural influences are present from most of the powers that ruled Algeria
throughout the years, but none are nearly so pervasive as that of the Arabs and the religion of Islam. Islam
began around the year 610 A.D. when Mohammed, the religion’s founding prophet, had his first revelation as a
messenger of God. The revelations took the form of a restoration of the original religion of Abraham, the
founder of Judaism and monotheism, and include many of the tenets of Judaism and Christianity. During his
life, Mohammed recorded his revelations in the Koran, and it became the sacred text of Islam. Islam is a much
more comprehensive force than most Western views of religion. It encompasses personal faith, unification of
followers into a community, a code of ethics, laws, and a way of life. In a Muslim-dominated nation, Islam can
have strong influences on political theory and the role of state. To varying degrees, Muslims follow the tenets
of Islam, from literal and rigid interpretations of the law to more liberal personal interpretations. This
characteristic, although common to all religions, is perhaps best exemplified with Islam (Parker 1987, 86–87).
Algeria’s population is ninety-nine percent Muslim, so Islam is a large part of everyday life. Islam
encourages discussion of its doctrines, and is taught widely in the country (Parker 1987, 98). The doctrine of the
last day, which is similar to the Christian and Jewish notions of an apocalypse or judgment day, is pervasive in
the Islamic mentality. According to the doctrine, on the Last Day, every soul will have to stand before God and
account for its actions in life. The constant presence of a Last Day mentality inspires the followers of Islam to
keep their faith and to follow the rules of the Koran. The concept of jihad, or holy war, helps to explain the
willingness to revolt, as a Muslim is willing and happy to die to defend his beliefs. If Muslims are prevented
from forming a brotherhood under their own determination, as France prevented Algerian Muslims from doing
so, they will rise up to fight, as happened in 1954. But aside from the militancy that Islam can inspire, the
observance of the religion itself has an even bigger effect on Algerian culture (Parker 1987, 98–99).
The most active of the Islamic doctrines are the requirements for prayer. Each morning, prayers are called,
the first of five daily. Either at home or in a Mosque (Muslim Temple), the great majority of Muslims kneel
down facing the city of Mecca (the birthplace of Mohammed, in present-day Saudi Arabia) and worship. There
are specific prayers outlined called the salat, or ritual prayer, but personal prayers are also given. Another
doctrine, swam, requires both fasting during the daylight hours of the month of Ramadan, and the Id al-Fitr,
which is the festival to celebrate its end. Also integral to Islam is Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca, which all able-
bodied persons are supposed to make. Each Muslim in Algeria follows these doctrines to varying degrees, but
they are all present in the collective conscience of the country, which shows Islam to be its largest cultural
influence (Arberry 1969, 32–33).
Many of the other cultural influences in Algeria have their roots in economics or geography, which in
many ways are interrelated. Algeria is divided into three geographical areas, the coastal zone, the plateaus, and
the Sahara, from north to south, respectively. The coastal zone is, by far, the most fertile in Algeria and
accounts for about one sixteenth of the total land area, but nine tenths of the total population. Almost all urban
enclaves are in this region. Yearly rainfall in the coastal area is sufficient to supply rivers that are used for
irrigation. The plateau area is about twenty-five percent larger than the coastal area, and houses about five
percent of the population. Most of the residents in this zone pursue a nomadic lifestyle. The desert region is
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about ten times the size of the plateau region and also accounts for about five percent of the population. Its
population is also nomadic, except for those raising crops on the few oases present in the region. Only one
tenth of the Algeria’s land is arable, yet sixty-five percent of the population is involved in agriculture. This
dependence on agriculture has deleterious effects on the economy and is one of the reasons for Algeria’s low per
capita income. Agriculture, however fraught with problems, is still a huge part of Algerian society. It has been
extremely difficult for the government to try to change what is essentially an agrarian society into an industrial
one. The socialist government had discouraged private enterprise until the relatively recent admission that
industrialization does not proceed well without it.
The discovery of large oil and natural gas reserves in the Sahara has been a boom for Algeria’s economy.
This revenue allows Algeria to invest in more social programs, and has allowed for large expenditures on
education, so as to raise the literacy rate (Parker 1987, 45–46). The infrastructure left behind by the French, in
terms of equipment, roads, and so forth, is just beginning to be used to its full extent. What was essentially an
uneducated, untrained populace is beginning to improve itself, so the potential for growth in Algeria is
significant. With fewer people working at subsistence farming or for subsistence wages, more leisure time
becomes available for intellectual expansion and other pursuits. As a society becomes more industrialized,
niches in the economy develop and form markets for academia and the fine arts. The University of Algiers, both
stands as an example of this new market and shows what Algeria promises to achieve in the future.
Until the outbreak of civil war in 1992, Algeria had progressed rather democratically. It is unusual that
through such economic hardship they were able to maintain ideals such as representative government and
elections. This is even more surprising considering Algeria’s status as a former colony. Algeria inherited many
of the same problems other colonial states had upon achieving their independence. When the colonial power
leaves, with it goes its capital, ingenuity, and entrepreneurism, in political, economic, and social arenas.
Oftentimes, colonial powers upset the balance that the country had achieved before their arrival, but do not train
natives to act independently when they are gone. Government structures in Algeria were reserved for French
citizens only. Most business ventures were sponsored by French citizens. In accordance with mercantilist theory,
the purpose of a colony is to create revenue for the mother country, a process through which many countries
have their resources and their labor force pillaged before their eyes. Although Algeria was not in nearly as bad a
situation as other African colonies, its people did feel the effects of the French withdrawal. These effects were
combined with the weakening Algeria endured during its war for independence. Colonial powers are consistently
blamed for the slow development of the periphery, and Algeria is just one of many. But for all that the French
took with them, they left a great deal behind culturally. Although Arabic is spoken by most people in Algeria,
French language and culture has endured since Algeria’s independence. Algeria and France still have many
economic relations, and this constant contact ensures that French culture will continue to influence Algeria for
many years.
Algerian culture is an amalgamation of several distinct influences. With each successive ruling empire
through its history, the people of Algeria have retained something. The Arab invasions brought Islam to
Algeria, and it is now the biggest component of national culture and identity. The French occupation left many
cultural influences in Algeria, from fine arts to political structures. What was left was an agrarian society with
many subsistence workers, yet with good potential for growth. These factors combine to make Algeria unique
among Muslim states, and culturally unique throughout the world.
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Algeria’s Troubled Political Situation
Algeria, a nation so recently filled with hope toward its future, is in the midst of a bloody civil war. In 1992,
the ruling military elite canceled the results of the national elections, results that would have handed over control
of the government to the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The victory of the FIS was so resounding, that it would
have held enough seats in the legislature to enact their strongest campaign promise, to make Algeria an Islamic
state. The military knew the constitution would be rewritten as soon as the FIS took power, so immediately
following the preliminary elections, they began to raise questions as to the validity of the results. This was the
first step toward their eventual retention of power. Soon afterward, the final elections were canceled and the FIS
splintered. Offshoots of the FIS began guerrilla raids; led specifically by the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The
movement quickly gained steam, and Algeria was plunged into a full-scale civil war. The Islamic
fundamentalists were on one side, the military was on the other, and the people of Algeria were caught in the
middle (Shields 1994, 44).
The root of the Algerian civil war lies within the policies the government has followed since independence
in 1962. An elite class of fewer than five thousand has ruled the country of twenty-eight million for the past
thirty years, having seized power shortly after independence (Shields 1994, 45). What should have been a
progressive, industrializing economy, bolstered by oil and natural gas revenues, became an economy directed by
corrupt and inefficient one-party socialism. This left the country with high inflation, high unemployment, a
disproportionately sized public sector, and a population largely under thirty years old. These young people,
entering a period of their lives that should ideally be dominated by labor and earnings, instead are turning to
radical Islam for their focus.
The precedents for current government behavior came to be soon after the French turned over control of
Algeria to the FLN. Infighting broke out among rival factions vying for power in the war-torn country. The
conflict almost escalated into a civil war at the time, but power was finally seized by Ben Bella and Houari
Boumediene (Nelson 1985, 74). Ben Bella quickly organized legislative elections with a single slate of
candidates made up of military and political allies. The candidates were approved for five-year terms, and the first
meeting of the national assembly took place on 25 September 1962, only five days after the elections. On the
following day, Ben Bella was named premier and Boumediene named Minister of Defense. One of the first
policies they pursued was to stamp out any political dissension among the people. They banned political
activity by those not supportive of the new authoritarian government—specifically communists and left-wing
socialists. Ben Bella wanted to keep the FLN an elite party through which he could improve his own political
standing. While Ben Bella was busy consolidating his political power, Boumediene was consolidating and
reforming the army. In 1963, Ben Bella rewrote the constitution to legitimize his unification of power. The new
constitution established a position of President who acted as head of state, head of government, and supreme
commander of the armed forces. His power effectively had no check. In July of 1964, uprisings began in some
of Algeria’s southern regions, led by military holdouts from the war for independence. Ben Bella was able to
persuade them to join the government’s side by offering them party positions. This maneuvering was to prove
fatal however, as Boumediene perceived this as a threat to his power. This was crucial because most of Ben
Bella’s power rested with the military. Boumediene saw his policies as contrary to the national interest and took
notice. The people of Algeria were not happy, either. Bella’s emergency austerity measures further ravaged an
already war-torn populace. The government owned almost all major industries, but allowed the workers to
manage them. While this might sound beneficial, most workers were too inexperienced to do the job, and
industries such as agriculture suffered. The failure of this worker-management program, called autogestion, was
one of the reasons for Ben Bella’s downfall (Tlemcani 1986, 99).
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Throughout late 1964 and early 1965, Bella went about distancing himself from Boumediene. He even went
as far as to call for the formation of a popular militia to help offset the power of the army. In April of 1965, he
told the local police captains to report directly to him, instead of the Minister of the Interior, who was one of
Boumediene’s allies. He also attempted to fire his foreign minister, another ally of Boumediene’s, and wanted to
go toe-to-toe with Boumediene over the issue. During the Summer, Bella was making preparations to host a
conference of African and Asian leaders. Boumediene was concerned that Bella would greatly increase his
influence with the leaders of the non-aligned countries, and decided the time had come to depose him. On 19
June, Boumediene took over power in a bloodless coup, and Bella was taken into custody (Humbaraci 1966,
217–219).
Revolution (Nelson 1985, 83): Boumediene criticized both Ben Bella’s lust for power and his views of
socialism (Humbaraci 1966, 219). His first important political step after the coup itself was to dissolve the
national assembly and suspend the 1964 constitution. The power now rested with the Council of the
Revolution, a predominately military body created by Boumediene for the purpose of making policy and for
fostering relations between the political party and the military (Humbaraci 1966, 220). The stated goals of the
new government were the revitalization of the FLN, the formulation of a new constitution that would lead to
elections, and social and economic reform, especially in the agricultural sector.
Boumediene proved to be a true nationalist, and resented foreign influence strongly. He had been
traditionally educated in Arabic, was deeply influenced by Islamic values, and was one of the few prominent
Algerians who expressed himself better in Arabic than French (Nelson 1985, 85). His pragmatism and moderate
politics were quite a change from the flamboyance of Bella, and they were reflected in his reasons for the coup.
He simply wanted to avoid the consolidation of power under the president and wanted a government that would
respect the autonomy of the military. Because he did not have a strong political following, he allowed
representation in the government from many different factions, deferring to group decisions rather than by
exerting military influence. The arrangement was inherently unstable however, and leftist politicians and
military leaders became upset by Boumediene’s “betrayal” of the rigorous socialism proposed originally by Ben
Bella. In late 1967, a coup attempt was launched by Colonel Zbiri, the chief of staff of the army, but was
unable to gather enough support to overthrow Boumediene. After that incident however, Boumediene became
much more reclusive, and relied more heavily on his most intimate advisors. This coalition of military and
technical experts essentially replaced the party politicians in terms of government decision making. As a result,
the military became more involved in economic and civil development projects. The FLN became powerless, in
essence a symbol that functioned solely to rally public support for the regime (Nelson 1985, 87). The period
from 1968 on was one of stability for Algeria. It was during this time that Boumediene completed his
consolidation of power. New governmental structures were being developed, from the local through the national
level, and new goals and policies were formulated for the economy. Ben Bella and his supporters were shuffled
from prison to prison—or silenced permanently—and a state of relative political calm existed in Algeria for the
first time since before the war of independence with the French (Nelson 1985, 86–88).
From 1968–1973, Algeria assumed a much greater profile internationally. The internal situation of the
country was stable enough that the Boumediene regime was able to concentrate on giving Algeria the
international character of a nonaligned country. The Soviet Union was watching carefully what appeared to be a
military takeover of a friendly socialist (slightly communist) government, but their fears were assuaged when
Boumediene rebuffed Western advances to show that his regime was not Western-oriented (Nelson 1985, 88).
After the relative successes of this period, Boumediene became less reclusive at home, and more public of a
leader internationally. Rather than focusing on Algeria as a nation that had militarily defeated a colonial power,
he tried to show how Algeria had become an independent country through intelligent management of its natural
resources and diversification of its trading partners. Algerian foreign policy became a study of the relationship
between political and economic policies to the principle of non-alignment (Nelson 1985, 89). Boumediene felt
that the relationship between the industrialized East and West had caused the division of nations to be along the
lines of the developed North and the undeveloped South. He was a major proponent of using natural resources,
such as petroleum and natural gas, as a tool with which to establish a more equal relationship between the
developed nations and those of the periphery.
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Boumediene became a leading spokesman for a new economic balance in the world. In 1974, Algeria called
for a special session of the United Nations General Assembly to discuss natural resources and development. The
United States worked to limit the discussions to energy issues, and as a result, the problem of third world
economic development was not satisfactorily addressed. Algeria also took an active role in organizing both
African and Arab resistance to the state of Israel, and support for the PLO. Boumediene was highly critical of the
cease-fire agreements reached after both the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. In both instances, Algeria made a
move to replace Egypt as the Arab world leader (Nelson 1985, 90). Algeria was similarly critical of the Camp
David accords reached between Egypt and Israel in 1978. Concurrently, Algeria took an active role in supporting
the Western Saharan independence movement against Morocco, further exemplifying the increasing role Algeria
was trying to achieve in international politics (Parker 1987, 13–14).
In April of 1976, the regime finally acted on one of its original aims set forth in the 1965 coup, the
formation of a new constitution. The National Charter was drafted, and took the form of a philosophical and
ideological document on which the actual instrument of government could be based. Socialism was confirmed as
an “irreversible option” for Algeria, but to be used as a “strategic tool,” rather than political and economic
dogma (Nelson 1985, 93). The National Charter was published and submitted to an unprecedented debate among
the citizens, in the press, and in town meetings around the country. The people were allowed to propose
amendments in the meetings, of which many were accepted for the constitution, and the charter passed almost
unanimously in a national referendum in June. Boumediene presided over the constitutional convention that
turned out a document declaring Algeria to be a one-party state led by a president to be elected to a six-year term.
The president and candidates for the national assembly were to be chosen by the FLN and elected through direct,
universal suffrage. In November of 1976, the referendum for the constitution passed with more than ninety-nine
percent support. Boumediene was re-elected by ninety-five percent of the vote in December of 1976, but did not
preside for long thereafter. In September of 1978, he fell gravely ill and died on 27 December 1978. The Council
of the Revolution reconvened to take over the business of the government, because Boumediene had not chosen
a vice-president. There was a split in the government over the choice of a successor, with the army wanting one
candidate, and the moderates wanting another. To avoid the controversy, the party nominated Colonel Chadli
Benjedid, who was also confirmed almost unanimously, on 31 January 1979. The smooth transition was a credit
to the institutions that Boumediene had put in place (Nelson 1985, 96).
Benjedid’s first year was filled with making political appointments to his cabinet and working on policy
options with the political bureau, an executive committee of the FLN. In June of 1980 however, Benjedid began
his first ambitious plan as president. He summoned the a party congress for discussion of the drafting of a five-
year economic development plan. At the same time he also entertained discussion among the party members on
how to improve his administration. The five-year plan that Benjedid proposed was a very liberal shift in the
realm of economic planning. It stressed the importance of the private sector and of encouraging foreign
development. He also shifted the focus from the typical socialist-communist slant toward heavy industry to
agriculture, as no plan yet in place had had that great of an effect. He also suggested reorganization of some of
the state industries and state farms into smaller firms to increase efficiency. As with most economic plans, the
revenue for development would come from the sale of hydrocarbons, specifically natural gas, of which Algeria
had the fourth largest reserves in the world. Benjedid was adamant that foreign consumers should play a larger
role in the development of refineries and pipelines, and that without acceptance of higher prices, Algeria would
cut back on production (Nelson 1985, 96–97).
Politically, Benjedid also stressed reforms to strengthen the FLN. The FLN congress during Benjedid’s term
granted greater powers to the Secretary General of the party for political appointments. Benjedid also found a
way to attack social problems that had previously gone unresolved. During his term the government was able to
institute clean-up programs in the literal and figurative sense. The urban areas of Algiers and other cities were
swept of “parasitic elements” that included vagrants, criminals, listless youths, and rural migrants that had
descended upon the streets (Nelson 1985, 98). The police, using a good deal of physical intimidation, rounded up
these people and sent them off to work the state farms and public works projects. An effort was also made to
clean up the litter in the streets and to enforce traffic regulation to make the cities less congested. Political
corruption was also curtailed through a crackdown on many prominent politicians and executives in state
industries. All was not perfect however, as incidents of unrest in 1980 and 1981 would show. Benjedid
reaffirmed the government’s commitment to Arabization, but at the same time was forced to make concessions
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to the Berber minority in the arena of education. These concessions enraged the Muslim majority, and violent
clashes took place between Berber and Muslim students in Algiers (Djemil, 1995). Demonstrations also took
place by unemployed youth backed by leftist political groups. Benjedid however, was able to control the
situations without an overabundance of political fallout.
Benjedid was reelected in 1984 and continued with his programs of political, social, and economic
revitalization. A drop in world prices for oil and natural gas constrained the economy however, and planted seeds
of dissension. In 1986 a new National Charter was approved that increased the role of the private sector in the
economy, and declared socialism and Islam as the twin pillars of the state. The liberalized economy worked for a
while, but history tends to repeat itself, and in 1988 high unemployment, high inflation, and political
corruption were back (Djemil, 1995). This scenario sparked massive unrest in October of 1988, and
constitutional referendums were passed in February of 1989 that ended the Algerian commitment to socialism
and a one-party system. In July of 1989 a multi-party system was legalized and in the elections of June 1990 the
fundamentalist FIS won approximately sixty-five percent of the popular vote. The FIS geared up for the
legislative elections of 1991, while the military started to fear the end of its reign. Demands by fundamentalists
for an Islamic state led to the imposition of a virtual state of siege from June to September 1991. After the first
round of preliminary elections on 26 December, the FIS was poised for such a sweeping victory that again the
military disqualified the results on 11 January 1992. At the same time they also forced the resignation of
Benjedid. The government and presidential powers were assumed by a five member High Committee of State
(Entelis 1995, 14–16).
The aftermath of the military’s decision has been a bloody and protracted civil war. This has reached the
level where more than one thousand people are dying each week. The Islamic fundamentalists are practicing
guerrilla tactics, led by the ultra-extremist GIA, and the government is responding with “death squads” that shoot
on site. The GIA is trying to involve foreign nations, hoping that foreign pressure will cause the military
regime to crumble. They have pronounced a death sentence on all foreigners in Algeria, and have murdered at
least seventy-five in a recent count (Marlowe 1995, 75). Some of the more notable incidents include such
attacks as the December 1994 hijacking of an Air France jet and the brutal murders of seven Italian sailors at
port in Algiers. France is reluctantly backing the military regime, while the Islamic fundamentalists are
possibly receiving support from Iran, Morocco, and the Sudan (Shields 1994, 45 and Djemil, 1995). The
fighting has already brought down the gross domestic product of Algeria eight percent, further exaggerating the
problems facing the populace. The people of Algeria never supported the military regime, no longer support the
fundamentalists, and now are simply in the crossfire. People fear simply leaving their homes (Djemil, 1995).
The mass death in Algeria has come to the point that schoolchildren must step over dead bodies and pools
of blood on their way to class (Marlowe 1995, 51). Yet there is no end in site. The GIA continues to send
messages that they will never give up—even though most of their leaders have been imprisoned or killed. Even
if they were to win, most of the intellectuals and politicians that were poised to win the elections in 1992 are
dead, too. The military appointed a new president and provisional legislature in 1994, in what they say will be a
three year transition to democratic rule. The fundamentalists, needless to say, are not willing to wait and be
disappointed. Better supplied and better organized, the military is likely to win. But to what end? What is the
point of democratic rule if all of the candidates supported by the populace are disqualified through incarceration
and death? These questions have no clear answers, and neither does the question about how and when this
conflict will subside. The United States feels that the only way to end this conflict is to forge a negotiated
political solution between the fundamentalists and the military, but many also feel that option has long past
(Shields 1994, 45). The only thing that is clear is that Algeria is presently one of the most politically unstable
nations in the world, and certainly the most unstable in the North African-Middle Eastern sphere. No matter who
wins, or how or when it happens, a rift has been created in Algerian society that will exist long after the final
shots are fired. Whether through diplomacy, stalemate, or surrender, a self-perpetuating war such as this one is
best ended soon—hopefully soon enough for the people and the nation to recover.
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Algeria: From French Colony to Nuclear Proliferation Risk
Algeria’s progression from a French colony to a nuclear proliferation risk is a simple story of a nation striving
to improve its standing in the world order. Algeria, along with nations such as North Korea and Iraq, is
considered a nuclear threshold state, and is believed to be capable of building a bomb within the next ten years.
Military and energy concerns, which factor in to varying degrees in a nation’s desire to acquire nuclear weapons,
are very different in Algeria than in most nuclear hopefuls. Algeria possesses large quantities of oil and huge
quantities of natural gas and does not need a civilian nuclear program to provide energy to its people. It is
because of Algeria’s extensive hydrocarbon reserves that the international non-proliferation regime has focused
on Algeria as a potential threat. Algeria’s history since independence has been dominated by the influence of the
military over the government, or in many cases, the military as the government. This preponderance of military
thought in the political arena has caused the notion that the best route toward increased leverage for Algeria is
through the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
The power that Algeria’s military wields today is the product of a long history of conflict, going back to
the nation’s origins. Successive waves of invaders, from the Romans to the French, have occupied Algeria, each
militarizing the society in different ways. The birth of the modern Algerian armed forces is usually regarded as a
conference of the most prominent FLN leaders held in Soummam Valley in August of 1956 (Nelson 1985,
310). This meeting took place two years after the beginning of the guerrilla resistance against France, but a full
two years before the FLN became the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA). At the
conference, the FLN chiefs laid down the structure of the National Liberation Army (ALN), dividing the nation
into six military sectors, known as wilayaat. Each of the wilaya was then subdivided into zones, regions, and
sectors. A commander was appointed to each wilaya, each in control of a group of tactical units. A system of
military ranks and operational conduct was also adopted. The commanders themselves were subordinate to the
Coordination and Enforcement Committee (CCE), which was responsible for combining the previous guerrilla
activities into an organized fighting force (Nelson 1985, 310).
This arrangement proved too difficult to maintain, as political control over the armed forces fell apart
because of the ravages of war. In 1957 a campaign of strikes and violence broke down the organization of the
ALN inside Algeria, and the military leadership had to take refuge in Tunisia and Morocco. Those remaining,
referred to as the “internal ALN,” continued to fight and contributed to the war effort that eventually led to
independence. The “external ALN” set up bases near the borders of Algeria and were able to reorganize along the
lines of a conventional army. They trained and obtained modern equipment, largely through the generosity of
sympathetic foreign governments. The external ALN attempted to supply the internal ALN with arms and other
equipment, but were often foiled by effective French defense of the borders. Toward the end of the war,
factionalism began to develop based on which division of the ALN should be dominant after independence.
Issues were also raised as to whether the military was to be subordinate to the civilian government, or if it
should have an independent status (Nelson 1985, 311).
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Approximately one week before the signing of the Evian Accords that ended the war, the GPRA dismissed
Houari Boumediene and the rest of the general staff. Boumediene controlled the strongest armed faction of the
ALN and decided to reject the authority of the GPRA. He supported Ben Bella, one of the chiefs of the
revolution, against the GPRA and led contingents of the external ALN eastward from Morocco to Algiers. In
Algiers he met with Ben Bella and became the minister of defense in the government that Ben Bella formed in
September of 1962 (Parker 1987, 38).
The GPRA’s failure to assert its political power over the military in 1962 was an important aspect of
Algerian military evolution. The ALN that became the National Popular Army (ANP) had entrenched itself as
an institution with vast political power. The Algerian leadership began to debate the merits of limiting the size
and force of the military, inspired by former internal ALN leaders and enemies of Boumediene (Nelson 1985,
312). Boumediene however reasserted the need for a modern state to have a well-equipped and trained armed force
and set about integrating remaining guerrilla elements into the army (Parker 1987, 39). The size and diversity of
the army were far beyond what was needed in Algeria at the time and imposed a heavy burden on the economy.
Boumediene began to reduce, consolidate, and reorganize the army, but essentially completely restructured it.
The wilayaat were done away with, and new military regions were formed. The former guerrilla commanders
were replaced with officers that Boumediene trusted, many of whom had been trained in the French army prior to
independence. Ben Bella began to fear the consolidation of power under his minister of defense and took steps to
wrest it back. He drew up a new constitution in 1963 that named him commander in chief and three weeks later
appointed a military chief of staff. In 1964 he called for full FLN (now the ruling party) control of the military
and the creation of people’s militias. Boumediene strongly resisted these changes and moved to reinforce his
control over the military by forming alliances with leaders that were previously his rivals. He exacted a coup
d’état in June of 1965 in which Ben Bella was arrested by his own chief of staff. Boumediene and his Council of
the Revolution became the new government (Nelson 1985, 313).
The coup of Boumediene strongly affected the relationship between the military and the government. After
the coup, the military became closely identified with Boumediene’s government, and Benjedid’s later. Neither
was truly a military regime, but Algerian leaders counted on ANP support in political and security matters.
Legislation was unlikely to pass if it faced united ANP opposition. Boumediene’s Council of the Revolution
contained twenty-two military men out of twenty-six members, twelve of whom were presently serving as
officers in the ANP. By 1967, internal tensions had died down, and Boumediene began to rule through his
Council of Ministers, an entirely political entity. A coup attempt in late 1967 showed the disapproval of the
military for being left out of the leadership, but its failure showed that Boumediene was still in control. He
responded by dissolving the General Staff of the military and assuming many of the duties himself. In this way
he was able to reassert his power over the ANP before the situation got out of control (Nelson 1985, 314).
The internal peace of the 1970s allowed Boumediene to take a more ideological tone toward world affairs. At
the same time, a group of more liberal officers began to replace the conservatives as the prominent figures in the
Algerian military leadership. When Boumediene fell ill in 1978, the ANP saw that the Council of the
Revolution took over the day-to-day operations of the government, rather than the president of the National
Popular Assembly, who had the constitutional right (Nelson 1985, 317). After Boumediene’s death, the ANP
supported Chadli Benjedid as the FLN candidate for president. Not surprisingly, he won (Parker 1987, 40).
Benjedid’s Political Bureau and Council of Ministers included strong ANP representation, as well as voices from
other factions of the FLN. He overhauled the national leadership, including retiring and reassigning
approximately eighty military leaders that he was not closely allied with. With these moves, Benjedid both
consolidated his power and changed the degree of influence of the ANP in the government. ANP representatives
were chosen based on their ability as policy makers, not because of a military dominance of the government
(Parker 1987, 40).
Benjedid did his best to promote economic and social reforms, but civil unrest in 1988 led to constitutional
reforms ending Algeria’s commitment to one-party rule. Free preliminary elections in 1991 left the FIS poised
to take over the Algerian government (Smolowe 1992, 30). The military did not want Algeria to become an
Islamic fundamentalist state and forced the resignation of Benjedid. This caused the dissolution of the legislature,
the cancellation of the final elections, and led to the military appointing Mohammed Boudiaf as the head of a
new five-member Council of State (Smolowe 1992, 30). The FIS splintered into many factions, the most
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militant of which immediately began guerrilla actions against the military. Since that time, Algeria has been
embroiled in a civil war that has left thousands dead and the country in a shambles.
One of the major concerns of the military is to protect Algeria’s hydrocarbon industry against sabotage by
the Islamic Fundamentalists. The development of the Algerian hydrocarbon industry is due to France, which at
the time of independence had constructed and financed most of the industry and its infrastructure. French private
interests were assisted by the government under the assumption that the efforts would be geared to the French
economy (Nelson 1985, 199). The first oil field was discovered in 1910, but large-scale deposits were not found
until 1956, in the Northeastern Sahara region and along the Libyan border. Smaller fields were subsequently
discovered, and, in 1985, three new major fields were located. Algerian reserves were estimated at eight to ten
billion barrels, which is a relatively small amount. The crude itself, though, is of very high quality (Nelson
1985, 200). Much of it is found at deep levels and high-pressure water or gas extraction is often necessary; both
are expensive processes. Production in the 1980s was decreased to follow the world market demand and as a
result, accounted for only three to five percent of OPEC’s total output. By the mid-1980s, Algeria had the
capacity to refine about nineteen million tons of crude per year. They also had seven major pipelines to link the
oil fields with the coast (Nelson 1985, 201).
Algeria has greater wealth in natural gas than in oil, however. Its reserves are estimated to be the fourth
largest in the world. The first well was discovered in 1958, about 350 miles south of Algiers. By the mid-
1980s, Algeria was producing ninety billion cubic meters per year, of which half was commercially exploited
(Nelson 1985, 202). Like its oil, Algeria’s natural gas is relatively pure and is easy to process. By 1985 there
were four liquefying plants, fourteen pipelines for transporting the gas and nine others for transporting
condensate and liquefied petroleum gas. The pipelines include the Trans-Med gas pipeline to Italy, completed in
1981, which boosted sales of natural gas to Europe. Another pipeline, connecting Algeria to Spain through
Morocco, was scheduled to be completed in 1995, although that is now unlikely because of the civil war
(Kielmas 1992, 24).
Although all of Algeria’s power needs could easily be met through its hydrocarbon reserves, Algeria has
nonetheless invested in a nuclear program. In 1987 Algeria began its program with the purchase of a 1 MW
thermal natural uranium research reactor (Deutch 1992, 132). A reactor of that size is too small to be considered
a proliferation risk, although having any type of reactor increases the likelihood of a nation developing nuclear
weapons. In 1988 Algeria signed an agreement with China to purchase a 15 MW thermal heavy water reactor,
which is a proliferation concern (Cheung 1991, 15). The Chinese, known for being extremely liberal in the sale
of nuclear technology and materials, claimed that the reactor was part of a 1983 bilateral agreement on nuclear
cooperation. They also urged Algeria to open the reactor to international safeguards (Cheung 1991, 15). The
reactor, built at Oussera, has been reported by some intelligence sources as appearing to have a forty to 60 MW
thermal capacity (Church 1991, 48). No matter which size estimate is correct, the reactor at Oussera can produce
enough plutonium to make a bomb. Satellite pictures have shown that the site is guarded by surface-to-air
missiles, and that there are no power lines carrying electricity to Algiers, which is supposedly its purpose
(Church 1991, 48). As a result, international pressure led Algeria to agree to IAEA inspections, beginning in
February of 1992. What is also a concern, however, is that Algeria may be aiding other nations to develop
nuclear weapons. U.S. intelligence has picked up rumors that Iraqi nuclear scientists are working in Algeria and
that Baghdad has provided Algeria with difficult to acquire nuclear technology (Church 1991, 48). Considering
these factors, it is likely that Algeria is pursuing some type of nuclear weapons program, although details are
sketchy.
Algeria, like most nations of the world, is interested in raising its level of influence in the global
community. Boumediene began the trend by expanding Algeria’s role as a leader of both Islamic and non-aligned
states. Today, the acquisition of nuclear weapons is a “quick fix” to the problem of attaining leverage. It is also
an enhancement of national security, of which Algeria is constantly concerned because of tenuous relations on
its borders. Algeria has a strong military history—in which might is power—and nuclear weapons are today’s
supreme example of might. Their abundance of hydrocarbon reserves gives them the capital to develop a nuclear
program, but at the same time causes suspicion about their program’s supposed civilian uses. If Algeria is
discovered scouring the marketplace for technology used in fissile materials reprocessing or if they begin to
build new nuclear facilities, their program will have a great deal more light shed on it. It is likely that Algeria is
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attempting to develop nuclear weapons, but until their program becomes a more tangible threat to the
international non-proliferation regime, it will likely go on.
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The Position of Algeria on Extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Twenty-five years ago, the nations of the world came together to sign an agreement that became the framework
for the worldwide arms control regime. This agreement, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, is up for review this year and various issues in the nuclear community will undoubtedly be addressed.
The locus of power in the nuclear regime has been largely unchanged since the treaty’s inception on 5 March
1970, but the global community has seen new leaders arise on both economic and political fronts. The treaty
has proven largely effective during its life and hopefully will continue to do so, but stronger efforts need to be
made on all sides to live up to the articles contained therein.
Originally there were signatories and non-signatories as well as declared nuclear states and non-nuclear
states. Now however, some non-signatories have acquired nuclear arsenals and some signatories have attempted
to do the same. These changes show the NPT regime to be a static—not dynamic—force, as was originally
hoped. The reason for this has been the actions of the five declared nuclear powers: Russia, the United States,
the United Kingdom, France, and China. Instead of following the provisions set forth in Article VI of the treaty,
which dictate that the declared nuclear powers pursue good faith negotiations toward the cessation of the arms
race and toward a complete nuclear disarmament, these nations have modernized and expanded their arsenals.
Similarly, these nations have not followed the provisions of Article V, which states that the technological
benefits derived from the ability to build and detonate nuclear weapons should be shared with the non-nuclear
powers. Instead, a discriminatory “nuclear club” has been created, leaving most nations that are badly in need of
these resources without them. Their protest has been to seek out nuclear technology on their own.
Algeria has long desired a peaceful civilian nuclear power program. Our dreams were realized in 1988, when,
with the assistance of the Chinese, we built a 15 MW reactor south of Algiers. We were not signatories to the
NPT at the time and, under intense international pressure, we acceded in 1992. We posed no threat and violated
no tenets of international law, yet we were required by nations possessing thousands of nuclear weapons to say
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that the pursuit of nuclear weapons was wrong. We fortunately agreed with the statement, but were educated
nonetheless. We learned that while the NPT was a largely effective measure for the prevention of the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, there was a dichotomy inherent within it. A treaty stating that a nation that
had detonated nuclear weapons prior to 1967 can be a declared nuclear power—but that no other nations can ever
be—is not fair. In 1970, a date such as 1967 might be important, but what of the year 2000? Are we, as
sovereign nations, correct in allowing a nuclear monopoly to continue while the nuclear powers, for the most
part, do not live up to their ends of the bargain? Certainly not.
The government of Algeria supports the continuation of the NPT, but not for an indefinite period of time.
The nations of the world need to make a statement to the nuclear powers that unless they commit to
disarmament, the rest of us will no longer feel the need to abide by the provisions set forth in the NPT. An
indefinite extension further solidifies the monopoly held by the declared powers and is a statement of acceptance
of their past and present behavior. Limiting the extension to ten years would give the nations of the world an
opportunity to reevaluate their relationship with the declared nuclear powers, toward the aim of discovering
whether they have really gained anything by waiving their rights to pursue nuclear weapons technology. When a
nation such as Israel can develop a weapons program with the tacit approval of the declared powers, the NPT, at
least in the case of our country, cannot be considered a true security guarantee. The nations of the world need to
make sure that the NPT works truly in the collective interest and historically, it has not. An indefinite extension
would be de facto approval of a regime created by and for the declared nuclear powers—not for all nations of the
world.
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The following brief position papers were written by members of the nuclear engineering class that participated
in discussions on the mock Treaty Review and Extension Conference.
France’s Position Toward the Non-Proliferation Treaty
Allen Toreja
In the hopes of averting the “devastation that would be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war,” the Treaty
on the Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was drawn up and opened for signature in July of 1968. In
compliance with Section Two of Article X of the treaty, the Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty
will be held on 17 April 1995. Although not particularly exciting like India, Iraq, or Argentina, one of the
countries “to watch” during this conference is France. Whenever nuclear technology is discussed, it is virtually
impossible not to mention France. With around 70 to 80 percent of its electricity generated by nuclear power,
France is one of the leading nations in the “nuclear field”. Furthermore, according to the treaty, France is one of
the five countries that is allowed to possess nuclear weapons. Thus it cannot be disputed that France’s position
toward the Non-Proliferation Treaty is quite important.
Very simply stated, France is in favor of the Non-proliferation Treaty. In June of 1991, France announced
that it would sign the treaty. This was particularly surprising considering that for the past twenty-three years the
French had refused to do so. When the treaty was originally drawn up, France declined to sign, although it
pledged to behave as though it had. Furthermore, this announcement of its signature in 1991 was complemented
with a dramatic call to arms reduction throughout the world. This call incorporated the reduction of biological
weapons and nuclear arsenals, and negotiations to limit prosperous trade in conventional arms. Apparently,
France has set an example in this call to arms reduction by decreasing its own nuclear stockpile, which in many
ways, is a miniature version of the US nuclear configuration.
It is also worth noting that in recent matters concerning nuclear arms, France has followed the lead of the
other nuclear weapon states. In June of 1993, President Clinton extended that US moratorium on nuclear testing
through September of 1994. Upon hearing this, France, along with Russia, immediately extended their
previously declared moratoriums. At first, this action of France was met with some concern. There has always
been a great uncertainty in the French commitment to the moratorium and its own limits to its nuclear arsenal.
In 1993, a French parliamentary committee recommended resuming nuclear testing. However, this
recommendation appears to be on hold until the retirement of opposing party’s President Mitterrand. Therefore,
it could be said that the French abandonment of the moratorium before renegotiation of the Non-proliferation
Treaty is dubious.
Another example of France’s following the other nuclear weapon states occurred in 1993. Apparently, there
was talk of the United Nations endorsing a resolution calling on the World Court to declare nuclear weapons
illegal. This initiative was all but abandoned by the non-nuclear states as a result of the domination of the
nuclear powers. The United States, Britain, and France all put intense pressure on capitals around the nonaligned
world to halt the initiative before it reached the General Assembly. Although this “display of power” revealed
the western nuclear weapon states’ desire to protect the status quo, it also exemplifies France’s somewhat
consistent behavior of following the other nuclear power states and their actions.
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Although no one can be certain of any country’s forthcoming decisions, one can almost speculate as to
what the actions of the French will be during the conference. As it appears, France has in the past followed the
lead of the other nuclear weapon states. It would not be surprising for France to continue this behavior during
the conference. Furthermore, it stands to reason that, as one of the leading nations in the nuclear industry,
France would be receptive to any actions that would maintain this position. Hence, it would seem that France
would definitely be in favor of an extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Needless to say, the outcome of the
Review and Extension Conference is going to be met with much anticipation.
Russia’s Stand on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Brett Booth
Russia’s nuclear program dates back to the 1940s, when they were part of the Soviet Union. The United States
and Great Britain had a pact to share the research information that they found, but in the end the United States
refused to do this. The Soviets, who, under Stalin, were not about to fall behind in the race of being a
superpower, went full steam into developing their own nuclear program.
This was the start of the Cold War that went on for more than forty years ending around 1991 when
communism started to die, and the Soviet Union soon fell apart. When the Soviet Union fell apart it was rather
simple as to which Soviet states would inherit the nuclear technology and missiles. It was decided by where the
missiles sat. The Soviet states that inherited all this power were Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
Russia has remained a nuclear power, while Belarus and Kazakhstan have already given up their nuclear
weapons. Ukraine has recently (5 December) renounced nuclear weapons and has claimed that they will be a non-
nuclear state and will join the NPT.
As for Russia’s position on the NPT, they have stated that they believe that it should be indefinitely
extended to help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)
Director Yevgeny Primakov stated that “the optimum solution would be open-ended prolongation of the treaty”.
He also said that “no political ambitions, whatever the good intentions, should be a deterrent to the world
balance in the nuclear sphere”.
SVR officials reported Russia’s plans to sell nuclear technology to Iran to help develop a nuclear plant, but
said that this does not violate the treaty. The deal was $800 million for Russia to complete the construction of
their unfinished 1300 MW reactor, reportedly a major center for nuclear research located 450 miles south of
Tehran on the gulf coast.
Both these reactors were started by Germany’s Siemans Kraftwerke Union before the Islamic revolution,
which brought Muslim fundamentalist rule to Iran. Germany has since refused export permits for vital
equipment.
In September 1994, the CIA warned that Russia was a key source of nuclear technology and expertise for
Iran’s drive to become a nuclear power. The United States believes that Iran may only be five years away from
developing an atomic bomb. Although some experts doubt that Iran has the capacity or knowledge to sustain a
clandestinely acquired nuclear program. This is probably why Russia does not consider this in any way breaking
the NPT. One of the reasons Russia agreed to this contract with Iran was because of Russia’s bad economy and a
contract of these proportions could greatly help.
Russia’s heart seems to be in the right place. They seem to be completely in compliance with the United
States when it comes to reducing nuclear weapons globally so that nobody accidentally destroys the world. I do
not see them as doing anything wrong by trying to help their economy by building Iran a peaceful way of using
nuclear power. Russia is in full backing of keeping the NPT for an indefinite amount of time.
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Pakistan and the Non-Proliferation Treaty
Thomas Whittenhall
Pakistan will not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty as it currently stands with its current members. Several
reasons exist for this stance on the NPT.
The most important reason for not signing the NPT is India’s reluctance to sign the treaty. As India feels
that the treaty is discriminatory, it will not sign any time in the near future. They currently possess the means
to manufacture nuclear weapons. As Pakistan is currently battling Indian claims over disputed land, any
advantage they may receive over Pakistan is unacceptable. Therefore, Pakistan must be allowed to manufacture
nuclear weapons to prevent India from having a monopoly, hence an incredible advantage, of nuclear weapons
against Pakistan.
Second, it is widely known that Pakistan can currently enrich material enough to manufacture nuclear
weapons. Pakistan sees no reason to surrender that technology or subject it to inspections in order to satisfy the
terms of the NPT.
Third, Pakistan needs no help in generating electricity through nuclear reactors. Pakistan currently has 125
MWs on line and another gigawatt on the board. Electricity is not a problem for Pakistan.
As you can see, Pakistan has little need for the NPT. Signing it can only hurt, as it gives the advantage to
India. Pakistan will not and has no plans to sign this treaty.
Mexico, Brazil, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty
Dave Monti
Mexico is not in favor of an indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty. Mexico feels that the
five nuclear powers of the world have not lived up to their pledge to deplete their weapons stockpile over the last
twenty-five years. An indefinite extension of the treaty would create a permanent inequity between the states that
possess nuclear weapons and those that do not.
Mexico is greatly appreciative of the United States’ $40 billion financial package, but they do not feel
obligated to support an indefinite extension of the treaty. The country also appears to be comforted by the
United States’ pledge to protect them from any invading force.
Mexico has a small number of nuclear power generating stations. They wish to increase their use of nuclear
technology, and they are relying on the United States to assist them with this ambition.
Brazil’s stand on the treaty is similar to that of Mexico. They believe that the five nuclear powers should
have made more progress in nuclear disarmament over the last twenty-five years. Therefore, they do not support
an indefinite extension of the treaty, as do many third world nations. It has been suggested that the treaty be
extended for a period of five years so that disarmament could be checked on more frequently.
Brazil and other third world nations feel that the nuclear powers are taking the non-nuclear states for granted,
and that they should not only speed up their progress on disarmament, but they should be sharing their nuclear
technology with the less developed countries. Brazil is very limited in its use of nuclear power.
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South Africa and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Paul Tabour
Historically, South Africa has been one of the more intriguing nations from a nuclear arms perspective. Our
program, in comparison, is rather young; the Y plant (for the enrichment of U-235) was in full cascade
operation beginning only in 1977. The first actual highly enriched UF6 was produced in early 1978, and the
quantity was quite modest. Through 1978 and the better part of 1979, more highly enriched uranium
hexafluoride was produced and converted to metal form. This material was only about 80 percent U-235 and was
chemically impure. Nonetheless it was fitted into our first nuclear device in November 1979. In August 1979
the plant had an unexpected in-process gas reaction and was out of operation until July 1981, when it resumed
and continued operation until February 1990, when it was decommissioned. We had assembled six devices by
that time, and have since disassembled them all without ever testing one. This is an important consideration, for
there are yet many that believe that our government was in some way responsible for the “double flash” that
occurred in the south Atlantic on 22 September 1979; these speculations are completely untrue. The idea that we
could have exploded a device that produced such a ‘clean’ yield after no testing whatsoever (and indeed before we
had even fitted a device with uranium) is unreasonable. Our commitment to nonproliferation is strong; the
uranium that was in these devices has been either fitted into the fuel rods (or as target material) of the SAFARI
isotope production reactor (being used to produce Molibdenum-99 for medical uses) or is being used as
pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuel. Another example of our commitment is the open-door transparent policy
stated by former President de Klerk; an open invitation to the IAEA for visits “anywhere, any time, any place—
within reason”. I hereby make our position clear: the South African government and its people stand behind the
NPT fully, and encourage all other nations to do the same.
There are few changes we would suggest to the current inspection process; however, the one we feel needs
to be effected is the method of inspecting parties to the NPT who were nuclear before signing. A standard
procedure needs to be developed for this case, because it is crucial that no unreported material from the pre-NPT
era is carried over into the now NPT timeline for the country in question. It is also extremely important that all
countries should have similar policies as we do regarding the IAEA visits. If a nation is not completely open to
the IAEA, the situation may easily become confrontational, which is entirely outside the spirit of the NPT.
Thus to keep the spirit of this extremely significant treaty alive, we nations, as a community, need to be
completely open to these visits and inspections.
We occupy a unique position in the NPT regime, as the only nation with nuclear deterrent capability that
has willingly and of its own accord turned itself around into a state without that capability and has then become
party to the NPT. We look forward to a long and peaceful time of prosperity, and now perhaps more safety, in
our corner of the world.
Kazakhstan and the Non-Proliferation Treaty
Steven Gunther
When the former Soviet Union collapsed, Kazakhstan inherited nearly fourteen hundred nuclear warheads. The
government made an early pledge to become a non-nuclear state, yet until recently, Kazakhstan had been in no
hurry to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The country of Kazakhstan has two legitimate concerns that need to be addressed. First is the concern about
national security. Kazakhstan comprises a large land area, but does not have a large population. More
importantly, it lies between two recognized nuclear powers, Russia and China. Secondly, the country has
serious economic problems; they do not have the money to finance themselves.
In order for Kazakhstan to support the NPT as a non-nuclear state, it must be given certain provisions from
the official nuclear powers. First of all, they need to be guaranteed financial support in the task of disarming and
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removing the warheads. Most importantly, Kazakhstan needs guarantees for its national security. These security
guarantees would most likely have to be offered by the United States and neighboring Russia.
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The International Atomic Energy Agency and
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:
A Critical Review of Their Roles in the Present Nonproliferation Regime
Kendra Foltz
Introduction
For more than three decades, an international organization known as the International Atomic Energy Agency
has consistently played a leading role in national and international efforts to avoid the further spread, or
proliferation, of nuclear weapons and to deter misuse of facilities and materials that serve civil nuclear programs.
To this effect the Agency has been the primary supporting organization of the NPT that came into full force in
early 1970 and will be up for review in 1995 for possible extension. The NPT serves as the central document of
the international nonproliferation regime and is credited with preventing the rapid spread of nuclear devices and
materials that was predicted twenty years before its creation. The IAEA and the NPT are the cornerstones of the
present regime.
The NPT’s ultimate goal is to completely eliminate nuclear weapons and make available peaceful nuclear
technologies to all signatory countries. The main proliferation function of the IAEA under the NPT is to verify
by safeguards (including on-site inspections) that safeguarded facilities or materials are being utilized for peaceful
purposes only and that they are not being diverted to produce nuclear devices. This vital function makes the
IAEA the heart of the nonproliferation regime that works to control the spread of nuclear weapons.
Today it is recognized that both the IAEA and the NPT have characteristics that decrease their effectiveness
at discouraging proliferation. For example, the IAEA faces problems that threaten to discredit the reliability and
effectiveness of its safeguards and subject it to a loss of confidence from the global community. The discrediting
or failure of the IAEA safeguards could eventually cause the nonproliferation regime to collapse that would
create serious international instability. In addition there are limitations present in the NPT that allow countries
to get too close to obtaining or producing nuclear weapons. Without strong support for a long-term extension,
the NPT will most likely lose considerable authority in the nonproliferation arena.
This paper fully describes basic functions of the IAEA and the NPT in the nonproliferation regime
including important historical notes. Most importantly, limitations and problems of each are discussed along
with suggestions to improve their capacity to achieve their stated goals.
The Operating Framework of the IAEA
The International Atomic Energy Agency serves as the world’s central intergovernmental forum for scientific and
technical cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The IAEA was established on 29 July 1957
in accordance with a decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and serves as an autonomous
organization. It grew out of the Atoms for Peace program initiated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953.
It carries out its mandate in close cooperation with other national and international organizations. There are
currently 114 Member States in the IAEA (see Appendix for a current list of Member States). The Headquarters
of the IAEA Secretariat are located at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria that also houses a
number of other UN organizations.
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Objectives
Article II of the IAEA Statute states that “the Agency shall seek to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of
atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world. It shall ensure, so far as it is able, that
assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision or control is not used in such a way as to
further any military purpose”. The Statute then goes on to describe how the objectives are to be achieved. The
IAEA is authorized by the Statute to establish and administer safeguards, foster the exchange of scientific and
technical information on the peaceful uses of nuclear materials, encourage and assist research and development
on the practical application of atomic energy, make provision for materials, services, equipment, and facilities to
meet the needs of research on, and development and practical application of, atomic energy, and to establish or
adopt standards of safety for protection of health and the minimization of danger to life and property.
Structure
The policy-making branches of the IAEA are the Board of Governors and the General Conference. The Board of
Governors currently has thirty-five members. Thirteen of these are designated by the Board while twenty-two are
elected by the General Conference. The General Conference is composed of representatives of the entire
membership of the IAEA. The Secretariat has the responsibility of implementing the IAEA’s program after it
has been approved by the Board of Governors and the General Conference. The Secretariat is headed by the
Director General. Below is a figure illustrating the organizational structure of the IAEA.
Services to Member States
The IAEA provides legal services and advice in the negotiation, drafting, and conclusion of various types of
international agreements. The most notable of these being safeguards, agreements, and international conventions
pertaining to the use of nuclear energy. The IAEA also serves as the depository for a number of multilateral
conventions including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Convention on
Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, the Convention on Early Notification
of a Nuclear Accident, and the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage.
In addition the IAEA performs services as an international clearinghouse of information on nuclear energy
issues for use by Member States, international organizations, national governments, the nuclear industry,
scientists and technicians in the nuclear field, the media, and the general public. The IAEA publishes books and
reports on all aspects of nuclear science and technology written by consultants engaged for particular projects or
by groups of experts invited from Member States. The proceedings of all IAEA symposia and conferences are
also published, and the IAEA issues a large number of technical documents that are distributed free to readers
with special interests in the subjects.
The Non-Proliferation Role of the IAEA
Most experts believe that the proliferation of nuclear weapons to more countries would increase the probability
of their use. It is the spread of nuclear weapons to more states that affords the most danger to international
peace. Avoiding this dissemination of nuclear weapons, materials, or technology is essential to achieve global
agreement on the question of nuclear arms control and disarmament.
The principal proliferation function of the IAEA has become verifying by safeguards (including on-site
inspection) that safeguard facilities or materials are being used only for peaceful purposes and are not being used
to produce nuclear weapons. This function of the IAEA under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons rends the Agency vital to the nonproliferation regime that is intended to deter the further spread of
nuclear weapons. The regime is defined by a loose collection of understandings, agreements, treaties, and
predispositions that have been created over the course of more than three decades. By the end of 1992 the IAEA
had 188 safeguard agreements with a total of 110 countries.
The amount of material under IAEA safeguards is expressed in significant quantities. A significant quantity
is defined as the approximate number amount that would be required to produce one nuclear explosive device,
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taking into account any conversion processes involved. The total under safeguards is now equivalent to more
than 65 thousand significant quantities and is predominantly in the form of plutonium contained in spent fuel.
This form of plutonium accounts for approximately 70 percent of the total amount of significant quantities,
while separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium account for another 7 percent.
The number of facilities under safeguards or containing safeguarded materials accounts is now 545 including
201 power reactor units, 169 research reactor and critical assembly units, 44 fuel fabrication plants, and 47
different storage facilities. There are also 6 reprocessing plants and 7 enrichment plants included in the total.
The IAEA carries out more than two thousand safeguards inspections per year at facilities and other places
containing nuclear material. These inspections are performed by approximately two hundred trained inspectors
who are supported by IAEA headquarters. Two regional offices (in Toronto and Tokyo) contribute to the
effectiveness of inspections.
After a period of relative quiet in the 1980s, during which continual improvement of the IAEA safeguard
system was carried out, the past few years have seen events that have called for special responses from the
IAEA. The most significant of those being:
1) The difficulties experienced in the implementation of the safeguards agreement with the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, where the IAEA had to ask for special inspections of two undeclared sites to
verify the correctness and completeness of their initial declaration;
2) The discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapons program in Iraq by the IAEA as a result of unrestricted
investigative activities authorized by the Security Council of the United Nations;
3) The emergence of newly independent States that used to be part of the former Soviet Union and the
challenges associated with upholding the NPT and implementing safeguards in these states;
4) The conclusion of a comprehensive safeguards agreement with Argentina, Brazil, and the Brazilian–
Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Weapons, where the IAEA safeguards system is
supported for joint accounting and control of their nuclear activities;
5) Recent developments in South Africa, where the IAEA has been invited to observe the former nuclear
weapons program termination as well as all present nuclear activities as a result of their accession to the NPT.
All of the cases described above are significant to the future evolution of the IAEA’s safeguard system.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
The NPT was first signed in mid-1968, however it was not until 1970 that the treaty came into force. By late
1993, 161 states had signed the treaty and are, therefore, labeled as signatory states (see Appendix for a list of
Party States as of 9 December 1986). The NPT is considered the central juridical instrument of the international
nonproliferation regime. It also involves, along with the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin
America (or the Treaty of Tlatelolco), a unique experiment in international safeguards to verify that nuclear
materials and facilities are not used to make nuclear weapons.
The NPT separates the countries of the world into two groups, nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear
weapon states. Nuclear-weapons states are those that have detonated some sort of nuclear device before 1967
(that is, the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China) and non-nuclear weapons states
are those countries that have not.
The NPT states an international agreement against the further spread of nuclear weapons and provides for
verification of the pledges of non-nuclear weapons states not to manufacture or receive nuclear explosives.
Article I of the NPT states that weapons-state signatories are committed not to transfer nuclear weapons or to
assist non-nuclear weapons states in acquiring such weapons. Article II states that non-nuclear weapons states
commit themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons or explosive devices and Article III requires non-nuclear
states to submit all of their peaceful nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards to facilitate verification that they are
meeting their treaty obligations. All parties are committed to require IAEA safeguards on their nuclear exports as
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well. The NPT also contains negative and positive assurances with regard to peaceful nuclear development. The
treaty stipulates that there should be no discrimination among parties with respect to such development.
According to Article IV of the NPT, all parties must undertake to facilitate “the fullest possible exchange” of
equipment, materials, and technological information. In addition, all countries accepting the NPT must agree to
pursue the end of nuclear arms races and achieve nuclear disarmament under international control. A party may
also withdraw from the NPT on ninety days notice if “extraordinary events” related to the NPT have in some
way “jeopardized” its “supreme interests”.
In effect, the NPT is a global agreement to further the goals of nonproliferation and therefore decrease the
imminent danger of global or partial global nuclear annihilation. According to the NPT, non-nuclear states give
up their right to develop nuclear arms and allow safeguards to inspect any nuclear-related facilities. In contrast,
nuclear weapons states will agree to share peaceful nuclear technology with other countries and to pursue arms
control if they have a nuclear arsenal. The NPT, however, does not prohibit any party from amassing nuclear-
weapons materials (that is, highly enriched Pu or U) as part of their peaceful nuclear energy programs as long as
they are under IAEA safeguards. The treaty has also been interpreted to allow the sale of nuclear materials to
parties who are not signatories even if they have unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The nuclear materials being
exported, however, must be placed under IAEA safeguards.
At the present there are six non-nuclear weapon states of proliferation concern -Brazil, Argentina, South
Africa, Israel, India, and Pakistan. All of these countries have unsafeguarded nuclear activities. Libya, Iraq, Iran,
and North Korea are parties to the NPT, but are potential nuclear weapons states.
Limitations of the NPT
The existing nonproliferation regime centered on the NPT and the IAEA deserves credit for slowing the spread of
nuclear weapons. However, it has been criticized for functioning as a means of managing rather than preventing
proliferation. Some of the flaws in the nonproliferation regime are present in the treaty itself, whereas others are
the result of changes in the international environment in which the treaty is applied.
Incomplete Membership
One problem facing the effectiveness of the NPT on supporting nonproliferation is that the NPT itself is not
universally supported. A number of important non-weapons states are not parties to the treaty, for example
India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil. Two nuclear weapons states, France and China, are
also not parties to the NPT. France has stated that it will act as though it were a treaty party and has thus far
lived up to that commitment, and China has made similar statements. However India, Brazil, and Argentina
remain strong critics and opponents of the Treaty. In addition, certain states that have adhered to the treaty have
become suspect regarding their intentions as stated previously. To bolster global support of the NPT, more
countries need to be encouraged to become signatories to the Treaty. This could be achieved possibly by pressure
from neighboring countries or allies.
Development of Peaceful Nuclear Explosive Programs
From the late 1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union began the development and testing of so-called
“peaceful applications” of nuclear explosives (PNE’s). India later seized upon this idea of legitimate use of
nuclear explosives to justify its nuclear test in 1974. The United States has since abandoned these applications
of nuclear weapons and opposes their use, the Soviet Union continued some experimental activity even though
they agreed to a comprehensive test ban (CTB).
As a result of the early PNE activities of the United States and the Soviet Union, the negotiations of the
NPT were influenced and resulted in the incorporation of provisions for ensuring that the potential benefits of
peaceful nuclear explosives would be made available to non-nuclear weapons state parties by weapons-state
parties. These provisions can be found in Article V of the NPT. Correcting this situation would involve
amending the NPT to banish all PNE activities regardless of the status of the country.
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Nonproscribed military activities
A related problem with the NPT is that it leaves open the possibility for non-nuclear weapons states to pursue
non-explosive military applications such as submarine propulsion. The development of such a program in a
non-weapons state could take place outside safeguards if it involved indigenous materials or materials from a
supplier that did not specify its use for non-explosive military purposes. This creates the possibility that a non-
explosive military program might be a cover for explosives development or that the program may be a
compliment to a clandestine weapons program. In addition, there are no provisions in the NPT to prevent a non-
weapons state party from taking initial steps toward developing nuclear weapons as long as they do not actually
acquire them. This fact has contributed to a debate over where proliferation actually begins. Increases in
safeguards activities by the IAEA may help this limitation of the NPT.
Easy Withdrawal from Treaty Obligations
Considering the critical nature underlying the NPT’s no-weapons pledges, it is confusing that Article X of the
Treaty permits a party to withdraw upon a 90 days’ notice if “extraordinary events related to the subject matter of
the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme national interests” of the country giving notice. This remains a cause
for concern because of the fact that some countries might be tempted to withdraw from the Treaty because they
do not perceive their security interests as being affected one way or another by such action, or out of feelings of
frustration about increased restraints on the part of nuclear suppliers. Other countries may withdraw from the
NPT because they have everything that they want. However, no countries as of yet have invoked the withdrawal
position that shows support for the NPT. In addition, there is good reason to believe that, absent a general
breakdown of confidence in the regime or a weakening of the international consensus against proliferation,
withdrawal from the Treaty would be politically and diplomatically difficult. This effect serves to uphold the
NPT in the international community.
Binding Period of Parties to the NPT Too Short
Again, considering the importance attached to the NPT for the control of proliferation, it is odd that it has a
term of only twenty-five years. In 1995 it must be decided “whether the Treaty shall continue in force
indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods”. The record of the IAEA and its
safeguards is expected to influence the proceedings and outcome of the conference along with debate over nuclear
arms control and questions of nuclear technology transfers and assured supply. The future of safeguards may
depend on the fate of the NPT because it is doubtful that safeguards would maintain adequate credibility or
confidence if all facilities were not covered at least in most countries that describes the situation present today.
Narrow Definition of Proliferation
The NPT defines proliferation as the acquisition or testing of a nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device, but
does not include the acquisition of nuclear materials that could be readily be diverted to make nuclear weapons as
part of that definition. This was in fact intended by the drafters of the Treaty. Uranium enrichment and the
stockpiling of fissionable material in connection with a peaceful program does not violate Article II of the NPT
so long as these activities are safeguarded under Article III. Also permitted is the development, under safeguards,
of plutonium-fueled power reactors and research on the properties of metallic plutonium.
By the mid 1970s the question arose as to the adequacy of the non-proliferation regime and whether the
definition of proliferation should not take into account capabilities as well as behavior. It was felt that some
states may have joined the Treaty to gain access to nuclear technology and to acquire weapons-usable material,
without necessarily appearing to do so, under a military program. This more than any other problem discussed
reflects the case of external changes rather than faults residing in the NPT. IAEA safeguards also felt the impact
of these changes.
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Discrimination
A common complaint concerning the NPT is that it is discriminatory. This is because of the fact that the Treaty
imposes different obligations on countries according to whether they are nuclear weapons-states or non-nuclear
weapons states. Many parties find this discriminatory. This is another important consideration that will be taken
up at the conference in 1995 when the fate of the Treaty is decided. Considering the present international
political climate among the superpowers, it is the authors opinion that the Treaty should be amended in 1995 so
that it imposes equal obligations on all countries.
Safeguards
Safeguards are vital to nonproliferation, peaceful nuclear cooperation, and trade. Therefore verification of pledges
by non-nuclear weapons states to not use nuclear activities to make nuclear devices and the assurance by
inspection that nuclear materials in peaceful use are accounted for are central to the basic proposition of Atoms
for Peace—that is, that the civil and military uses of nuclear energy can be somehow separated. As applied by
the IAEA, safeguards are a major and unique innovation. However, more recently, IAEA safeguards have been
challenged as ineffective. In part, this stems from misunderstandings about the nature and purpose of IAEA
safeguards and its mandate, but it also derives from concerns about effectiveness of international safeguards for
large bulk-handling facilities (such as reprocessing or enrichment plants) that provide direct access to weapons-
usable material in relatively easily divertable forms. The challenge also reflects doubts about how the IAEA has
organized to meet its safeguards responsibilities. There are questions about the ability of the IAEA’s
management structure to ensure that an alarm will be quickly raised if and when needed.
Obtaining support for the extension of the NPT at the international conference in 1995 may require several
treaty amendments to correct some of the more pressing limitations described above. Observers fear, however,
that the NPT will unravel if it is in any way subject to revision. However, the NPT, as the most vital document
in the nonproliferation regime, should be able to stand up to such challenges because of its importance in the
political health of the global community.
Problems Facing the IAEA
Today the IAEA confronts critical problems that threaten to jeopardize agency safeguards and to undermine their
continued utility in the regime. As a consequence of the IAEA’s exceptional authority to implement
international safeguards, it has come to occupy a central and indispensable role in the global nonproliferation
regime. But this in turn has made the agency an important political prize in the international arena. Blocs of
states that see the agency as politically important seek to control or dominate it in order to direct it toward their
preferred goals. In such struggles, the higher purposes of the agency can be lost from sight. The agency is
unfortunately at the present beset by problems that, if unresolved, could undermine others’ confidence in its
ability to carry out its responsibilities. The more important of the problems include:
1. Credibility of Safeguards—This issue involves not only an assessment of how well the IAEA
implements safeguards, but also what purposes and objectives they should serve.
2. Politicization—As mentioned previously, an urgent problem facing the agency is the introduction of
political issues irrelevant to the IAEA’s mission, purpose and objectives into agency activities. This erodes
confidence in the organization’s ability to effectively perform its duties.
3. Balance Between Technical Assistance and Safeguards—This problem involves the balance between
the IAEA’s program and safeguards functions. There is disagreement between members from industrialized and
developing countries on what sort of balance should exist and how it can best be achieved. This issue
threatens to polarize the agency along North-South lines, as is common in other international agencies.
4. Tensions Between NPT and non-NPT Members—Another important concern is the tension between
signatory nations to the Treaty and non-signatory members of the Agency. IAEA actions suggesting that
NPT-related activities are somehow more important than non-NPT-related activities are viewed as distortions
of the statute and a threat to the legitimacy of the policies and programs of non-NPT member states.
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Initiatives for Strengthening the IAEA’s Support of the NPT
Inadequacies in the IAEA can be very detrimental to its success in implementing activities to support the NPT.
Solutions must be found to remediate these problems so that the limitations characteristic of the NPT can be
decreased and nuclear proliferation can be put under control.
We have already discussed some general ways the NPT can be strengthened, but how can the IAEA be
strengthened? Toward this end, specific initiatives in three areas—technical assistance, safeguards, and
depoliticization—can be identified.
Technical Assistance
A need also exists for a sustained diplomatic campaign to persuade countries that effective technical assistance is
important. One of the strongest motivations supporting the worldwide nonproliferation regime is energy
security. The technical assistance function of the IAEA is very valued by many members and the sharing of
technical information on peaceful uses of nuclear energy by all countries is also supported by the NPT. The
IAEA needs to place technical assistance on a more certain and predictable basis that will reduce criticisms that
stem from differential treatment received with respect to the developmental and safeguards aspects of agency
responsibility. Technical assistance has been funded by voluntary contributions where safeguards funding is
based on assessments. The IAEA should instead adopt a floor of assessed technical assistance. In so doing, this
would create a political visibility for technical assistance that could remove a source of irritation and enhance
support for the agency.
Safeguards
A first priority of the IAEA with respect to safeguards under the NPT should be to clarify the purposes and the
role of the safeguards and inspection goals. Clarification of these agendas is necessary to benefit the international
community as a whole. A second action the IAEA must realize is to work toward establishing agreed criteria for
determining safeguards effectiveness. The Special Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation, which was
created in the mid-1970s and advises the Director General, could serve in this task. Third, there are a variety of
safeguards improvements related to inspection authority, inspector designation, safeguards transparency, and
safeguards implementation that need to be addressed. Also there is a need to address the problems of safeguards
capacity posed by prospective developments at the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle. Particular attention should
be given to the creation of supplementary institutions that can serve to reinforce international safeguards, such
as international or regional arrangements for spent-fuel storage and an effective international storage system for
plutonium.
International safeguards are important to non-proliferation, give them the nuclear assistance that is essential
to the establishment of a peaceful nuclear energy program, and add to their security. A broad consensus regarding
the necessity for fully effective safeguards will help their implementation. States need to be more willing to
accept new techniques and instruments that can provide greater certainty in material accounting, surveillance, and
containment. This is a problem mainly with non-NPT states. There is also a need for more acceptance of the
role of inspectors, and their access must be assured on a timely basis. Agreement must also be made on
arrangements for supplementary institutions to compensate for limitations on safeguards and to avoid
technological development outpacing effective social controls.
Whether charges of inequities between technical assistance and safeguards resources are justified, they
continue to pose serious questions for the future when more installations and facilities will be under Agency
safeguards. How and to what extent allocation of the safeguards effort should be changed must be determined.
The Agency must face this issue soon in order to prevent another crises over its safeguards purposes and
objectives.
In light of more recent developments that have called for special IAEA response (that is, Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, Iraq, Brazil, Argentina, India, Pakistan, Israel, South Africa), the Agency needs to
continue to develop more intrusive inspections in its support of the NPT. Efforts need to be bolstered to request
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unofficial “visits” to undeclared sites and to conduct “special inspections” of undeclared facilities in NPT states
with safeguards agreements. Procedures also need to be developed to inspect both declared and undeclared sites
quickly and effectively.
The IAEA should begin to safeguard more nuclear materials. More specifically, the IAEA needs to apply
safeguards to yellowcake, and to nuclear materials such as tritium and polonium 210 that are useful for the
development of neutron initiators.
The IAEA should also expand its inspection of dual-use equipment. At the present it has already invited a
number of member states to provide information on exports and imports of nuclear and dual-use equipment for a
new registry.
Politicization
As mentioned previously, continued intrusion of extraneous political issues into Agency activities threatens to
undermine the confidence member states have concerning the ability of the IAEA to effectively carry out its
responsibilities. However it is also true that politics cannot be entirely excluded from the Agency as in any
international body. It is essential to sharply curtail, or try to exclude entirely, the introduction of extraneous
politics. Unfortunately, each member has its opinion on what can be considered as “extraneous”. The task
should be then for the Agency to define excludable issues, and if such an agreement cannot be made, to discuss
such issues so as to minimize the risk of their becoming unmanageable and destructive.
Depoliticization depends on various factors. The first is to successfully build an agreement on what
constitutes an extraneous issue and then to reject the introduction of such topics during deliberations and other
activities of the Agency. This, however, cannot be achieved by a small group of industrialized states alone, but
entails reaching out to all nations bringing the moderates among them into the agreement-building process from
the earliest stage. Bringing all nations into the nonproliferation framework would also help to strengthen the
nuclear nonproliferation regime under the NPT.
The agency should also make more efforts to foster a new climate of openness and transparency between
member states and other members and the Agency. This is necessary to make it more difficult for countries to
hide nuclear programs they should not be supporting. Openness would also help to build confidence in members
that information about nuclear programs are not being misused. Excessive secrecy, once a rule of thumb for the
nuclear powers, no longer serves commercial interests, but has only served to feed public mistrust. One way to
begin is to require all nations to declare their stocks and production sites of plutonium and highly enriched
uranium.
Conclusion
The IAEA and the NPT are the major cornerstones of the nonproliferation regime at the present. Both have flaws
and limitations that reduce their effectiveness in supporting the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, however
improvements can be made to solve their existing inadequacies. The NPT will be reviewed by an international
organization in 1995 to determine if it should be extended, changed, or replaced. It will be through this review
process that improvements to the Treaty must be made for it to perform more effectively in the existing
nonproliferation regime. Some improvements to the NPT include increasing membership to the Treaty,
discouraging all peaceful nuclear explosives activities, increasing the binding period, defining proliferation more
specifically, ending discrimination to non-weapons states, and increasing the use of safeguards. Improvements
must also be made to the IAEA in its supporting role of the Treaty if improvement to the existing regime is to
be lasting. Changes in the NPT will aid the IAEA in its role, but the IAEA must also improve itself mainly by
minimizing politicization in its ranks, increasing the credibility of its safeguards activities, and finding an
acceptable balance between its technical assistance and safeguards roles.
As discussed throughout this paper, there exists many problems with the present organization and support
of the nonproliferation regime under the NPT and the IAEA. With the end of the Cold War, the decline and
collapse of the Soviet Union have added new issues to be addressed. Iraq’s violations of its NPT obligations has
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exposed further weaknesses in the traditional regime. In addition, Pakistan’s achievement of a potential nuclear
weapons capability in the late 1980s brings proliferation to the forefront in South Asia. There are no single
solutions to these problems, but any improvements must be built upon the successes of the existing regime,
the addition of new instruments (such as unannounced inspections and sanctions), and the increase of the priority
given to proliferation in international affairs. If improvements are not made, the prospect of nuclear use will
increase.
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APPENDIX 1
Member States of the IAEA as of 1993
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Chile
China
Columbia
Costa Rica
Côte d’Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Denmark
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Gabon
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Holy See
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran, Islamic Republic of
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Korea, Democratic People’s
Republic of
Korea, Republic of
Kuwait
Lebanon
Liberia
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Madagascar
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritius
Mexico
Monaco
Mongolia
Morocco
Myanmar
Namibia
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Singapore
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Sweden
Switzerland
Syrian Arab Republic
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United Republic of Tanzania
United States of America
Uruguay
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yugoslavia
Zaire
Zambia
Zimbabwe
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Acronyms
ALN National Liberation Army
ANP National Popular Army
CCE Coodination and Enforcement Committee
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CTB Comprehensive Test Ban
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
DFLP Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
DOP Declaration of Principles
FIS Islamic Salvation Front
FLN Front de Liberation Nationale (National Liberation Front)
GIA Armed Islamic Group
GPRA Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
IAEC Israeli Atomic Energy Commission
IDF Israeli Defense Force
IFF Identity Friend or Foe
KAL Korean Air Lines
LABS Low Altitude Bombing System
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
NPT Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty
NSA Nuclear Safeguards Accord
NWFZ Nuclear Weapons Free Zone
PFLP Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PLO Palestinian Liberation Organization
PNE Peaceful Nuclear Explosives
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor
ROK Republic of Korea
SGN Saint-Gobain Techniques Nouvelles
SVR Russian Foreign Intelligence Service
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
WHO World Health Organization
